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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature addressing the euro adoption by the 
New Member States (NMSs) of the European Union by proposing a definition of 
real convergence based on real exchange rate (RER) dynamics. As fluctuations in 
RER represent deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP), the thesis also adds 
to the literature on PPP theory. Finally, by proposing basic and extended small open 
economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium international real business cycle 
(SOE-DSGE-IRBC) models of RER determinants for the NMSs, it fills a gap that 
has hitherto existed in the literature.  
 
The analysis of RER dynamics is conducted on two levels: empirical and theoretical. 
On the empirical level, the scale of RER dynamics in the NMSs is measured. Factors 
contributing to these dynamics are identified. Particular attention is drawn towards 
the factors which could account for the recorded appreciation of RER in these 
countries since the early 1990s. On a theoretical level, variants of the  
SOE-DSGE-IRBC model of RER determinants for a typical NMS are developed. 
 
The findings of Chapter 1 show that the univariate variance analysis accurately 
measures real convergence in the analysed countries. The results also indicate that at 
present, only Estonia and Slovenia (ex post) are ready to adopt the euro. The basic 
SOE model of Chapter 2, unlike its expanded version of Chapter 3, is only able to 
roughly match the moments of the Polish data. Therefore, its findings provide 
insights into the theoretical ‘puzzle’ of RER volatility and its persistence. The 
expanded model results show that productivity shocks to the non-traded sector are 
the main cause of price differentials between Poland and the euro area. This is in 
contrast to the two competing hypotheses that either productivity or quality 
improvements in the tradable sector are the main source of real exchange rate 
appreciation in this country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis analyses real exchange rate (RER) dynamics of the New Member States 
(NMSs) of the European Union (EU), and explores the implications of these 
dynamics for the entry of the NMSs into the eurozone. Analysis of RER dynamics is 
of course not a new topic. It goes back to Cassel’s (1918) analysis of purchasing 
power parity (PPP). It has given rise to a rich body of literature, among the most 
interesting aspects of which is the ‘puzzle’ of why fluctuations in real exchange rates 
are often very large and persistent compared with other macroeconomic variables, 
such as output for instance. This dissertation contributes to the literature on PPP on 
two levels: empirical and theoretical. On an empirical level, it attempts to measure 
the scale of the RER dynamics (with respect to the euro) in the NMSs of the EU, and 
to identify the factors contributing to these dynamics. On a theoretical level, and 
motivated by the empirical findings, it develops variants of the small open economy 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium international business cycle (SOE-DSGE-
IRBC) model to describe the RER determinants for a typical NMS of the EU 
– an approach hitherto absent in the literature for the EU NMSs. In so doing it helps 
to shed some light on what lies behind the ‘puzzle’ of large and persistent RER 
fluctuations.  
 
The relevance of RER dynamics in the context of the euro adoption by EU NMSs is 
better understood once the movements of the RER are viewed as an indicator of 
underlying economic conditions between a particular NMS and the eurozone. In this 
thesis it is argued that the scale of RER volatility (against the euro) can be a useful 
measure of the degree of real convergence understood as the degree of symmetry 
between these two economic zones. This is because the lower the degree of RER 
volatility due to real shocks, the greater is the extent of adjustment mechanisms at 
work other than the nominal exchange rate, and/or the lower is the exposure of the 
NMSs to asymmetric shocks, and/or the greater is the degree of symmetric monetary 
policy responses between the respective NMSs and the eurozone in response to 
symmetric shocks. Because in the European Monetary Union (EMU) (and any 
common currency area) the set of policy tools that can be used to mitigate the impact 
of arising asymmetries, is considerably reduced, the degree of asymmetry between 
the NMSs and the eurozone represents the cost of the euro adoption. Consequently, 
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since a less volatile RER indicates greater symmetry between economic zones, it 
also reduces the scope for monetary and exchange rate independence. 
 
The analysis of RER dynamics in the NMSs proposed in this dissertation is relevant 
both in the run-up to accession to the eurozone of these countries, and after accession 
has taken place. If the average eurozone inflation level at the launch of the expanded 
euro area is assumed to reflect an equilibrium, the degree of fluctuations of the intra 
eurozone real exchange rates (i.e. inflation dispersion) can be taken to reflect the 
degree of asymmetry between the eurozone average and its individual member 
states. As documented in the literature, these asymmetries are not negligible among 
the current eurozone members (see for example De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000), 
Andrés et al. (2006) or Altissimo et al. (2005)). Given that the NMSs have much 
lower price and income levels than the first eurozone entrants, it is unlikely that 
these asymmetries are going to disappear once the fixed nominal exchange rate (the 
euro) is introduced in these countries.  
 
Some have argued that one need not worry about large asymmetries between 
economies creating a common currency region (or thereafter). Since the RER is by 
definition the relative price of domestic and foreign production, changes to that price 
can play a stabilizing role even within a currency union (i.e. they can influence the 
balance of supply and demand between domestic and foreign goods and services). 
However, this is not necessarily the issue. The issue is not that the RER can adjust, 
but the different ways in which real exchange rates adjust inside and outside of a 
currency zone.  
 
The variation in the channels of possible adjustments in and outside a common 
currency area has different implications with different challenges. For example, a 
RER appreciation is needed in the presence of excess demand for home production 
in order to restore equilibrium. Under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes 
the expenditure-switching mechanism eventually restores the balance by re-directing 
demand towards foreign production and supply towards domestic markets (as 
predicted by Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch type models). The adjustment mechanism 
however depends on the exchange rate regime in place. Under the flexible regime, 
the required appreciation may happen (fully or partially) via movements in the 
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nominal exchange rate. In the situation when the nominal exchange rate cannot 
adjust, necessarily, all the pressure is put on the domestic price level, which, in this 
case, must increase, causing domestic inflation. Likewise, if a shock to external 
demand is negative, in the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustments, without 
immediate improvements in productivity, RER depreciation will have to be 
accommodated by declining wages and prices. This will result in unemployment and 
possible political tensions. Additionally, given frictions in prices and wages and in 
the absence of other flexible adjustment mechanisms, positive and negative external 
demand shocks can result in a prolonged period of RER misalignment and persistent 
regional disparities. Depending on the direction of the shock this situation could 
have negative implications for countries’ terms-of-trade (i.e., a drop in the price of 
commodities which is not accompanied by the immediate price change results in 
exporters’ losses).  
 
Of course there are also other types of shocks, such as internal demand shocks, 
which are probably better tackled with fiscal instruments. Nonetheless, fiscal policy 
is not always easily/promptly available, for political reasons. Besides, the choice of 
the adjustment mechanism depends on the nature of the shock and internal and 
external conditions. For instance, for catching-up economies like the NMSs, the right 
response to macroeconomic imbalances stemming from increases in internal demand 
might be to accept higher inflation accompanied by current and trade account deficit 
in anticipation of future surpluses as well as increases in real income, and not a fiscal 
contraction. Also, since the NMSs have high growth potential, they may run into the 
problem of overheating after reaching the equilibrium level of economic activity. To 
slow down, wage increases may be needed (see Blanchard (2001) on the Irish and 
Spanish case)1. 
 
This is not to say that RER volatility is necessarily a result of undesirable shocks, in 
which corrections are desirable. It can be an equilibrium phenomenon, a result of 
                                                
 
1
 One can argue (in line with R. McKinnon (2000)) that if macroeconomic shocks were themselves 
induced by poor policies, creating a currency area with another country or a group of countries would 
minimize those shocks (for example by imposing fiscal discipline). Nevertheless, the more similar the 
structures of economies wishing to formulate a currency union, the lower the likelihood that common 
shocks will have asymmetric rather than symmetric effects.   
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improvements in the tradable sector productivity (i.e., the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson (HBS) effect), improvements in equilibrium employment, capital 
accumulation, liberalisation of prices, or increases in the initially undervalued 
exchange rates, to name a few. These trends have been observed already (see 
Błaszkiewicz, et al. (2005)) and are likely to continue for quite some time in the 
NMSs, since these economies are characterised by relatively low income levels. If 
underlying changes in the domestic price level in these countries were only to mean 
higher steady state inflation and gradually appreciating equilibrium real exchange 
rates, then the appropriate policy would be again to accept them, since they are 
necessary for achieving higher standards of living.  
 
Overall, however, managing large real external or internal imbalances in countries 
with sizable asymmetric real shocks is likely to prove to be difficult, especially 
during the mandatory Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERMII) period prior to the euro 
adoption. This is because the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria requires 
simultaneous stabilisation of inflation and the nominal exchange rate, as well as a 
balanced budget. Meeting these conditions can be further complicated if they are 
coupled with large and volatile capital flows and credit booms. Under a common 
monetary policy, unless these asymmetries are absorbed, major trend movements in 
domestic wages and price levels can be expected. Clearly, where this is the case, 
there is a danger that monetary conditions set by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
will be too loose for the individual NMSs and thus not optimal. Moreover, assuming 
that the eurozone will have a fairly constant price level, and given that the real 
convergence process can be expected to continue for quite some time, large 
asymmetric changes in relative prices could have negative implications for price 
competitiveness2. Additionally, as shown by Canzoneri et al. (2008), who studied the 
interactions of twelve separate fiscal policies and the common monetary policy in 
the euro zone, the smaller eurozone countries seem to be at a particular disadvantage 
when compared with bigger members when the costs of asynchronised business 
                                                
 
2
 It is often argued that fixed exchange rates are beneficial for trade (see Rose (2000), Jeanne and 
Rose, (2002)). But trading companies still remain subject to the RER changes. Despite the fact that in 
the currency union they have more time to adjust to price changes (i.e., domestic prices tend to move 
more slowly than nominal exchange rates), volatile real exchange rates do change price 
competitiveness for exporting and importing companies. 
12 
 
cycles are calculated. This is because inflation rates in the larger countries show 
higher correlation with the aggregate euro area inflation to which the ECB reacts. 
Their calculations show that the welfare costs of business cycles can be up to four 
times higher in an "average-size" EMU country (to which the NMSs will be 
classified) than in a "large" one. 
 
From the above discussion, and given that the convergence process is already 
underway, the importance of the evaluation of the RER dynamics in the NMSs is 
clear. Even if real convergence is not a Maastricht criteria, it should be an important 
part of the analysis of the timing of the ERMII/EMU accession and should be an 
integral part of ERMII/ EMU monitoring and decision making. Understanding RER 
dynamics is also important from the point of view of equilibrium exchange rate 
analysis. Once NMSs are in the eurozone, the analysis of their exchange rate 
dynamics will help identify the need for structural adjustments and should inform the 
conduct of a macroeconomic policy.  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis further discusses the importance of RER variability for the 
euro decision making process, proposes a definition of real convergence in terms of 
RER volatility, and sets out an analysis of the degree of this convergence between 
the selected NMSs and the euro area. As a part of the analysis, the degree of real 
convergence in the NMSs is compared with the degree of real convergence achieved 
by the selected Old Member States (OMSs) of the EU in the onset of the euro 
introduction. To quantify RER volatility in the New and Old Member States of the 
EU, as well as to assess whether the NMSs are converging over time in real terms, a 
two-step variance analysis is performed. The two-step variance analysis is necessary 
as there exists no uniform econometric methodology which would allow for an 
adequate measure of RER volatility (and thus the measure of real convergence) due 
to real shocks only. There are various ways the volatility can be measured. In this 
study, in step one, the univariate variance analysis of real exchange rates in countries 
of interest is performed. The AR(p) and AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) econometric 
methodologies are used to measure the degree of RER volatility3. To separate and 
                                                
 
3
 AR(p) refers to the autoregressive model of order p. GARCH(p,q) refers to generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model of order p and q (p is the order of autoregressive 
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measure the magnitude of real and nominal components in real exchange rate 
movements, in step two, a bivariate variance analysis is conducted. It utilises a 
structural vector autoregression methodology with a Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
decomposition (BQ-SVAR). Given that BQ-SVAR methodology cannot measure the 
overall degree of RER volatility, in the context of the proposed definition of real 
convergence, it necessarily complements the univariate analysis. Moreover, to the 
extent that giving up an independent monetary and exchange rate policy can 
constitute a cost of the euro adoption, a BQ-SVAR analysis also facilities the 
assessment of the role of the nominal exchange rate in the NMSs in accommodating 
real asymmetric shocks. The results of the two-step variance analysis indicate that: 
(i) real asymmetric shocks are significant when compared with those experienced by 
the poorer Old Member States of the European Union in their accession to the 
eurozone; (ii) nominal exchange rates, in general, do play a stabilising role in the 
NMSs; and that (iii) nominal shocks, on average, do not move real exchange rates. 
Therefore, based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, it appears that among the 
NMSs, at present, only Estonia and Slovenia (already in the eurozone) are ready to 
give up monetary and exchange rate independence.   
 
Chapters 2 and 3 present an analysis of RER dynamics in the SOE-DSGE 
framework. A special emphasis is put on investigating the sources of RER 
appreciation recorded by the NMSs since the early 1990s (see Figure A.1.1 in  
Annex A.1). To strengthen the theoretical investigation, more data analysis on the 
possible RER determinants is provided in both chapters. Although this part of the 
dissertation focuses on Poland (i.e. the additional empirical investigation and the 
models’ calibration are done for Poland), given structural similarities among the 
NMSs and the stylised character of proposed models, they have much broader 
application.  
 
The objective of Chapter 2 is two-fold. First, given Chapter 1’s findings that nominal 
shocks, on average, do not move real exchange rates in the NMSs, the chapter 
examines the nature of real determinants of RER movements in these countries. This 
                                                                                                                                      
 
GARCH terms, and q is the order of moving average autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) terms). 
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is important, as – given the existing real asymmetries - these real determinants need 
to be better understood if progress in real convergence is to be achieved. Second, 
Chapter 2 seeks to match the RER variability and its appreciation observed in the 
NMSs. To meet these objectives, a basic, one sector, flexible price and wage SOE-
DSGE IRBC model with monopolistic competition and complete market is 
developed4.  
 
The one sector model is used for two reasons. First, in his influential work, Engel 
(1999) demonstrated that the bulk of RER movements can be accounted for by the 
movements of relative prices of tradable goods between countries – the so-called 
external real exchange rate channel. As pointed out by Vilagi (2005), because of 
market segmentation, the lack of empirical support for PPP, and the correlation 
between nominal and real exchange rates, this is the more traditional approach to 
modelling real exchange rate misalignments within the DSGE framework (or more 
precisely, New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)). Second, even if in the 
NMSs appreciating real exchange rates are often discussed in the context of the HBS 
effect (i.e. the internal RER movements), the empirical relevance of this effect is 
mixed (see Egert (2002), Błaszkiewicz, et al. (2005), Mihaljek and Klau (2004), 
Wagner (2005))5. Moreover, as will be shown in the body of Chapter 2, there is 
evidence of strong export performance in the NMSs, which is combined with terms-
of-trade improvements, increased export unit values and quantities exported. These 
trends suggest that in the NMSs the external and not internal RER may be more 
important in real exchange rate developments. In particular, the observed trends 
point to the quality factor as an important determinant of RER improvements (see 
also Egert and Lommatzsch (2004), Lommatzsch and Tober (2004),  
Hanousek and Filer (2004) or Broeck and Slok (2006) discussed 
in Chapter 2).  
 
                                                
 
4
 The reasons why the models of Chapter 2 and 3 do not include nominal rigidities or monetary 
disturbances is discussed in the body of Chapter 2. 
5
 For the detailed exposition of the HBS effect see Błaszkiewicz et al. (2005). In short, the HBS effect 
predicts that productivity improvements in the tradable sector, via wage equalisation, lead to price 
increases in the nontradable sector. This appreciates the ratio of the domestic prices of tradables to 
non-tradables relative to the same ratio abroad (the so-called internal real exchange rate) and leads to 
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To the extent that quality changes might be responsible for RER dynamics in the 
NMSs, the model put forward in Chapter 2 includes home bias in consumption and 
exogenous quality factor. A home bias channel captures the shift in consumer 
preferences towards higher quality products and thus looks at the effect of quality 
changes on the RER from the demand side. An exogenous quality factor captures the 
supply side. The home bias channel in the one sector, flexible price, model is crucial 
as it breaks PPP, allowing for real exchange rate fluctuations. It also diminishes the 
expenditure-switching mechanism, adding to real exchange rate persistence.  
 
The model developed in Chapter 2 and calibrated to the Polish economy (chosen as a 
representative NMS for the purposes of calibration) shows that the main RER 
determinants are quality and productivity shocks (although a consumption preference 
shock also matters). The observed RER appreciation (as evident for Poland and other 
NMSs) is indeed possible when the economy is hit by a shock that improves the 
quality of domestically produced goods. Positive changes to productivity bring about 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the fit of the model in terms of the 
key moments of the Polish data, depends on the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign tradable goods. The model best matches the data when the value of 
this elasticity is very low. Surprisingly, the basic SOE-DSGE IRBC model performs 
reasonably well in delivering a persistent RER.  
 
Chapter 3 builds on the SOE-DSGE IRBC model developed in Chapter 2 by adding 
a number of additional mechanisms to improve the model performance in terms of 
matching the moments of the Polish data. These mechanisms include a nontradable 
sector, a distribution sector and incomplete risk-sharing. The nontradable sector is 
integrated into the model because even if the empirical significance of the HBS 
effect in real exchange rate movements in the NMSs is mixed, the studies cited 
above do agree that it is not insignificant. Moreover, as will be shown in the body of 
the chapter, the limited relevance of the HBS effect in the NMSs may be related to 
measurement problems. Also, Burstein et al. (2005) point out that Engel’s (1999) 
measures do not separate the distribution component of tradable good prices. When 
these authors adjust traded goods prices for a tradable component, they find that 
around 50 percent of real exchange rate movements should be attributable to the 
movements in the relative price of nontraded goods. Therefore, adding not only the 
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nontradable but also distribution sector into the model is of relevance. The 
distribution sector also allows deviations from the law of one price for baskets of 
goods that are traded. This is important as these deviations play a large role in real 
exchange rate fluctuations (see, for example, Betts and Kehoe (2006)). Finally, 
incomplete risk-sharing allows for another channel of possible real exchange rate 
fluctuations, namely the impact of international payments on the real exchange rate 
(e.g. Corsetti et al. (2007), Benigno and Theonissen (2006), Selaive and Tuesta 
(2006)).  
 
The expanded model is able to account for the main features of the Polish data and 
captures the dynamics of RER movements. The model’s ability to replicate the RER 
volatility and persistence observed in the Polish data, without resorting to nominal 
rigidities and monetary shocks, confirms the importance of real factors in driving 
real exchange rates in Poland (and other NMSs). Moreover, this is achieved without 
using unrealistically low values of elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign tradable goods.  
 
Also, in Chapter 3, the model responds to a positive tradable productivity shock that 
generates the RER appreciation consistent with the HBS theory and positive wealth 
effects6. Capturing the HBS-like effect in the two-sector DSGE framework is not an 
easy task. This is because, in this type of model, a positive productivity shock 
typically causes a terms-of-trade depreciation, which offsets an appreciation caused 
by the HBS effect (or HBS and positive wealth effects if markets are incomplete). To 
the author’s best knowledge, there are no models which are able to show this in the 
small open economy framework – the contribution of this chapter. It is also shown, 
however, that the RER appreciation in response to the positive tradable productivity 
shocks depends on the value of elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign tradable goods and on the value of the parameter governing bond holding 
costs. The value of the parameter governing bond holding costs is also a decisive 
                                                
 
6
 Note that for the HBS effect to hold various assumptions must be satisfied. For example, the law of 
one price (LOOP) must hold, sectoral wages must equalize, domestic and foreign tradable goods 
should be close substitutes, etc. Unless these are met, what is often called the HBS effect should be 
understood as the impact of a positive productivity shock in the tradable sector on the internal real 
exchange rate.  
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factor in generating RER appreciation in response to the quality shock, i.e., RER 
appreciates only when these costs are low. To this end, the chapter’s findings point 
towards the importance of the current account channel in RER modelling. 
Nonetheless, when variance decomposition is performed, the results indicate that 
neither asymmetric tradable productivity nor quality shocks account for the RER 
movements in Poland. Instead, as in Altissimo et al. (2005), the main determinants of 
RER movements are nontradable productivity shocks.  
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CHAPTER 1 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: A MEASURE OF REAL 
CONVERGENCE IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN EURO 
AREA ACCESSION COUNTRIES 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2004 eight Central and Eastern European Countries acceded to the European 
Union and at the same time became active members of the third stage of the EMU7. 
By doing so, they committed to participate in the ERMII), and eventually adopt a 
common European currency, the euro. The basis on which these countries time their 
accession to the ERMII and adopt the euro is of considerable policy importance, and 
the focus of this chapter.  
 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the binding criteria for these eight NMSs into the 
eurozone are exclusively described in nominal terms8. However, the fulfilment of 
Maastricht criteria by no means ensures that the NMSs will enjoy the net benefits of 
the monetary union. The extent to which the NMSs will benefit from giving up their 
monetary and exchange rate independence, in addition to the broader issue of the 
sound functioning of the enlarged eurozone, is generally discussed in terms of real 
factors, in particular, the degree of real convergence between the NMSs and the 
participating euro area countries.    
 
This chapter proposes a definition of real convergence in terms of real exchange rate 
volatility and sets out an analysis of the degree of this convergence between the 
selected NMSs and the euro area. As a part of the analysis, the degree of real 
convergence in the NMSs is compared with the degree of real convergence achieved 
                                                
 
7
 These were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia. Although during the time of writing Slovakia and Slovenia joined the eurozone (in 
January 2009 and January 2007, respectively), they were left in the sample for comparative purposes.   
8
 Maastricht criteria relate to the nominal exchange rate, the budget, public debt, inflation rate and 
long-term interest rates. 
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by the selected OMSs of the EU at the onset of the euro introduction. To quantify 
RER volatility in the New and Old Member States of the EU, as well as to assess 
whether the NMSs are converging over time in real terms, a two-step variance 
analysis is performed. The two-step variance analysis is necessary as there exists no 
uniform econometric methodology which would allow for the adequate measure of 
RER volatility (and thus the measure of real convergence) due to real shocks only. 
There are various ways the volatility can be measured. In this study, in step one, the 
univariate variance analysis of real exchange rates in countries of interest is 
performed. The AR(p) and AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) econometric methodologies are 
used to measure the degree of RER volatility. To separate and measure the 
magnitude of real and nominal components in real exchange rate movements, in step 
two, a bivariate variance analysis is conducted. It utilises a structural vector 
autoregression methodology with a Blanchard and Quah (1989) decomposition. 
Given that BQ-SVAR methodology cannot measure the overall degree of RER 
volatility, in the context of the proposed definition of real convergence, it necessarily 
complements the univariate analysis. Moreover, to the extent that giving up an 
independent monetary and exchange rate policy can constitute a cost of the euro 
adoption, a BQ-SVAR analysis also facilities an assessment of the role of the 
nominal exchange rate in the NMSs in accommodating real asymmetric shocks. The 
results indicate that: (i) real asymmetric shocks are significant when compared with 
those experienced by the poorer OMSs of the European Union in their accession to 
the eurozone; (ii) nominal exchange rates, in general, do play a stabilising role in the 
NMSs; and that (iii) nominal shocks, on average, do not move real exchange rates. 
Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, it appears that among the NMSs, at 
present, only Estonia and Slovenia (ex post) are ready to give up monetary and 
exchange rate independence.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Part 1.2 proposes the novel 
definition of real convergence, explains its usefulness as a measure of the degree of 
real convergence in the NMSs, discusses its pros and cons and finally explains the 
econometric techniques used to measure it. Part 1.3 analyses the choice of the 
sample and data properties, including recent developments of nominal and real 
exchange rates, as well as prices in the NMSs, the evolution of exchange rate 
regimes, and data integration properties. Part 1.4 sets out and explains 
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methodologies utilised in the univariate estimation of nominal and real exchange rate 
variances, as well as in the BQ-SVAR model, which is used to identify two 
structural shocks (i.e., temporary and permanent). Part 1.5 presents the results. Part 
1.6 concludes. 
 
1.2 REAL CONVERGENCE: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT  
There is no generally accepted indicator of real convergence. The European 
Commission itself, in various contexts, refers to such indicators as the balance of 
payment position, and to financial and product market integration (Convergence 
Report 2004). Other research papers (Frankel (2004), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004), 
Kočenda et. al (2006)) focus on narrowing gaps of productivity or real income 
between respective countries and the euro area average, or concentrate on the 
correlation of business cycles. 
 
This chapter proposes a definition of real convergence which is based on real 
exchange rate volatility, i.e., it measures the degree of real convergence between a 
particular NMS and the eurozone in terms of real exchange rate variances (standard 
deviations). These variances are then compared with the averages estimated for the 
selected group of OMS in years preceding the creation of the eurozone. While real 
exchange rate volatility analysis is not new, and in the context of optimal currency 
areas goes back to Vaubel (1976, 1978), to the best of the author’s knowledge it has 
not yet been explicitly applied as a measure of real convergence.  
 
What makes the scale of real exchange rate volatility a useful measure of the degree 
of real convergence? Real exchange rate volatility reflects underlying economic 
conditions in a number of ways. Under the assumptions of price and wage rigidity, 
the magnitude of real exchange rate volatility between a particular NMS and the 
eurozone captures:  
 
• The extent to which flexible adjustment mechanisms affecting relative prices 
exist in that NMS, other than the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the degree to 
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which real exchange rates react to real asymmetric shocks). Such 
mechanisms might include, inter alia, factor mobility, fiscal policy, and the 
flexibility and shock-absorbing capacity of the financial sector.   
 
• The degree to which the real exchange rate between the NMS and the 
eurozone is exposed to real asymmetric shocks. The degree of this symmetry 
would in turn depend on the similarities in price levels and GDP per capita, 
labour mobility, the synchronisation of business cycles, structural 
similarities, convergence of the interest rate differential between that NMS 
and the eurozone, the degree of trade openness and trade diversification of 
that NMS, the degree of stability in terms of trade, and financial market 
integration. 
 
• The degree to which monetary policies in the NMS and the eurozone react 
symmetrically to symmetric shocks.  
 
The lower the degree of real exchange rate volatility, the greater the extent of 
adjustment mechanisms other than the nominal exchange rate, and/or the lower the 
exposure of the NMS to asymmetric shocks, and/or the greater is the degree of 
symmetric monetary policy responses between the respective NMSs and the 
eurozone in response to symmetric shocks.    
 
The existence of flexible adjustment mechanisms other than the nominal exchange 
rate, in the onset of unexpected real shocks, allows smooth tuning of macroeconomic 
imbalances, limiting the need for an exchange rate’s adjustments. Given that 
symmetric shocks do not require adjustments in relative prices, they do not distort 
equilibrium. Consequently, a less volatile real exchange rate indicates less scope for 
monetary and exchange rate independence. These economic conditions, which 
guarantee a more stable real exchange rate, are also traditional arguments behind the 
successful creation of optimal currency areas (Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), 
Kenen (1969))9. 
                                                
 
9
 The traditional arguments however have not gone unchallenged. Based on Mundell (1973), it has 
been argued that if members of a currency zone are financially integrated, then a high degree of 
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An additional advantage of the proposed definition of real convergence is that the 
real exchange rate volatility criterion does not depend on the exchange rate regime in 
place, nor on the fact that a system actually chosen is optimal for the country. It only 
relies on the assumption that national price stability is desirable, and that therefore 
the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate may be justified to avoid changes in the 
real exchange rate that entail inflation or deflation above or below the eurozone 
average.  
 
However, without empirically verifying the shock-absorbing role of a nominal 
exchange rate it is not possible to assess to what extent giving up monetary and 
exchange rate independence actually constitutes a cost of euro adoption, and to what 
extent nominal flexibility facilitates convergence. Even if the analysis showed that a 
high degree of real exchange rate volatility is due to real shocks, the only inference 
one is able to convincingly draw - based on the proposed definition – is that it is not 
yet advisable to join ERMII or the eurozone (or both)10. Given the nature of the 
shock and the catching-up process in the NMSs, in many ways such a conclusion 
could be sufficient (i.e., it may be that the only appropriate way to move these 
countries to higher income levels is exactly via higher inflation, implying that these 
countries should not rush to give up their own currencies). Nevertheless, this 
conclusion could be further reinforced were one able to empirically confirm the 
nominal exchange rate’s theoretical ability to induce rapid adjustments in the onset 
of idiosyncratic real shocks. Where this is the case, it would be possible to argue that 
the nominal exchange rate is an important channel for the real exchange rate 
changes, and thus plays a positive role during the convergence process (i.e., 
stabilises real shocks in the absence of other adjustment mechanisms and sluggish 
prices). Losing this instrument represents the cost of the monetary integration and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
symmetry of the shocks among them, although desirable, is no longer a prerequisite. This is because, 
in a currency area, asymmetric shocks can be smoothed through risk sharing – i.e. through portfolio 
diversification and pooling of foreign exchange reserves (see Błaszkiewicz-Schwartzman and 
Woźniak (2005) for an overview of this literature). However, the risk-sharing argument does not 
change the fact that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, fewer asymmetric shocks call for a smaller 
need to adjust, and that giving up monetary and exchange rate independence represents a cost of 
monetary unification. This remains the basis of the approach set out in this paper. 
10
 Eichengreen (1991) argues that real exchange rate variance analysis is not able to distinguish 
between the size of a shock and the ability to cope with it. Even if his argument were true, here it is 
argued that it does not matter if the volatility is high due to the degree of asymmetry or because the 
absorbing potential of other adjustment mechanisms is low. The outcome is the same: it is costly to 
join the common currency area.  
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can have negative implications for countries’ economic performance11. Of course, if 
this role is not confirmed, given high real asymmetries, recommendations on the 
timing of ERMII/ euro area accession would not change. Unless greater real 
convergence is achieved it may be too costly to share a common monetary policy. 
Still, it would be also obvious that since shocks cannot be addressed by monetary 
policy, the only way to achieve real convergence is via implementation of structural 
reforms. Moreover, if the nominal exchange rate did not play a shock-stabilising 
role, the scale of real shock asymmetry would indicate the degree of flexibility of 
other adjustment mechanisms (i.e. labour mobility or real wages)12.  
 
The analysis of real convergence developed in this chapter builds on two strands of 
empirical literature with roots in the early theory of optimal currency areas (OCAs). 
The first of these focuses on the degree of real asymmetry between countries or 
regions wishing to constitute currency areas (Vaubel (1976, 1978), von Hagen and 
Neumann (1994), Gros and Hobza (2003), Błaszkiewicz-Schwartzman and Woźniak 
(2005)). The second strand of empirical literature attempts to test the main 
assumption of the OCA theory, and detect whether exchange rate flexibility is a 
significant stabilizer of real asymmetric shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), 
Clarida and Gali (1994), Canzoneri et al., (1996) in the context of developed 
countries, and Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) and Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) in the 
context of the NMSs). All these papers utilise standard assumptions of open 
macroeconomy sticky-price models in the spirit of Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch, to 
                                                
 
11
 Whether or not exchange rates serve as effective shock stabilisers depends to a large extent on the 
price strategies governing firms’ decisions (as stressed by New Open Economy Macro Models). For 
example, under conditions of local-currency-pricing, nominal currency changes would not change 
either real or nominal prices in the short run. However, in the context of the NMSs this is unlikely to 
be the case. Were it the case, observed real exchange rate volatility would have to be induced by 
market incompleteness and exporters’ ability to discriminate against different markets, requiring that 
relative prices stay constant. Yet in the NMSs, inflation rates fell dramatically during the 1990s. (See 
also Engel (2002), who shows that if importer-distributors face pass-through to import-prices, then 
some flexibility may be still desirable. Similarly, Obstfeld (2002) provides empirical evidence that 
there is still an important role for exchange rate flexibility to play in changing relative prices). 
Therefore, it is probably fair to assume that nominal exchange rates are not totally ‘disconnected’ 
from the real economy in the NMSs and - at least to a certain degree - are able to provide 
equilibrating real exchange rate adjustments. 
12
 Buiter (2000) emphasizes that the decision to join a monetary union, is a monetary issue. If prices 
of goods are flexible, relative-price behaviour is usually independent of the monetary regime. The 
choice of monetary regime only matters for short-run changes – the period during which nominal 
prices are adjusting. In this paper it is however argued that in the context of catching-up economies 
this decision does depend on the degree of real convergence, as the only way to reach higher income 
levels is via higher than the eurozone average growth rates, and thus inflation.   
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classify shocks in different SVAR systems. In common with this first strand of 
literature, this chapter focuses on real exchange rate volatility. In common with the 
second strand of literature, this chapter attempts to separate shocks governing 
movements of real and nominal exchange rates into their nominal and real 
components, and to detect the responses of nominal exchange rates to different types 
of disturbances.  
 
The chapter uses a two-step univariate / bivariate econometric methodology. In step 
one, the univariate variance approach measures the degree (magnitude) of 
unexpected real exchange rate variance, and thus the degree of real convergence13. In 
step two, the bivariate approach utilizes a BQ-SVAR analysis to identify nominal 
and real factors driving real and nominal exchange rate movements. The BQ-SVAR 
methodology also allows for an analysis of the potentially stabilising role of nominal 
exchange rates and thus an assessment of the cost of euro adoption. The two-stage 
strategy is necessary for two reasons. First, it is essential for the accurate 
measurement of real convergence. This is because, as mentioned, the univariate 
variance approach cannot convincingly distinguish between nominal and real shocks 
in real exchange rate movements, and therefore by itself is not well designed to 
accurately assess the degree of real convergence. Therefore, the BQ-SVAR 
methodology is used to separate and measure the magnitudes of real and nominal 
components in real exchange rate movements. Second, the BQ-SVAR approach 
provides an indication of the shock-stabilising role that the nominal exchange rate 
plays in any NMS – i.e. the methodology establishes if the nominal exchange rate 
indeed responds to asymmetric real shocks, and moves together and in the same 
direction as the real exchange rate in order to ensure the necessary change in relative 
prices. Thus, the BQ-SVAR analysis makes it possible to assess to what extent 
giving up monetary and exchange rate independence actually constitutes a cost of the 
euro adoption, and to what extent nominal flexibility facilitates real convergence. 
 
While the BQ-SVAR analysis conducted in this chapter provides results useful to the 
policy questions raised by the prospect of the euro adoption, it is not without 
                                                
 
13
 Since there are various ways in which the degree of RER volatility can be measured, the final 
choice of the econometric methodology implemented in this paper is discussed in section 1.4.1. 
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limitations, noted below. The broad decomposition of shocks into real and nominal 
components is both a strength and weakness. On one hand, the methodology does 
indicate whether or not nominal exchange rates move in the same direction as real 
exchange rates at the onset of a real shock, pointing to the stabilising role of the 
nominal exchange rate. On the other hand, it is not able to assess fully the 
destabilising role of the nominal exchange rate at the onset of the nominal shock. 
Even if the ex-post data revealed that variations in the nominal exchange rate were 
caused by a different type of shock to variations in the real rate, this could not be 
conclusively interpreted as an indication of the ineffectiveness of the nominal 
exchange rate to stabilise nominal shocks. An equivalently valid explanation could 
be that a nominal exchange rate fully cushioned the impact of a nominal shock on a 
relative price. This argument could be even stronger, given that nominal shocks 
represent a whole range of temporary shocks, such as supply, demand or monetary 
and financial shocks14. The only inference one would be able to make from such a 
result, would be that neither monetary policy nor fiscal policy can change 
competitiveness of a given country (and vice-versa, provided nominal shocks turned 
out to be important in real and nominal exchange rate movements). However, to the 
extent that the primary interest of this chapter is to assess the importance of 
permanent movements in the real exchange rate, and the potential role of flexible 
regimes in stabilising permanent shocks (i.e., demand and supply shocks related to 
the convergence process) this decomposition is sufficient.    
 
Although some of the existing empirical literature with roots in the early theory of 
OCA does focus on the NMSs of the EU, their goals and analytical tools are 
different to the one set out in this study. For example, Gros and Hobza (2003) 
measure an observed rather than unexpected real and nominal exchange rate 
variability as an alternative OCA criterion for the NMSs (or rather the candidate EU 
countries). Based on their analysis they come to the conclusion that the still 
remaining variability of real exchange rates in Central Europe might be mostly due 
                                                
 
14
 The same arguments apply to the 3-equation VAR system, and therefore the estimation of such a 
system would also fail to fully resolve the question of whether flexible exchange rates are 
destabilizing or not. It is true that a three-variable SVAR model distinguishes between demand and 
supply shocks (which the bivariate system cannot), but again its identification specification is not able 
to unambiguously separate between impact of the temporary supply and monetary/financial shocks on 
the short-run behaviour of the nominal exchange rate.  
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to the fact that nominal exchange rates are still a source of shocks. However, they do 
not formally separate the shocks that affect the real and nominal exchange rates. 
Their conclusion is based on the fact that nominal exchange rates are more volatile 
than real rates. The problem with this kind of analysis is that it is not possible to 
detect whether the real and nominal exchange rates are governed by the same or 
different types of shocks. It also says nothing about the stabilizing role of nominal 
exchange rates.  
 
Although, Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) also utilize a two-dimensional BQ-SVAR 
methodology (on a differenced real exchange rate and prices) in investigating the 
sources of real exchange rate movements in Hungary and Poland, the aim of their 
paper differs from the one pursued here15. The authors examine the proposition that 
different fiscal and monetary policies in transition countries should lead to the 
predominance of real shocks in some countries, but nominal shocks in others and 
covers the period between 1990 and 1999. Their results suggest that during that time 
the Polish real exchange rate was mainly driven by nominal shocks (in the short-run) 
whereas the Hungarian real exchange rate was driven by real shocks. However, the 
span of their sample includes a period of little nominal exchange rate flexibility and 
therefore cannot address the issues discussed in this chapter. Also, they do not 
measure the size of real exchange rate volatility and therefore, based on their paper, 
very little insight about the process of real convergence can be gleaned.  
 
Finally, in a paper by Borghijs and Kuijs (2004), an investigation is made of whether 
for five NMSs - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia -  nominal exchange rate flexibility is a useful absorber of real shocks or an 
unhelpful propagator of monetary and financial shocks. The authors work within a 
three-equation model in the spirit of Clarida and Gali (1994), and answer similar 
questions to Canzoneri et al. (1996), but their SVAR model includes a nominal 
exchange rate instead of prices, since they argue that the loss of nominal exchange 
rate flexibility is the key cost of euro area participation. However, as pointed out 
above, the role of the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber is only relevant if 
                                                
 
15
 The papers which identify sources of nominal and real exchange rates fluctuations within the 
bivariate BQ-SVAR models in developed countries include, among others, the works of Lastrapes 
(1992) and Enders and Lee (1997). 
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there are large real asymmetries between the economies wishing to form a common 
currency zone – the issue addressed in this chapter. This is because even if a nominal 
exchange rate were not addressing macroeconomic imbalances and its movements 
were only a reflection of money and financial market shocks, one could not say that 
there is no cost from losing monetary and exchange rate independence.    
 
Application of the two-step methodology proposed here, and as described in more 
detail in sections below, suggests that real asymmetric shocks (i.e., the degree of real 
exchange rate volatility scaled down for the presence of nominal shocks) in the 
NMSs (with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia) outsize those experienced by 
OMSs at the time of their euro adoption process. This finding suggests that the 
NMSs are still converging in real terms on the basis of the proposed indicator. 
Additionally, it is found that in the NMSs the nominal exchange rate does play a 
stabilising role (with the exception of Slovenia), and that nominal shocks do not, on 
average, move real exchange rates. Given that the benefits of monetary union are not 
immediately obvious at present, some caution should be exercised in timing the 
ERMII accession and euro adoption. 
 
1.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The rationale for the choice of countries used in the sample, as well as the sample 
time span for both the univariate and bivariate analysis, are set out below. Since the 
data employed in the study should be stationary, the recent evolution is discussed of 
the real and nominal exchange rate against the euro as well as price movements in 
the selected countries, as a pre-step towards detecting integration properties of the 
data. Finally, formal unit root tests are conducted.   
 
1.3.1 Sample Choice and Size 
The NMSs analysed in this study include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The sample for 
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inclusion in the two step univariate / bivariate methodology used in this chapter 
gives rise to the following issues: 
 
• First, while all NMSs can be included in the univariate sample (i.e., because 
of a real exchange rate flexibility), bivariate SVAR analysis (with real and 
nominal exchange rates) can only be applied to countries with relatively 
flexible nominal exchange rates. As a result, not all the countries included in 
the univariate analysis were included in the bivariate analysis.  
 
• Second, countries included in the SVAR analysis must have de facto variable 
exchange rates. In some cases, de facto exchange rates differ from officially 
announced exchange rate regimes. In order to distinguish between different 
exchange rate regimes, officially announced exchange rate arrangements (as 
published by the IMF) were cross-checked with the classification developed 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002)16. According to both classification schemes, 
the exchange rates of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia may be regarded as relatively flexible exchange rates. 
The exchange rates of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are regarded as fixed, 
and could not be included in the bivariate SVAR analysis17. Box 1.1  reviews 
the evolution of nominal exchange rate regimes in the five NMSs which may 
be regarded as having flexible exchange rates.  
 
• Third, meaningful structural analysis requires sufficiently long data span. 
Unfortunately, for countries under consideration, reliable data only exists 
from the beginning of the 1990s. As a result, for the univariate analysis the 
estimation period spans 1993M1 to 2007M11. Prior to this period, the data is 
contaminated by structural changes related to the transition process. The data 
span used for the bivariate analysis is based on the de facto flexible exchange 
rate regime in place, as described in Box 1.1.  
 
                                                
 
16
 Because Reinhart and Rogoff’s study goes to December 2001, exchange rate regimes between 
2001M12 and 2007M11 were classified in accordance with the IMF code.   
17
 From now on, whenever the reference is made to the de facto exchange rate regime, it refers to 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification.  
29 
 
Box 1.1 Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Choice of Sample Size). 
In the Czech Republic, exchange rate flexibility was limited before 1996. Initially the official 
exchange rate was tied to a currency basket and then to the ECU. De facto, however, the country 
had a crawling band system around the DM (with a band width of ±2%). More flexibility was 
introduced in May 1997. The Czech koruna was officially classified as a pre-announced crawling 
band around the DM with a band width of ± 7.5% (de facto the band width was ±5%). Because, 
between 1993M1 and 1996M3, the official regime was less flexible than indicated by the de 
facto regime, the final sample for the Czech Republic spans from 1996M3 to 2007M11.   
 
In Hungary, until December 1998, the exchange rate regime was a de facto crawling band around 
the DM, with a band width of ±5%, until May 1994, and ±2% between May 1994 and January 
1999. From January 1999 to December 2001, the exchange rate was de facto classified as a pre-
announced crawling band around the euro. Officially, more flexibility was introduced in May 
2001. The crawling band was widened from ±2.25% to ±15%. While more official flexibility 
was announced in 2001, it is not possible to conduct analysis on so few data points. Given this, 
and the fact that there was already some flexibility before 2001, the estimation period used for 
Hungary covers the years 1993M1-2007M11.  
 
The sample size for Poland starts in June 1995 since before that a de facto exchange rate regime 
was either classified as freely falling (i.e., period of hyperinflation) or dual market. From mid-
May 1995 up to February 1998, the de facto regime was classified as a crawling band around the 
euro (ECU) with a band width of ±5%; there was a pre-announced crawling band around the DM 
and the US dollar of ±7%. Between February 1998 and April 2000, the band width was 
systematically widened (up to ±15%). In April 2000, a float was introduced (i.e., a de facto 
managed float). The regime has not changed since then. The final sample size spans 1995M6 to 
2007M11. 
 
In Slovakia exchange rate flexibility was introduced gradually. Between 1993M1 and 1996M7, 
the currency was de facto governed by a crawling band regime around the DM with a band width 
of ±2%. The band width did not change up to September 1997, but between August 1996 and 
September 1997 the pre-announced crawling band was progressively widened to ±7%. As of 
September 1997, de facto the band was widened to ±5% and a pre-announced crawling band of 
±7% was maintained. Even though the managed float system was introduced in October 1998, 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff, between October 1998 and December 2001, all the 
observations remained within a ±5% band of DM/euro. Taking into account policy changes in 
the exchange rate regime, the estimation period starts in 1996M8 and ends in 2007M11.  
 
Between the years 1993 and 2004, the nominal exchange rate in Slovenia was governed by a de 
facto crawling band around either the DM, or euro with a band width of ±2% (euro/ECU 
replaced DM in October 1996). From June 2004 Slovenia has been participating in the ERMII 
system in which the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate by ±15%. Unfortunately, the period of 
greater de jure flexibility is not long enough to perform the estimation. Therefore, estimation 
based on data spanning 1993M4 to 2006M12 has been used (before April 1993 a de facto regime 
was classified as freely falling; Slovenia adopted the euro on January 1 2007). The final results, 
however, are presented for the period 1996M1 to 2006M12 (this relates to issues of 
heteroskedasticity, and will be discussed in further depth below). 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and the IMF classification. 
 
The sample of current euro area countries chosen for comparison with the NMSs 
includes Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain (the so-called Club Med countries) as well 
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as France and Germany. The Club Med countries are regarded as belonging to the 
periphery of the EU, while France and Germany are chosen to represent the core of 
the EU. The span of data for chosen eurozone countries runs from January 1993 to 
December 1998 (nominal (and real) exchange rates for the OMSs are calculated 
against the ECU, which was replaced by the euro at a rate of 1:1 on 1 January 1999). 
This choice reflects the following two factors: First, 1993 marks the end of the 
European Monetary System, which allowed nominal exchange rates to fluctuate 
within a band of +/-15 percent. This ensures minimum policy coordination between 
countries and is important for comparative purposes. Data after December 1998 is 
not considered, as for the purposes of this study, the performance of countries after 
their entry into the eurozone in January 1999 is not of interest.  
 
Unfortunately, the only country within this selected group with a de facto floating 
exchange rate regime was Germany (according to the Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
classification). Nevertheless, because between 1993 and 1998 the Club Med 
countries as well as France adopted some kind of peg or crawling band regime 
against the DM, at the same time fluctuating freely around the ECU, they are all 
included in the SVAR modelling. 
 
1.3.2 Data Source and Transformation 
For all NMSs, monthly data on period average nominal exchange rates, against the 
euro, up to November 2007 were sourced from Eurostat. Eurostat also provided data 
for the former eurozone national currencies vs. euro (ecu) considered in the sample 
as well as the euro area consumer price index (HICP). Consumer price indices 
(CPIs) for the New and Old Member States were taken from the IMF IFS18. All 
series were transformed into logarithms, and scaled with the base period set to 100 in 
2005 for the NMSs, and to 1995 for the OMSs. The individual real exchange rate 
indices were calculated as nominal NMS (OMS)/euro rates, deflated by the relevant 
consumer price indices (i.e. CPI for NMSs and OMSs, and HICP for 
the eurozone) 19. 
                                                
 
18
 HICP indices for NMSs are not available over the time period estimated in this study. 
19
 An increase in the index indicates currency depreciation relatively to the euro. 
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1.3.3 Graphical Presentation 
Figure A.1 in Annex A.1 presents the developments of real and nominal exchange 
rates (indices, 2005=100 transformed into natural logarithms) as well as price ratios 
(defined as PEMU/P, indices, 2005=100 transformed into natural logarithms) between 
1993M1 and 2007M11, for the NMSs included in the univariate and/or bivariate 
variance analysis20. It shows that in countries with relatively flexible nominal 
exchange rates, real and nominal exchange rates tend to move together (and 
appreciate), as indicated by the coinciding turning points21. This outcome is 
confirmed by the simple correlation between real and nominal exchange rates in 
these countries. This coefficient is approximately 0.9 for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia and equal to approximately 0.8 for Lithuania, 
and Slovenia. The lowest comovements between real and nominal exchange rates are 
observed in Estonia, where the correlation coefficient is 0.3 (see Table A.1.1 in 
Annex A.1 for details). Despite a high correlation, over time, nominal and real 
exchange rates diverge or move in different directions in the case of Hungary and 
Slovenia22. The differences in the short and long-term dynamics of real and nominal 
exchange rate point to the presence of two different types of shocks affecting these 
countries: one temporary and one permanent in nature. This is consistent with the 
predictions of the broad class of structural open macro models (i.e., Dornbusch’s 
(1976) ‘overshooting’ model or Stockman’s (1987) ‘equilibrium’ model). Given that 
the divergence of the rates occurs quickly, there exists a strong pre-assumption that 
permanent shocks dominate real exchange rate movement.  
 
1.3.4 Integration Properties 
This section formally tests the unit root hypothesis for the data series used in this 
study. In the case of the univariate analysis, nonstationarity of data in levels would 
imply that real exchange rate movements cannot be characterised by their average 
                                                
 
20
 The results of analysis conducted on the OMSs treated in this paper are not discussed in detail, as 
they only serve a point of comparison.   
21
 These observations are not unique. Enders and Lee (1997), for instance, have noted similar trends 
in Canada and Japan.  
22
 Given the objective of monetary authorities to keep the real exchange rate constant in Slovenia, and 
to limit initial flexibility in Hungary until 2001, this is not surprising. 
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values. In such cases it would be inappropriate to use standard measures of volatility, 
such as variance/ standard deviation of the series. Stationary data is also required for 
the Blanchard and Quah decomposition of the SVAR model. Moreover, the variables 
in a VAR should not be cointegrated if the data in levels is non-stationary23. To test 
cointegration between the pairs of nominal and real exchange rates entering the 
VAR, it is enough to check the integration properties of price ratios in levels (i.e., the 
price ratio between the eurozone and country of interest inflation) (see Enders and 
Lee (1997)). Only when all the variables are I(1) and no cointegrating relationship 
exists, is it appropriate to estimate the VAR in first differences. The results of the 
formal unit root analysis discussed below should however be treated with great 
caution as the time span on which the tests are conducted is very short.  
 
Following Maddala and Kim’s (1999) argument that the Dickey-Fuller, augmented 
DF, and Philips-Perron unit root tests do not have enough power to meaningfully 
reject the null hypothesis, these tests are not used. Instead, in this study the DF-GLS 
test of Elliot-Rothenberg and Stock (1996) as well as the class of MZt and MZa tests 
of Ng and Perron (2001) are applied. As suggested by Ng and Perron (2001) (based 
on Monte Carlo simulations), in order to maximize the power, all tests are based on 
GLS detrending; likewise, in order to minimise the size distortion under the null (and 
not over-parameterise under the alternative), the choice of the lag length is selected 
on the basis of the Modified Akaike Information Criteria (MAIC). The maximum 
number of lags is set in accordance with the rule suggested by Schwert (1989). 
Given that DF-GLS and MZ-GLS tests may not be appropriate for variables with an 
apparent structural break (see Perron (1989), Christiano (1992), Zivot and Andrews 
(1992)), the unit root test of Perron (1997) which allows a parsimonious single 
structural break is also carried out. The structural break date is treated as unknown 
and chosen so as to minimize the t-statistic on the α  coefficient (i.e., model 3 in 
Perron (1997, p. 358)). The number of lags is determined by the ‘general-to-specific’ 
procedure with the maximum number of lags specified as in the previous tests.  
 
                                                
 
23
 If the variables were cointegrated, then, Error Correction Model and not the first differenced VAR 
system should be estimated. 
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The performed DF-GLS and MZ tests (the unit root is the null hypothesis in both 
tests) indicate non-stationarity of the investigated data (i.e., the data is I(1) - see 
Annex A.1, Table A.1.2) for all the series to be used in the univariate and bivariate 
modelling, but for the real exchange rate for Slovenia. The result for Slovenia, 
however, was not confirmed by the unit root test with a break (i.e. the unit root null 
hypothesis could not be rejected (see Annex A.1, Table A.1.3) where the test statistic 
row is called ‘ADF’). However, based on the unit root test with a break, in the case 
of Hungary, France and Slovenia, there is some evidence of the stationarity of the 
nominal exchange rate (Hungary and Slovenia) and price ratio (France). Therefore, 
as a check, the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin’s (KPSS) test was done. 
This test sets a stationarity hypothesis as the null and was suggested by Maddala and 
Kim (1999) as confirmatory analysis24. In this case, a stationarity hypothesis for the 
Slovenian real and Hungarian nominal exchange rates as well as the price ratio series 
for France was rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Based on the results from the unit root test, the series of real and nominal exchange 
rate used in this study enter univariate and bivariate estimations in first differences. 
Additionally, all the countries selected in Section 1.3.1 above, are included in the 
SVAR modelling, since: (i) all the exchange rate series of countries previously 
proposed for the structural VAR analysis are non-stationary in levels (with some 
uncertainty as far as the real and nominal exchange rate in Slovenia and Hungary are 
concerned); and (ii) the integration properties of the ratio of prices in levels do not 
suggest cointegration between respective pairs of nominal and real exchange rates in 
those countries (with some uncertainty in the French case). Once again, given the 
short span on the data, the performed tests are rather indicative than conclusive25.  
                                                
 
24
 Confirmatory analysis is understood as a situation in which one simultaneously rejects (cannot 
reject) a unit root hypothesis with DF-GLS and MZ type of tests and fails to reject (rejects) 
stationarity hypothesis with a KPSS test. Were it the case, there is a stronger and mutually reinforcing 
evidence that the series being tested is (non) stationary. 
25
 Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) argue that assuming non-stationary real exchange rates in transition 
economies is reasonable as purchasing power parity, implying stationary real exchange rates, holds 
under very restrictive conditions, which are extremely unlikely to be met in the case of the transition 
economies. Moreover, equilibrium real exchange rates in these countries should exhibit an upward 
trend over time due to the catching up process and as productivity and real wages increase over time. 
Because such shocks are generally stochastic in nature, there is a strong presumption that real 
exchange rates should have a permanent component during the time-span covered by their study. The 
same arguments should hold for the NMSs in the period of 1993-2007. 
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1.4  ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
The univariate and bivariate components of the econometric methodology employed 
in the study are explained in further detail below.  
 
1.4.1 Univariate Variance Analysis: Technical Aspects 
To provide an estimate of the degree of real convergence in terms of real exchange 
rate volatility (measured in terms of standard deviation) between the selected NMSs 
and the eurozone, as well as to assess whether the NMSs are converging over time in 
real terms, in step one, a univariate variance analysis of real exchange rates in 
countries of interest is performed. To assess the convergence process in the NMSs 
(i.e., to decide when the RER variance should be considered large and when small), 
the variance analysis also covers the selected OMSs prior to their eurozone 
membership. There are various ways that the univariate variance analysis can be 
conducted. In this study, what are of interest are fluctuations of real exchange rates 
which cannot be explained by their past movements, i.e. unexpected real exchange 
rates’ variances (standard deviations). Therefore, two types of econometric models 
of real exchange rate series for the New and Old Member States are estimated: 
AR(p) and AR(p)-GARCH(p,q). The general steps taken in the analysis are 
described below.  
 
First, AR(p) models are estimated on two selected groups of countries across the full 
sample for each country, ARCH tests are conducted. The ARCH tests are necessary 
to determine the most appropriate way of measuring convergence. For example, if 
real exchange rates in selected countries follow an ARCH/ GARCH process, real 
convergence in the NMSs and OMSs should be measured through conditional 
variances. If not, then unconditional variances should be used. Second, to see 
whether changes in the RER variance are statistically significant over time or not, an 
estimation of AR(p) models on different sub-samples is conducted. Various 
statistical tests are then performed to assess variance equality between the selected 
sub-samples. Third, motivated by the results of the AR(p) modelling, AR(p)-
GARCH(p,q) models for the NMSs and OMSs (on the whole sample as well as 
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different sub-samples) are estimated, and the magnitudes of time varying conditional 
variances (standard deviations) for real exchange rates are obtained. In order to gain 
a better picture about the convergence process over time, in addition to the 
magnitudes for the whole sample, the conditional standard deviations (CSDs) for 
different sub-samples are also calculated. Finally, the plots of time varying 
conditional variances for real exchange rates are also analysed. Both the magnitudes 
and the plots should help to see whether the analysed countries are indeed 
converging over time in real terms. Moreover, the performance of the evaluation 
over the whole estimated sample avoids the need to make a somewhat arbitrary split 
of the sample into sub-samples (which split is required in statistical tests of the 
residuals obtained from the estimated AR(p) models).   
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the univariate variance approach is 
only well designed to accurately assess the degree of real convergence if – among 
other things – it can precisely measure the degree of real shock asymmetry (i.e. the 
degree of real exchange rate variability due to real shocks), and thus the degree of 
real convergence. To this end, nominal shocks should be eliminated from real 
exchange rate movements. This is not an easy task and constitutes one of the main 
drawbacks of the proposed univariate variance analysis. Therefore, in the final step 
of the univariate variance analysis, an attempt is made to tackle this problem. Von 
Hagen and Neumann (1994) make a strong assumption that high-frequency 
(monthly) real exchange rate changes mostly reflect nominal shocks, and low-
frequency (quarterly) real exchange rate changes are principally due to real shocks26. 
This approach is also followed here. The AR(p)-GARCH (p,q) models are estimated 
on quarterly data, and plots of the time varying conditional variances are analysed. 
Unfortunately, because the low-frequency analysis necessarily means using fewer 
data points in the already small sample, a quarterly univariate variance analysis for 
the New and Old Member States is only performed on the whole sample, i.e. 
estimations for the respective sub-samples for the OMSs are not done. 
 
                                                
 
26
 It is however unclear/ debatable whether quarterly real exchange rate movements are freed from 
nominal shocks (i.e., nominal shocks could be more persistent). 
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In what follows, the technical details of the analysis detailed above are described. 
Given the unit root processes in the data (see Section 1.3.4), the AR(p) analysis on 
monthly data begins with a calculation of the unexpected RER component for each  
country in question (indexed by i) by regressing RER changes on their own lags by 
OLS, as follows27: 
 
(1.1) 
, ,0 1 , 1 2 , 2 12 , 12...i t i ti t i t i trer b b rer b rer b rer u− − −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ +  
where
,i trer∆  is the change in the real exchange rate.  
 
Residuals obtained from these regressions represent unexpected real exchange rate 
shocks. Next, the unconditional standard deviations of these shocks are calculated, 
which provide a measure of real convergence28. This exercise is done for each 
country over the whole analysed sample as well as different sub-samples. The whole 
sample for the NMSs runs from 1993M1 to 2007M11, for the OMSs from 1993M1 
to 1998M12 (see Section 1.3.1). There are three sub-samples for the NMSs, i.e. 
1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2006/7, which roughly represent the periods of the 
movement of nominal exchange rate regimes toward greater flexibility (see Egert 
and Kierzenkowski (2003)). For the selected OMSs, two sub-samples are selected: 
one prior to the participation of these countries in the ERMII (1993-1995), the other 
prior to euro adoption (1996-1998). Subsequently, various statistical tests are 
performed. To determine whether unconditional or conditional standard deviations 
should be used to test real convergence, ARCH tests on the whole sample are done. 
To test for variance equality between different subsamples, White’s tests for 
heteroskedasticity are carried out following Von Hagen and Neumann (1994). 
However, ARCH tests are also performed as financial market data often follow an 
ARCH/GARCH process.  
 
                                                
 
27
 The final number of lags in individual AR(p) and AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) equations was determined 
by the ‘general-to-specific’ approach. 
28
 As discussed in Part 1.1, this approach draws on Vaubel (1976, 1978) and is similar to that of von 
Hagen and Neumann (1994), Błaszkiewicz-Schwartzman and Woźniak (2005) and Gros and Hobza 
(2003). However, the estimation methods in these studies differ from the method utilized in this 
paper. 
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Having tested for ARCH residuals in the AR(p) models, AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) 
modelling is done for all the New and Old Members States included in the study. 
AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) models are estimated despite the fact that in three tested 
countries (Poland, Germany and Spain) the ARCH process could not be confirmed 
(see Annex A.1, Table A.1.4 and Table A.1.5). However, since the ARCH test is an 
asymptotic test and the estimated sample size is very small, in the end the 
conditional standard deviations as a final measure of real convergence are 
preferred29. Similar to the approach taken in the AR(p) analysis, AR(p)-
GARCH(p,q) modelling begins with an estimation real exchange rate changes on 
their own lags, by the means of OLS (i.e. equation (1.1) is again estimated). 
Additionally, however, the conditional variance equation is specified and estimated. 
Its general representation is as follows: 
 
(1.2) 2 2 2
, , ,1 1
q pi i
sji t i t j i t sj s
uσ ω β σ α
− −
= =
= + +∑ ∑  
where ω  is the constant term,  2
,i t su −  is the news about volatility from the 
previous period measured as the lag of the squared residual from the equation (1.1) 
(the ARCH term), and 2
,i t jσ −  is the last period’s forecast variance (the GARCH 
term). 
 
From the above conditional variance equation, the magnitudes and the plots of the 
estimated time varying conditional standard deviations (CSDs) for real exchange 
rates are obtained, and the average magnitudes of CSDs for different sub-samples are 
calculated. The results of the univariate variance analysis are presented in  
Section 1.5.1.  
 
1.4.2 Bivariate Variance Analysis: Technical Aspects 
As mentioned in the Introduction and emphasised in Section 1.4.1, univariate 
variance analysis is not well designed to detect how much of the real exchange rate 
volatility in countries of interest can be due to nominal shocks. Unless these are 
                                                
 
29
 Using conditional standard deviations for all countries also ensures comparability of the results.  
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eliminated, the proposed measure of real convergence may be biased. Although the 
low-frequency univariate variance analysis should help eliminate nominal 
disturbances from real exchange rate movements, its reliability is questionable, due 
to its limitations (see footnote 26) and data constraints. Therefore, in this study, in 
step two, the structural (long-run) VAR analysis with a Blanchard and Quah 
decomposition is conducted. This not only allows separation of real and nominal 
shocks causing real exchange rate fluctuations, but also helps to detect the shock-
stabilizing role of nominal exchange rates. The technical aspects of this analysis are 
discussed below.  
 
Given that the variables of interest, real and nominal exchange rates ( trer and tner , 
respectively), have a single unit root (and are not cointegrated), the VAR model 
considered in the study can be written as follows: 
(1.3) 0 1( )t t tB y L y ε−∆ = Γ + Γ ∆ +  
where ( , ) 't t ty rer ner∆ = ∆ ∆ , B  is a 2×2 invertible matrix, 0Γ  is a 2×1 matrix of 
constants, ( )LΓ  is a 2×2 polynomial in the lag operator, and 1 2(  ) 't t tε ε ε=  is a vector 
of white-noise structural disturbances, i.e., ~ (0, )t iid Dε  with D  being a variance-
covariance matrix of structural disturbances. 1tε  is interpreted as a real shock with 
possible permanent effects on nominal and real exchange rates. 2tε  stands for a 
nominal shock with only short-run effects on a real exchange rate.  
 
In terms of equilibrium real exchange rate modelling, this broad classification of 
shocks is consistent with predictions of the broad class of structural open macro 
models. For example, it fits the Dornbusch (1976) ‘overshooting’ model of a small 
open economy in which nominal shocks can have permanent effects on the nominal 
exchange rate, but only temporary effects on the real exchange rate (Lastrapes 
(1992), Enders and Lee (1997)). Also, given that real shocks can permanently affect 
real as well as nominal exchange rates, it is also consistent with the Stockman (1987) 
‘equilibrium’ model. And finally, the long-run neutrality restriction on the real 
exchange rate following a nominal shock is also consistent with the implications of 
the NOEM and other DSGE models (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Lane (2001)).   
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Given that there are more parameters than equations to be estimated, the inference 
starts from estimating the flowing reduced form VAR model by OLS30: 
 
(1.4) 0 1( )t tty C C L y e−∆ = + ∆ +      
          where 10 0C B
−
= Γ , 1( ) ( )C L B L−= Γ  and 1t te B ε−=  
 
It is further assumed that ~ (0, )te iid Ω  where Ω  is a variance-covariance matrix of 
the reduced form error term. This matrix can be expressed as: 
(1.5) 1 1( ) 'B D B− −Ω =      
Now, in order to recover the structural disturbances,  tε , from the reduced form 
VAR, 1B−  must be identified. As Blanchard and Quah (1989) show, this can be done 
by imposing long-run (infinite-horizon) restrictions on the matrix of structural 
dynamics multipliers (1)Θ  which can be obtained by estimating the moving average 
representation of ty∆ and then by re-writing it in terms of structural shock: 
(1.6) ( )t ty Lµ ε∆ = + Θ      
Because it was assumed that 2tε  has no long-run effect on a real exchange rate, )1(Θ  
can be obtained as a lower triangular. Since  (1)Θ  equals 1 1( (1))I C B− −− : 
(1.7) 1 [( (1)) (1)]B I C− = − Θ      
Using this expression, the reduced form long-run variance-covariance matrix can be 
expressed as:  
(1.8) 11[( (1)) ]  [( (1)) '] (1) (1) 'I C I C D−−− Ω − = Θ Θ     
The left hand side of this expression can by fully obtained by estimating the reduced 
form VAR by OLS. Normalising D to the identity matrix and given the imposed 
long-run restriction on (1)Θ enables (1)Θ  to be fully identified through the system of 
                                                
 
30
 As discussed in Hamilton (1994) separate VAR equation can be estimated by OLS without losing 
efficiency since, with the normality assumption, OLS estimators are almost identical with the 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimators.  
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equations specified in eq. (1.8);  when (1)Θ  is identified, 1B−  is also identified, and 
so are the structural disturbances, 1  2( ) 't t tε ε ε= :  
 
(1.9) 111
221 22
(1) 0
 (1) (1)lim
t s t
s t s t
rer
ner
εθ
εθ θ
+
→∞ +
    
=    
    
  
 
Given that (1)Θ is now fully identified, it is possible to test the additional identifying 
restriction 22 (1) 1θ =  (i.e., so far, in order to identify the system, it was assumed, in 
accordance with the broad class of open economy macro models, that the long-run 
effect of the nominal shocks on the real exchange rate is zero, i.e., 12 (1) 0θ = ), which 
says that a nominal shock has a proportional effect on a nominal exchange rate (see 
Enders and Lee (1997)). Since a positive nominal shock should cause a currency to 
depreciate, even if the long-run impact of the shock is not proportional, the expected 
sign on the estimated coefficient 22 (1)θ is positive.  
 
1.5  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
1.5.1 Univariate Variance Analysis. 
Since ARCH tests indicate that conditional rather than unconditional standard 
deviations should be used to measure real convergence in the New and Old Member 
States (see Annex A.1, Table A.1.4, Table A.1.5 as well as a discussion in  
Section 1.4.1), in this section, the plots and magnitudes of the estimated time varying 
conditional variances of real exchange rate fluctuations (on a monthly and quarterly 
basis) are discussed in turn31. In addition, tests for variance equality between 
different sub-samples from AR(p) model runs are presented and analysed32. The 
results for the NMSs are contrasted with those obtained for the selected OMSs.  
                                                
 
31
 In some instances, AR(p)-EGARCH(p,q) models were estimated instead of AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) 
models, as they provided a better fit. 
32
 The unconditional standard deviations obtained from the AR(p) modelling are available from the 
author upon request. In most cases they however were of the same magnitude as conditional ones.  
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Figure A.2. 1 in Annex A.2 presents the plots of CSDs calculated for real exchange 
rates in the selected New and Old Member States over the period 1993M1-2007M11 
and 1993M1-1998M12, respectively. As indicated in Section 1.4.1, the patterns of 
the variances recorded in the NMSs should help assess whether these countries are 
converging in real terms vis-à-vis the eurozone. When compared to the patterns 
observed for the OMSs, they should also provide an indication of whether the real 
convergence process in the NMSs has been similar to that observed in the OMSs 
prior to the formation of the eurozone. 
 
Among the eight NMSs, the lowest and diminishing volatility is observed in Estonia 
and Slovenia. However, in Estonia, although still at the fairly low level, the 
conditional RER variance seems to pick up from 2004. In Latvia RER volatility 
dropped significantly between 1993 and 1995, and then after 2000 (although it again 
appears to be increasing since 2006). In the Czech Republic and Lithuania, visible 
progress in convergence is observed from around 2000 and 2002, respectively. The 
level of RER volatility in Slovakia was lower in the early 1990s, but increased again 
between 1998 and 2004. Since then, a slight moderation in the RER variance has 
been observed although without any explicit trends. In Hungary and Poland, over the 
whole estimated sample, conditional RER volatility demonstrates a fairly similar 
pattern, with no clear signs of convergence. Looking at the OMSs, the best 
performers in terms of the scale of the conditional variance of the RERs are 
Germany, France and Portugal. However, in the case of Portugal, despite a relatively 
low level of volatility, no progress in convergence can be observed33. Italy and Spain 
show signs of real convergence from around 1996 onwards. In Greece it is hard to 
detect any progress in convergence over the whole estimated period.  
 
As postulated, the use of quarterly estimates attempt to eliminate nominal variability 
in real exchange rate movements and thus provide a more accurate measure of the 
real convergence process. The plots of the quarterly CSDs are presented in  
Annex A.2, Figure A.2.2. In Slovenia the quarterly CSD mostly confirms the 
patterns observed in the monthly data. In Estonia, although the quarterly CSD shows 
                                                
 
33
 The result for Portugal comes from estimating EGARCH (0,1) model. GARCH (p,q) models were 
also tried, but the variance equation coefficients were found to be insignificant. Therefore, the 
EGARCH (0,1) model was selected.  
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a similar pattern to that of the monthly CSD, it exhibits an upward trend in volatility 
from 1997 (and not from 2004 as exhibited in the monthly data). In Latvia, quarterly 
data discloses less convergence than monthly data – after an initial drop in volatility, 
no further progress is visible. In the Czech Republic and Lithuania, like in Estonia, 
quarterly CSDs show similar patterns to that of monthly, but it seems that the 
magnitudes of quarterly variances exceed that of monthly. In Slovakia, although the 
quarterly volatility decreased after 2000, it is hard to see significant signs of 
convergence from then on. In Hungary and Poland quarterly data provides a clearer 
picture of the convergence process. The quarterly Hungarian CSD not only confirms 
a lack of progress in real convergence, but also reveals its divergence. In Poland, the 
quarterly data shows increases in the RER volatility up to 2002. However, since then 
– despite a high overall magnitude – a decreasing trend has been observed. Quarterly 
CSDs for the OMSs confirm the trends seen in the monthly data for most countries. 
The lowest (and decreasing) volatility is visible in Germany and France. In the case 
of Portugal, quarterly RER is more volatile than monthly RER, with again no visible 
convergence. This is also the case in Greece. In Italy and Spain, similar to monthly 
patterns, between 1995 and 1998 volatility was decreasing.  
 
The precise magnitudes of the estimated time varying conditional standard 
deviations discussed above are summarised in Table 1.5.1. In addition to the 
magnitudes for the whole sample, the CSDs for different sub-samples are also 
calculated. As mentioned in Section 1.4.1, they represent averages of CSDs attained 
from the estimated GARCH/ EGARCH(p,q) models for the two whole samples (i.e. 
1993M1-2007M11 for the NMSs and 1993M1-1998M12 for the OMSs).  
 
Based on estimates for the whole sample, on a monthly basis, again, among the 
NMSs, Poland displays the highest real exchange rate volatility, Estonia and 
Slovenia the lowest34. For the full sample estimates, the average real exchange 
                                                
 
34
 The presence of the highest level of the real exchange rate volatility in the NMS sample in Poland 
could reflect the fact that Poland has the largest stock market in the region. It could also be related to 
a stronger presence than in other NMSs of nominal shocks, as nominal exchange rate flexibility is 
greater in Poland than in any of the other NMSs. As monthly RER volatility is most likely affected by 
these nominal disturbances, they could bias the results upwards. However, high RER volatility could 
also be due to the sluggish speed of structural reforms in Poland. It could also be due to both of these 
factors. The low volatility of the Slovenian RER is perhaps related to the fact that the policy objective 
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instability (i.e. standard deviation) in the selected NMSs is higher by approximately 
1.3 times when compared with the Club Med countries (by 3.1 times when compared 
with the average for France and Germany, and by 1.7 times when compared with the 
average for the group of Club Med countries plus France and Germany (OMSs)). In 
terms of the results for the particular sub-samples, there are three countries for which 
monthly conditional standard deviations of real exchange rate shocks exhibit a 
consistent and decreasing trend. These are Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia managed to decrease the variance of real exchange rate shocks 
between the II and I sub-sample. Nevertheless, in the third sub-sample, real 
exchange rates became again more volatile in these countries. In the Czech Republic 
there is clear evidence of stabilizing policies between 1999 and 2006/0735. Similar to 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania managed to lower its RER volatility between the 
second and third sub-sample. Based on the estimates of AR(p) models on the two 
sub-samples (1993M1-1998M12 and 1996M1-2007M11), statistically significant 
changes seem to be taking place in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia 
in the first sub-sample and in all considered NMSs but Poland and Slovakia in the 
second sub-sample (see column ‘Volatility Changes’ in Table 1.5.1). When the 
average magnitudes of the Club Med real exchange rate shocks in the early 1990s, as 
well as in years preceding the creation of the eurozone are compared with the NMSs 
average for the years 1999 and 2006/07, the results show that, on average, the NMSs 
real exchange rate volatility is 1.7 times higher than the real exchange rate volatility 
of Club Med countries in years preceding eurozone membership (i.e., 1996 to 1998), 
and almost equal to the variance of Club Med countries in the early 1990s. It should 
be stressed however that for countries like Estonia and Slovenia, real exchange rate 
volatility in years 1999-2006/07 is smaller not only when compared with the Club 
Med countries, but also when France and Germany are added to the Club Med group 
(i.e. when compared with the ‘OMSs’ line in Table 1.5.1). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
of Slovenian authorities was to keep the real exchange rate constant. Slovenia also has the highest 
level of GDP per capita among all analysed NMSs, and thus it is not surprising that its level of 
convergence with the eurozone is greatest among the NMSs.   
35
 i.e. the policies which were implemented after the Czech currency crisis in May 1997. 
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93-95 96-98 99-07
Czech Republic No*/Yes* 0.84 1.64 1.22 1.23 1.45
Estonia Yes/Yes* 1.23 0.56 0.40 0.57 0.54
Hungary Yes/No* 1.28 1.22 1.30 1.28 1.12
Latvia Yes*/Yes* 2.79 1.23 1.11 1.46 1.34
Lithuania No/Yes* 1.71 1.80 1.09 1.33 1.43
Poland Yes*/No 1.84 1.83 1.88 1.86 1.88
Slovakia Yes/No 1.29 1.09 1.36 1.29 1.34
Slovenia Yes*/Yes* 1.20 0.59 0.38 0.60 0.57
Average 1.52 1.25 1.09 1.20 1.21
Average (FRA and DEU) 0.45 0.33 0.39 0.28
Average (OMSs) 0.89 0.53 0.73 0.64
Average (ClubMed) 1.11 0.63 0.89 0.82
Full Sample
GARCH         
M
GARCH          
QVOLATILITY CHANGES
CSD                          
I
CSD           
II
CSD              
III
Table 1.5.1 Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
Note: Columns labelled ‘CSD’ report averages of conditional standard deviations (CSDs) calculated 
for selected sub-samples (on a monthly basis) from CSDs attained from estimating 
GARCH/EGARCH models for the whole sample (i.e. I-III). Columns labelled ‘GARCH M’ and 
‘GARCH Q’ report CSDs from models estimated for the whole sample (on a monthly and quarterly 
basis, respectively). Quarterly CSDs were normalized to monthly CSDs. “Yes” indicates 
convergence, “No” indicates divergence, i.e., we observe a decrease/increase in the standard 
deviations of the real exchange rate between the two tested sub-samples (93-95 and 99-07); ‘*’ marks 
differing variance of the error term of estimated AR(p) models of real exchange rate changes by OLS 
between the two sub-samples (based on p-values of conducted White Heteroskedasticity and/or 
ARCH tests and 10% significance levels reported in Annex A.1, Table A.1.4). Notice that the 
conclusions about convergence/ divergence based on the conditional and unconditional variances are 
the same. 
 
Source: Author estimates based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
 
Turning to results obtained from the whole-sample quarterly estimates (normalized 
to monthly), in half of the NMSs (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) 
the magnitude of individual quarterly real exchange rate variances is higher than that 
of monthly36. In the model the assumption was made that unexpected quarterly real 
exchange rate volatility reflects real shocks that are free of short-run disturbances. 
The data shows that with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia, real exchange 
                                                
 
36
 Recall that due to the short data span, the magnitudes of the quarterly CDSs for the selected sub-
samples are not calculated. Therefore, the only way to discern quarterly changes in RER variances 
over time is to rely on the patters of the CDSs plots presented in Annex A.2, Figure A.3 and discussed 
above.  
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volatility calculated for the NMSs on a quarterly basis is on average 1.5 times higher 
than the volatility calculated for the Club Med countries. It is therefore clear that 
asymmetric real shocks are still an important source of real exchange rate volatility 
in these countries.   
 
In summary, based on univariate analysis and the proposed definition of real 
convergence, it appears that only Slovenia and Estonia achieved a level of real 
convergence which is comparable with that of the selected OMSs in the onset of the 
euro adoption.   
   
1.5.2 Bivariate Variance Analysis. 
In what follows, the specifications of the VAR models used in this chapter are 
described and tested for adequacy. Next, the BQ-SVAR analysis described in 
Section 1.4.2 is implemented. This, together with the univariate analysis, establishes 
the basis for evaluating the differences between the degree of asymmetric real and 
nominal shocks in real exchange rates as well as verifies the shock absorbing role of 
nominal exchange rates in the analysing NMSs of the EU. 
 
As a reminder, because of the unit root process, nominal and real exchange rates, 
enter VARs in first differences. The VAR lag order for each country is chosen based 
on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The estimated lag length 
∧
p  is chosen for 
the value of p that minimises AIC(p), with the maximum number of lags of pmax=8 
(and 6 for the OMSs). Although the AIC criterion tends to overestimate the number 
of selected lags, as shown by Kilian (2001), impulse response estimates tend to be 
highly sensitive to the underestimation of a lag order.  
Model Specification and Checking. 
Before one can move to the structural VAR analysis of shocks (i.e. to evaluating the 
contribution of nominal and real shocks to exchange rate movements), it is necessary 
to make sure that the errors from the estimated reduced form VAR models are 
normal, i.i.d and that they do not exhibit ARCH process. For the models to be 
correctly specified, the estimated residuals should be normally distributed, serially 
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uncorrelated and have a constant variance. Moreover, since the structural VAR 
analysis needs to be conducted in constant economic structures, and since there have 
been frequent changes in the monetary and exchange rate regimes in the NMSs 
during the period under consideration (which could have disrupted a stable 
relationship between the variables), tests for structural changes are also performed. 
Normality, Autocorrelation, Heteroskedasticity and ARCH.  
In order to test whether the estimated VAR residuals exhibit any remaining 
autocorrelation, the Portmanteau and LM autocorrelation tests are executed. To test 
the normality assumption, the multivariate test of Doornik and Hansen (2008) is 
employed. Homoskedasticity is checked by performing general White’s tests (joint 
test and tests for individual components with (i.e., test for heteroskedasticity and 
specification bias) and without cross-products (i.e., test for pure heteroskedasticity)). 
White’s heteroskedasticity tests are primarily chosen because they neither require 
explicit formulation of the form of heteroscedasticity, nor do they require normality 
under the null hypothesis (i.e., no heteroskedasticity). The results of those tests are 
presented in Annex A.3, Table A.3.1)37.  Additionally, and given the univariate 
analysis above, ARCH tests on individual residuals from VAR equations are 
performed.   
 
Despite the fact that there seems to be no autocorrelation left in the residuals of the 
estimated VAR models, the results should be treated with caution because the 
misspecification autocorrelation tests are derived under the assumption of normally 
distributed errors, which is clearly violated in all cases but Poland (for the selected 
OMSs, three countries – Germany, Greece and Italy – do not pass normality tests). 
As indicated by White’s tests, in the cases of Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, the lack of normality could be due to heteroskedastic 
errors. In other countries, it could be because the distribution is skewed or 
leptokurtic, or simply because of the small sample size, which could be too small to 
confirm asymptotical normality. The results obtained from the conducted ARCH 
                                                
 
37
 Since the results of Portmanteau tests did not differ from the results of LM tests, only the former 
are presented in Table A.3.1. The results of the LM tests can be obtained however from the author 
upon request.   
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tests indicate ARCH errors in the estimated RER equations for the Czech Republic, 
Portugal and Spain as well as for Slovakia and Portugal in the estimated NER 
equations (see Annex A.3, Table A.3.2). However, in all cases, correcting for 
detected structural breaks (see the next section), and / or using the WLS instead of 
the OLS estimator also corrected for ARCH in residuals (see Annex A.3, Table 
A.3.2). Ideally, a better strategy would be to estimate SVAR-MVGARCH models. 
However, given the small sample size, the proposed solution seems more adequate.   
 
Structural Changes. 
 
In order to tests for structural breaks, the techniques developed by Bai et al. (1998) 
and Hansen (2000) are employed. Both treat the break date as unknown. In light of 
various econometric studies, which document that testing for structural breaks with 
an a priori determined break date can be misleading, the choice of the methods seem 
adequate (Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992), Christiano (1992), Zivot and 
Andrews (1992)).  
 
The advantage of using the Bai et al. (1998) method is that it tests for common 
breaks in multivariate time series (more precisely, it looks for the simultaneous break 
date in mean growth rates, treating autoregressive parameters as nuisance 
parameters). In doing so the procedure implements the "supremum" test of Andrews 
(1993) (i.e., Sup-Wald) and the related "average" and "exponential" tests of Andrews 
and Ploberger (1994) (i.e., SupF, ExpF, AveF tests)38. As shown by Bai et al. (1998), 
testing for simultaneous structural breaks in the VAR system improves estimation 
precision of a particular break date. Moreover, the authors construct confidence 
intervals for the break date that increase the estimation accuracy39. The difference 
between the Bai et al. (1998) test and that implemented in this study, is in the lag-
                                                
 
38
 Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) provide critical values for SupF, ExpF, and 
AveF tests. Hansen (1997) calculates p-vales for those tests. His Gauss program is available at 
http//www.ssc.wisc.edu/~hansen/progs/progs.htm 
39
 Bai et al. (1998) show that the width of the confidence interval decreases in an important way when 
series having a common break are treated as a group and estimation is carried using a quasi maximum 
likelihood (QML) procedure. 
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selection method. This is necessary in order to obtain models consistent with those 
employed in the SVAR analysis40.  
 
The disadvantage of the Bai et al. (1998) test is that it is based on the asymptotic 
distribution theory. Although, the asymptotic distribution is relatively easy to 
tabulate, it may be unreliable in finite samples. Additionally, because the Bai et al. 
(1998) test uses asymptotic critical values, calculated under the null of i.i.d. errors, it 
can be inadequate in persistent or/and heteroskedastic series. Given the results of the 
normality and heteroskedasticity tests performed on the estimated VARs residuals, 
the likelihood of obtaining misleading results may not be insignificant. For example, 
Hansen (2000) finds that asymptotic distributions of Andrews’ (1993) test statistics 
depend on the presence of a unit root and/or structural change in the regressors (i.e., 
they are not robust to structural change in the marginal distribution of the 
regressors), and thus the stationarity assumption underlying those tests may result in 
inadequate inference. Also, Diebold and Chen (1996) provide evidence of size 
distortions (i.e., tendency to over-reject) of supremum tests for a structural change in 
dynamic models. This poses a problem in testing conditional relationships, since 
these tests cannot differentiate between structural change in conditional and marginal 
distributions. As such, they are not of much use to policymakers. For example, the 
marginal model can be thought of as an instrument that can be moved in order to 
achieve some goal (i.e., expressed by the conditional model). For policy purposes, of 
interest is the question whether the conditional model has invariant parameters, 
despite changes in the marginal model. In the context of this study, the question is 
whether the parameters of the estimated VAR equations are stable, despite changes 
in the exchange rate regimes, changes to the rate of growth of money, etc. To this 
end Hansen (2000) proposes the ‘fixed regressor bootstrap’ which allows for 
arbitrary structural change in the regressors, including the lagged dependent variable 
and heteroskedastic error process. He further shows that this bootstrap technique 
produces the correct asymptotic distribution and also leads to reasonable size 
properties in finite samples. Therefore, in this study, the results of structural break 
                                                
 
40
 Bai et al.’s Gauss program was modified to select the break date on the basis of the minimum AIC 
value as opposed to BIC value preferred by the authors. 
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tests obtained by implementing the Bai et al. (1998) procedure are contrasted with 
those obtained by implementing Hansen’s (2000) bootstrap technique41.  
Test Results 
Based on the Bai et al. (1998) test, a break date in the mean at a common break date 
of real and nominal exchange rates is statistically significant for Slovakia (in 
2000M11) and Spain (in 1994M11). For the rest of the countries, there is no 
evidence of shifts in the mean growth rates (Annex A.3, Table A.3.2). The results 
obtained from the test due to Hansen are different (Annex A.3, Table A.3.3). 
According to the p-values, there is evidence of coefficient instability in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia in the NMSs group (in Poland only one tests 
appears to provide evidence for a possible break in the nominal exchange rate); and 
Portugal in the OMS group. However, in Hungary and Slovenia, once the tests are 
robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity, a potential structural break is confirmed 
only by the AveF test. The fact that estimated break dates cannot be confirmed by 
both tests is somewhat disturbing. Therefore, the CUSUM structural stability tests 
were also performed (for those countries for which the Hansen test corrected for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity indicate structural breaks). The results are presented 
in Annex A.3, Figure A.3.1. A plot of cumulative sum of residuals did confirm 
parameters’ instability in the case of Czech Republic at the 5% level for both VAR 
equations. In Slovenia, a plot of cumulative sum and sum of squared residuals 
indicated parameter or variance instability in the nominal exchange rate equation. In 
the case of Hungary and Poland, neither CUSUM not CUSUM squared tests 
revealed the presence of a structural break. In Portugal, both tests strongly confirmed 
the presence of the structural break.  
 
As documented by Diebold and Chen (1996), the Bai at al. (1998) test suffers from 
over-rejection, and since the CUSUM tests mostly confirmed the results obtained 
from Hansen’s (2000) tests, the later two are treated as superior. To this end, the 
                                                
 
41
 Given that results of the unit root tests may not robust, and the potential lack of normality of the 
data, as well as the presence of heteroskedasticity in some cases, performing structural change tests 
due to Hansen (2000) is also helpful in detecting whether the data used to estimate the conditional 
models are stationary (i.e., the evidence of structural break based on Andrews (1993) and Andrews-
Ploberger’s (1994) p-values which cannot be confirmed by the bootstrap method can be an additional 
evidence against stationarity of the data).  
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final VAR models include a shift dummy variable in the case of Czech Republic and 
Portugal (i.e., the dummy variable, respectively, equals one from 1999M3 and 
1994M1 onwards). Since a heteroskedasticity corrected bootstrap did not confirm a 
structural break in the Slovenian nominal exchange rate, it was concluded that the 
significance of the CUSUM squared test was due to the variance and not parameter 
instability. Moreover, the included dummy variables in the VAR equations were 
insignificant. No break was assumed for Slovenia. Similarly, given the outcome of 
the CUSUM tests for Hungary, and insignificance of the tested dummy variables in 
VAR equations, no break was assumed for Hungary. 
 
Once estimated with structural breaks taken into account, the results of 
misspecification tests did not change much (Annex A.3, Table A.3.1). Despite 
various attempts, normal and constant variance errors could not be obtained for 
countries in which these problems were initially detected (however, in the case of the 
Czech Republic, once the dummy variable was included in the model, ARCH errors 
in the real exchange rate were no longer present)42. Since the structural VAR form is 
derived from the reduced VAR representation (as a one-to-one transformation), the 
reliability of results from the structural analysis may be dubious. In order to mitigate 
normality issues, it is important to put some confidence on impulse responses and 
variance decompositions obtained from the SVAR models. Since, as a consequence 
of heteroskedastic/ ARCH errors, the structural shocks are not ‘purely’ exogenous 
and may depend on the values of variables in the system (i.e., the conditional 
variance of the nominal or real exchange rate may change with the past values taken 
by those rates), the White robust variance estimate for the errors or the SVAR-
MVGARCH modelling is needed (given data constraints the White robust variance 
estimate for the errors is preferred over SVAR-MVGARCH estimations)43.   
Small-Sample Bootstrap Confidence Intervals. 
Kilian (1998a, 1998b) shows that if the innovations in a VAR system are not 
normally distributed, standard methods of generating confidence intervals for 
                                                
 
42
 In the cases of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, dummy variables were also tested for 
periods of Asian, Czech, and Russian financial/banking crises, as well as for regime changes 
identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
43
 The Gauss programming language was used to obtain results presented in this and the next sections.   
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impulse responses - such as those proposed by Lütkepohl (1990) or  
Sims and Zha (1995) - bring unsatisfactory results. Following this approach, the 
bootstrap-after-bootstrap method is implemented. In Kilian’s bootstrapping 
technique, the non-normality of VAR innovations is accounted for through 
adjustments for the bias in the OLS coefficient estimates of the VAR system. The 
bias term in the original OLS estimator is approximated by the following procedure: 
1) standard nonparametric bootstrap methods are applied to draw 1000 
realisations of 
( )^ i
C from the estimated VAR (p) models (i.e., equation 
(1.4)) ; 
2) then, the bias term 
^
[ ]bias E C C= −  is approximated by 
( )^ ^ ^
1/1000
i
bias C C−∑= ; 
3) next, stationarity correction is applied if the bias-corrected estimates 
imply that the VAR becomes non-stationary; 
 
Once the stability conditions are satisfied, the biased corrected coefficients are used 
to generate 2000 new bootstrap replications of 
( )^ i
C . These bias-corrected estimates 
are next used to compute the empirical distribution of impulse responses. Confidence 
intervals on impulse responses are constructed using modified percentile method of 
Davidson and McKinnon (1993). The same, biased corrected coefficients are used to 
calculate confidence intervals for variance decompositions44. 
 
The nonparametric standard bootstrap method proposed in Step 1 draws on Runkle 
(1987) - i.e., it generates bootstrap innovations *te  by resampling with replacement 
from the empirical residuals 
^
te . Pseudo-data 
*
ty∆ is constructed with the use of 
VAR (p) coefficients and is conditional on the vector of initial observations 
*
0y∆ = { *25*1 ,..., yy ∆∆ }, which are selected randomly with replacement from the 
original VAR residuals (see Berkowitz and Kilian (1997)). These initial observations 
are then discarded so that the final pseudo-sample equals to *ty∆ . Additionally, each 
                                                
 
44
 See Kilian (1998a), p.220 for details. 
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bootstrap loop takes into account the lag order uncertainty resampling by choosing 
the number of lags in each draw by minimising the AIC criterion. As showed by  
Kilian (1998b, p. 545) failing to do so leads to misleading inference - i.e. ignoring 
the lag order uncertainty may seriously undermine the coverage accuracy of 
bootstrap confidence intervals for impulse responses45. His results further suggest 
that in small and moderate samples the coverage accuracy of bootstrap confidence 
intervals for VAR impulse response estimates is much closer to the nominal 
coverage for the AIC criterion than it is for more parsimonious criteria.  
White Robust Variance Estimate for the Errors. 
As discussed, not taking into account heteroskedasticity in the structural variance 
decomposition results in bias in the relative importance of random innovations in the 
forecast error (i.e., it is influenced by past singular events). Since the purpose of the 
variance decomposition is to identify the importance of shocks which hit the 
economy regularly and within constant economic structures, it is important to correct 
for the presence of heteroskedasticity before such structural inference can be 
conducted. Therefore, in countries where better specification of VAR models could 
not be achieved, in order to obtain the White robust variance estimate for the errors, 
te , each of the equations in a reduced form VAR system is estimated by WLS 
instead of OLS (in order to obtain accurate confidence intervals, WLS VAR 
estimation also replaces OLS in the above described bootstrapping).  
 
In the WLS estimation conducted for the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, 
and Spain the previously heteroskedastic residuals from the estimated reduced form 
VAR models turned out to be i.i.d.. Unfortunately, in the case of Slovenia the 
appropriate weights could not be found. Given that single digit inflation in Slovenia 
was reached only in 1996, the sample was set to start in January 1996. Despite still 
significant White tests, in this case weights for the WLS estimation could be 
obtained. Therefore, the final structural analysis for Slovenia was performed on the 
sample spanning from 1996M1 to 2006M12.  
                                                
 
45
 Because the lag order uncertainty is taken into account, the short-cut proposed by Kilian in step 2a 
(1998a, p.220) could not be taken. Additional 2000 loops had to be estimated. 
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Variance Decomposition.  
Once the reduced form VAR models were correctly specified, the structural 
Blanchard and Quah decomposition was executed. Table 1.5.2 shows the 
contributions of temporary (i.e. nominal) and permanent (i.e. real) shocks to 
explaining the forecast error variance of nominal and real exchange rates in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Column I and 
III in Table 1.5.2 reflect contributions of the real and nominal shocks, respectively, to 
the forecast variance error of the real exchange rate. Columns V and VII contain the 
contributions of the same shocks to movements of the nominal exchange rate. 
Finally, the numbers in columns II, IV, VI and VIII represent the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals calculated for a particular percentage of variance 
decomposition.  
 
The results are striking. In the case of Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia 
over 90% of shocks to the real exchange rate are real in nature. In the Czech 
Republic real shocks explain as much as 88% of the forecast variance error of the 
real exchange rate. Poland is somewhat different, with a nominal shock playing a 
substantial role in the variation of its real exchange rate (in the first month, the extent 
is 40%, which could perhaps be related to the fact that Poland has the largest stock 
exchange amongst all analysed NMSs). Nevertheless, after a year, the significance of 
the nominal shock drops significantly, with real shocks explaining approximately 
80% of the forecast variance error of a Polish real exchange rate. The dominance of 
real shocks in the real exchange rate fluctuations confirms the finding of the unit root 
tests which suggest that real rates are not stationary.  
 
Variance decomposition of nominal exchange rates is more heterogeneous. Nominal 
shocks overwhelmingly dominate the variation of the Slovenian tolar (over 80% of 
movements are due to this type of shocks), and are an important part of the volatility 
of the Polish zloty (around 50% irrespective of the forecast horizon), the Czech 
koruna (on average 30% within the first three months), the Hungarian forint (which 
despite a very minimal initial impact, after a year increases to around 20% and 
higher) and to some extent the Slovakian koruna (which remains around 15% after a 
year).    
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Table 1.5.2 Variance Decomposition (NMSs) 
Variable RER NER 
Variance 
Decomposition 
RER shock NER shock RER shock NER shock 
CZECH REP. I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
1-month 87.8 60.2-100 12.2 0.0-39.8 62.8 23.1-100 37.2 0.0-76.9 
3-month 91.9 72.0-100 8.1 0.0-28.0 70.1 35.3-99.7 29.9 0.3-64.7 
12-month 95.0 82.1-100 5.0 0.0-17.9 76.0 47.5-99.6 24.0 0.4-52.5 
24-month 97.5 90.3-100 2.5 0.0-9.7 80.9 58.7-97.6 19.1 2.4-41.3 
60-month 99.5 98.0-100 0.5 0.0-2.0 86.0 71.0-99.0 14.0 1.0-29.0 
HUNGARY         
1-month 99.5 58.6-100 0.5 0.0-41.4 96.9 38.0-100 3.1 0.0-62.0 
3-month 99.8 57.6-100 0.2 0.0-42.4 93.6 33.0-100 6.4 0.0-67.0 
12-month 99.5 69.1-100 0.5 0.0-30.9 83.0 23.7-99.5 17.0 0.5-76.3 
24-month 99.7 80.2-100 0.3 0.0-19.8 72.4 18.2-98.9 27.6 1.1-81.8 
60-month 99.8 91.5-100 0.2 0.0-8.5 60.8 7.8-94.4 39.2 5.6-92.2 
POLAND         
1-month 60.6 26.1-100 39.4 0.0-73.9 47.1 15.0-100 52.9 0.0-85.0 
3-month 69.1 36.1-100 30.9 0.0-63.9 53.1 20.1-100 46.9 0.0-79.9 
12-month 82.9 64.8-100 17.1 0.0-35.2 49.9 24.6-98.2 50.1 1.8-75.4 
24-month 90.4 81.2-100 9.6 0.0-18.8 45.7 23.6-94.2 54.3 5.8-76.4 
60-month 96.3 93.5-100 3.7 0.0-6.5 40.4 25.0-95.7 59.6 4.3-75.0 
SLOVAK REP.         
1-month 100 86.2-100 0.0 0.0-13.8 74.1 41.0-100 25.9 0.0-59.0 
3-month 99.6 88.5-100 0.4 0.0-11.5 78.4 48.0-100 21.6 0.0-52.0 
12-month 99.9 96.5-100 0.1 0.0-3.6 84.4 63.1-97.0 15.6 3.0-36.9 
24-month 100 98.2-100 0.0 0.0-1.8 85.2 66.5- 97.3 14.8 2.7- 33.5 
60-month 100 99.3-100 0.0 0.0-0.7 85.7 67.3 97.2 14.3 2.8- 32.7 
SLOVENIA         
1-month 95.4 38.9-100 4.6 0.0-61.1 14.9 0.0-81.6 85.1 100-18.4 
3-month 89.9 39.3-100 10.1 0.0-60.7 22.2 0.0-87.0 77.8 100-13.0 
12-month 92.9 56.7-99.9 7.1 0.1-43.3 8.1 3.3-65.2 91.9 96.7-34.8 
24-month 95.5 74.6-99.9 4.5 0.1-25.4 3.8 0.9-61.9 96.2 99.1-38.1 
60-month 98.0 90.3-100 2.0 0.0-9.7 4.3 0.3-66.9 95.7 99.7-33.1 
Note: Column I and III reflect contributions of the real and nominal shocks, respectively, to the forecast variance 
error of the real exchange rate; columns V and VII contain the contributions of the same shocks to movements of 
the nominal exchange rate; the numbers in columns II, IV, VI and VIII represent the bootstrapped confidence 
intervals calculated for a particular percentage of variance decomposition. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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With regard to the OMSs (Annex A.4, Table A.4.1), there is no doubt that real 
shocks are responsible for real exchange rate movements in all countries but Spain, 
where at the 3-month forecast horizon, a nominal shock explains 10 percent of real 
exchange rate volatility. Real shocks also move nominal exchange rates in Germany 
and France and to the lesser extend in Italy. For Greece, the nominal shock is 
persistent and amounts to around 30 percent of the nominal exchange rate volatility 
for all forecast horizons. For Portugal it remains at the 20 percent level. For Spain it 
drops to around 15 percent already after a year. Interestingly, despite the fact that all 
countries included in the OMS group except for Germany adopted some form of de 
facto pegged exchange rate regime to the DM, relatively little distortion caused by 
that fact seems to arise. The temporary component in the real exchange rate forecast 
error variance in all the countries is virtually nonexistent.   
Impulse Responses.  
Overall the shocks seem to be well identified, i.e. the restrictions imposed on (1)Θ  
make it possible to obtain impulse response functions (in response to structural 
innovations), which are consistent with an economic theory. As required by the 
identification assumption, in all cases, the one unit impact of the nominal shock on 
the real exchange rate is temporary (see Figure 1.1 below). Testing the hypothesis 
that a positive nominal shock has a proportional, long-run, effect on a nominal 
exchange rate (i.e., imposing the restriction D(2,2)=1) brought mixed results, but 
overall showed that a positive nominal shock leads to currency depreciation (i.e., 
D(2,2) is always positive, see Table 1.5.3).  
Table 1.5.3 Test of Long-Run Over-identifying Restrictions 
  L_BAND D(2,2) U_BAND 
Czech Rep. 0.18 0.40 0.50 
Hungary 0.74 3.84 4.24 
Poland 0.61 2.02 2.43 
Slovakia 0.13 0.67 0.87 
Slovenia 0.16 0.72 0.46 
 
Note: Columns L_Band and U_Band stand for the lower and upper band,  
respectively, of 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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This effect is less than proportional in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Despite the fact that the overshooting effect is present in Poland and 
Hungary46, the bootstrapped 90% confidence bands are rather wide. Finally, a 
positive real shock, in all countries, causes long-run nominal and real exchange rate 
depreciation (perhaps with the exception of Slovenia, where the real exchange rate 
appreciates over time). This provides some evidence against the ‘exchange rate 
disconnect’ theory – if nominal exchange rate movements were fully passed-through 
to the general consumer price index (i.e., they were fully offset by relative price 
changes), the real exchange rate would be constant. In this case, the nominal 
exchange rate flexibility would not be able to bring about the expenditure-switching 
mechanism. The remainder of this section deals with individual country cases47: 
                                                
 
46
 The D(2,2) coefficient is significantly above 1. Also, as figures showing the impact of the nominal 
shocks on nominal exchange rates in these countries indicate (see Figure 1.1), following the shock, 
nominal exchange rates never return to their initial values.  
47
 Impulse responses for the OMSs, as they are of little relevance for the study, are available upon 
request. 
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Figure 1.1 Impulse Responses (NMSs) 
 
 
Czech Republic        Hungary 
 
     
  Poland                 Slovak Republic 
 
Slovenia 
 
Note: RER – real exchange rate, NER - nominal exchange rate. The top two, out of four, panels 
presented for each country represent impulse responses of the RER to a unit of real and nominal 
shocks, respectively; the bottom two panels are impulse responses of the NER to a unit of real and 
nominal shocks, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, following a real shock, the real exchange rate jumps in the 
same direction but more than the nominal rate. After the initial jump, both rates 
return to their long-run values (0.0124 and 0.0106) within eleven and nine months, 
respectively. Given that the response of the real rate is larger than the response of the 
nominal rate indicates that permanent changes to the real exchange rate occurs 
through both the nominal exchange and the relative price. The fact that the nominal 
rate depreciates less in response to a real shock than the real rate does, indicates that 
the domestic relative price falls. One possible explanation of this outcome is that real 
shocks are supply-side shocks. The fact that the RER depreciates and not appreciates 
in response to the real shock in the Czech Republic does not support the hypothesis 
that the downward trend in the RER could be associated with a HBS effect in this 
country. It could be that either, the HBS effect is simply not responsible for the 
appreciating RER in this country. However, it could also be that the bivariate SVAR 
model is simply not capturing all sources of fluctuations with permanent effects on 
the RER48.  Along with the imposed identification restriction (D(1,2)=0), a nominal 
shock has no long-run effect on a real exchange rate. In the short-run, the real 
exchange rate increases, but this effect is not large and approaches zero in less than a 
year. In response to the nominal shock, the nominal exchange rate jumps away from 
zero, but the jump is of a very small and short-lasting magnitude, casting doubts 
about its significance. Finally, because nominal shocks have no long-run effects on 
real rates, and since nominal shocks do affect real exchange rate to some degree, 
nominal shocks have to affect prices by an equal but opposite amount (with some 
evidence of price sluggishness in the short-run). 
Hungary 
In Hungary, real shocks cause a long-term depreciation of both real and nominal 
exchange rates, indicating that the nominal exchange rate does absorb shocks which 
cause real exchange rate movements. The fact that the nominal rate depreciates more 
in response to a real shock than the real rate does, indicates that - in response to 
                                                
 
48
 Faust and Leeper (1997) make the point that if one identified structural shock consists of two 
independent shocks, then the BQ-SVAR methodology is valid only if the underlying macroeconomic 
variables respond to the two shocks in the same direction. 
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positive real shocks - domestic prices go up. One possible explanation of this 
outcome is that real shocks are demand-side shocks. In particular, given high and 
prolonged budget deficits in Hungary, this dynamic could be a result of fiscal 
shocks. Similar to the case of the Czech Republic, there is no evidence of the HBS 
effect in Hungary. In response to a nominal shock, after the initial (very minimal) 
appreciation, the real exchange rate comes back to the zero line – as predicted by the 
identification restriction (the effect does not last more than a year). On the other 
hand, following the nominal shock, the nominal exchange rate depreciates 
substantially and this depreciation is permanent. Because the movements of the RER 
is almost negligible when compared with the movements of the nominal exchange 
rate in response to the nominal shock, a possible explanation of those movements is 
that variations in the nominal exchange rate are due to monetary shocks, which cause 
proportional but inverse changes in domestic prices (with some evidence of 
overshooting as RER appreciates in the short-run). Notice that for the RER to 
appreciate when nominal rate deprecates, relative prices must appreciate as well. 
Poland 
In Poland, as in previous cases, a real shock causes real and nominal exchange rates 
to depreciate. The fact that real exchange rate depreciates in response to the tradable 
productivity shock casts doubts about the presence of the HBS effect also in this 
country. The adjustment path for the real rate nevertheless differs from that of the 
nominal rate. Following the real shock, the real rate goes through a brief period of 
revaluation relative to the initial depreciation. After a year a steady depreciation is 
observed. This indicates that the shock could be related to positive productivity 
improvements, which are associated with price decreases. In the case of the nominal 
rate, the final depreciation is lower than the initial response. The fact that the real 
exchange rate depreciates more than the nominal rate in response to the real shock, 
suggests that a positive real shock causes domestic prices to decline and thus 
improves the country’s price competitiveness (as in the case of Czech Republic). In 
response to a nominal shock a real exchange rate overshoots its long-run value. The 
impact is long lasting. Were nominal shocks monetary in nature, this would indicate 
that monetary policy can influence both real and nominal exchange rates. 
Nevertheless, in the short-run, the response of the real exchange rate to a real shock 
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is greater. The same is not true for the nominal exchange rate. The response of the 
Polish zloty to a nominal shock is greater than it is to a real shock; there is also 
evidence of moderate ‘overshooting’ (although less so than in Hungary). However, 
the nominal exchange rate reaction function indicates that the nominal exchange rate 
achieves its new long-run level in less than a year.  
The Slovak Republic 
An interesting feature of the impulse response analysis conducted for the Slovak 
Republic is that, although the magnitudes are somewhat different, the shapes of 
reaction functions are the same for the real and nominal exchange rates in response 
to a real and nominal shock, respectively. In the short-run, the real exchange rate 
depreciates more in response to the real shock than the nominal exchange rate does. 
Again, as in cases of Czech Republic and Poland, this indicates an improvement in 
the country’s price competitiveness and brings no support for the HBS effect. 
Looking at the effects of nominal shocks on real and nominal exchange rates, it is 
hard to see any significant evidence of overshooting. Even if both rates do move in 
response to nominal shocks affecting them, the jump is less than proportional (this is 
confirmed by the 90% confidence bands) and relatively small.  
Slovenia 
In Slovenia, the impulse response functions of real and nominal exchange rates are 
different depending on the shock hitting the economy. In response to a real shock, 
initial fluctuations of the real exchange rate are observed. The long-run value is only 
modestly higher when compared with the ‘starting’ level. As the real shock causes a 
long-run moderate appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, and the real exchange 
rate is almost constant, this suggests that the nominal rate has been moving in the 
opposite direction to the relative price. In response to a nominal shock, the real 
exchange rate jumps above its long run value, but the jump does not seem to be 
significant. The nominal exchange rate does not jump, but rather depreciates 
steadily. This is in line with the accommodative exchange rate policy geared at 
stabilizing real exchange rate conducted by Slovenian authorities – i.e. following a 
shock which results in price changes, in order to keep the real exchange rate 
constant, nominal depreciation is required (see also footnote 22). Given this 
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discretionary exchange rate policy in Slovenia, it is also not surprising that the 
nominal shock dominates nominal exchange rate movement (i.e., nominal shocks 
can be most likely interpreted as monetary policy shocks in this country). Overall, 
the scale of impulse responses in Slovenia, with the exception of the response of the 
nominal rate to the nominal shock, is minimal. 
Robustness Checks. 
Since the Faust and Leeper (1997) critique relating to the potential invalidity of 
imposing long-run restrictions to the finite sample is particularly important for VAR 
models with a large lag order, it is important to check the robustness of the 
performed structural VAR analysis. As showed by Lastrapes (1998) the robustness 
checks can be performed by re-estimating the bivariate SVAR model with the 
identifying restrictions imposed at different finite horizons. Annex A.3, Figure 
A.3.2, sets out the results of this analysis, and shows that impulse responses change 
very little in terms of original dynamics. Therefore, the structural VAR analysis can 
be said to be robust to the Faust and Leeper’s (1997) critique, and that the horizon of 
60 months can sufficiently approximate the long-run49. 
1.6  CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the results obtained from the univariate variance analysis as well as the 
structural VAR, the following comments and conclusions about the real convergence 
process in the NMSs of the EU can be drawn. 
 
As the estimates show, based on the proposed definition of real convergence, to 
lessen the costs of the eurozone membership, the levels of volatility in the NMSs 
will have to be reduced (with the exception of Slovenia50 and Estonia). This is 
because, despite the progress in real convergence, average volatility for the NMSs is 
currently 1.9 times higher than the average volatility of the selected OMSs analysed 
in this chapter in the mid-1990s (1.5 higher than it was for the average of Club Med 
                                                
 
49
 The results for the OMSs are available upon request. 
50
 As Slovenia is already in the eurozone, it can be said that – based on the proposed indicator – it was 
ready to give up its monetary and exchange rate policy and should benefit from the euro adoption. 
62 
 
countries and 3.5 times higher than the average estimated for France and Germany). 
The plots of the estimated quarterly time varying conditional variances for real 
exchange rates seem to support these findings. 
 
The fact that real shocks dominate real exchange rate movements implies that the 
univariate analysis undertaken in this chapter provides an accurate measure of real 
exchange rate variance (at least for countries for which VAR analysis was possible). 
Given the moderate impact of nominal shocks to real exchange rate variability at the 
3-month forecast horizon, it is not implausible to assume that monthly and quarterly 
volatility changes represent the ‘true’ magnitude of real convergence in these 
countries. However, due to the presence of nominal shocks, in the case of Poland, 
monthly and quarterly real exchange rate volatility should be scaled down by 
approximately 40 and 31 percent, respectively; in the case of the Czech Republic by 
12 and 8 percent. Likewise, because the variance decomposition for the Club Med 
countries as well as France and Germany shows that real shocks dominated real 
exchange rates in these countries, the benchmark magnitudes for real convergence 
can be treated with confidence. 
 
Although at the time of writing Estonia does not fulfil the nominal Maastricht 
inflation criterion, it seems that – based on the proposed definition – it could benefit 
from full integration into the EMU. Given that Estonia has managed to cope without 
monetary independence for over ten years, and given its comparatively flexible 
labour and product markets, Estonia could benefit from the euro adoption51. As for 
the rest of the countries, more effort is needed in reducing idiosyncratic real shocks. 
The proposed indicator for real convergence, ex post, does not support Slovakian 
admission into the eurozone in January 2009. Giving up monetary independence 
may be premature because existing asymmetries are not insignificant, and in fact are 
higher than those observed in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania (in the third 
sub-sample). Finally, analysis in the case of Poland, once real exchange rate 
volatility is scaled down for the presence of nominal shocks, imply that the country 
                                                
 
51
 Moreover, the policies needed to target current imbalances, in the currency union, would not be 
different to those required under a currency board. At the same time Estonia could enjoy the benefits 
of the common currency. 
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has achieved a level of real convergence with the eurozone comparable to other 
countries in the NMSs’ group52.  
 
The structural VAR analysis showed that in all countries except for Slovenia, for 
which it was possible to estimate VAR models, the nominal exchange rate does 
move in the same direction as the real exchange rate at the onset of a real shock, and 
thus does play a shock-stabilising role. Therefore, loss of the nominal exchange rate 
as an adjustment instrument would represent a cost of the euro area membership.  
 
In the case of Poland (and to a lesser degree in the Czech Republic), the importance 
of nominal shocks in the real exchange rate forecast error variance does not indicate 
that there is no cost in losing the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment instrument. 
This is because nominal shocks seem not to be destabilizing (similarly to other 
investigated countries), indicating that there is still some room for short-run 
effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policy in changing the real exchange 
rate in this country. However, it is also true that more stable monetary policy could 
result in a greater real exchange rate stability53.   
 
The results of the Blanchard and Quah variance decomposition show that the 
nominal component of nominal exchange rate movements in the five countries 
included in the SVAR modelling is not insignificant (perhaps to a lesser degree in 
the case of Slovakia)54. Therefore, elimination of these movements could be a 
positive benefit of speedy accession to the euro area. However, given the need to 
fulfil Maastricht criteria first, and the relatively significant degree of real asymmetry, 
there may be risks to premature ERMII participation (i.e. due to increased capital 
flows or consumption booms). Additionally, significant nominal exchange rate 
responses to real shocks in all five NMSs except for Slovenia need to be analysed 
                                                
 
52
 In the case of Poland, without the SVAR analysis, the univariate approach would produce distorted 
results.  
53
 The possibility of effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies in changing Polish 
competitiveness was also concluded by Dibooglu and Kutan (2001). However, in their study, a 
nominal shock dominates a real exchange rate forecast error variance to a greater degree.  
54
 The nominal exchange rate volatility in the OMSs was mainly driven by real factors (to the lesser 
degree in Spain and Greece). 
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and taken into account in assessing nominal exchange rate stability at the end of the 
ERMII period55. 
 
Finally, given (i) that real asymmetric shocks are not insignificant when compared 
with the Club Med countries, (ii) the stabilising role of nominal exchange rates (with 
the exception of Slovenia), and (iii) the fact that nominal shocks, on average, do not 
move real exchange rates, the NMSs may be well advised to take their time in 
joining the eurozone (except for Estonia and Slovenia (ex post)). In the interim they 
may do well to concentrate on enhancing structural reforms, until they are ready to 
give up monetary and exchange rate independence.  
 
                                                
 
55
 Given the broad classification of shocks, at this stage, without further identification of shocks, it is 
impossible to investigate the split between supply and demand shocks. 
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ANNEX A.1 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION AND INTEGRATION PROPERTIES 
Figure A.1.1 Exchange Rates and Price Ratio Developments in the NMSs 
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Note: The magnitudes of relative prices and real exchange rates’ indices are on the LHS axis; the magnitudes of 
nominal exchange rates’ indices on the RHS axis. Indices are defined with the base of 2005=100. Decrease in the 
exchange rate index indicates appreciation. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Eurostat and IMF IFS.  
 
Table A.1.1 Properties of Real Exchange Rates in a Data (NMSs) 
FULL SAMPLE
Persistance
Nominal Exchnage Rate 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.47 0.18 0.33 0.27 0.70
t-stat 2.58 3.83 5.11 7.11 2.42 4.66 3.73 12.86
Real Exchange Rate 0.14 0.69 0.24 0.53 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.53
t-stat 1.94 12.68 3.30 8.43 5.59 3.71 3.02 8.28
Cross-Correlations
Real and Nominal Exchnage Rates 0.94 0.31 0.92 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.89 0.77
Lithuania Poland Slovak Rep. SloveniaCzech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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NER RER PR NER RER PR NER RER PR NER RER PR
CZE -0.9 -1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -1.7 -1.4 -2.4 -5.8 -4.8 … … …
EST … -2.1 … … -1.0 … … -2.4 … … … …
HUN -0.9 -1.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.8 -1.5 -3.2 -6.5 -5.5 0.4 … …
LTU … -0.3 … … -0.1 … … -0.1 … … … …
LVA … -0.4 … … -0.4 … … -0.5 … … … …
POL -0.2 -1.7 -1.7 -0.2 -1.7 -0.8 -0.3 -5.8 -2.0 … … …
SVK -0.5 -2.6 0.1 -0.5 -2.5 0.1 -1.3 -13.8 0.3 … … …
SVN -0.2 -3.0 -0.5 -0.3 -3.0 -0.7 -0.5 -18.1 -1.8 0.3 0.3 …
FRA -2.0 -2.2 -1.1 -1.9 -2.1 -0.9 -7.0 -8.7 -1.9 … … 0.2
DEU -1.5 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.5 -4.6 -5.0 -4.7 … … …
ESP -1.2 -1.4 -1.3 -1.0 -1.1 -0.6 -2.3 -2.7 -1.2 … … …
GRC -1.7 -2.0 -0.4 -1.7 -2.1 -0.5 -6.3 -9.1 -1.1 … … …
ITA -1.5 -1.5 -0.8 -1.5 -1.5 -0.8 -5.0 -4.9 -1.8 … … …
PRT -1.1 -1.2 -1.5 -0.8 -0.9 -1.5 -1.5 -2.1 -4.3 … … …
KPSSDF-GLS MZt MZa
Table A.1.2 Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: NER - nominal exchange rate; RER – real exchange rate; PR – price ratio. Bolden magnitudes 
indicate significant tests at the 5 per cent level; i.e., stationarity of exchange rate or/and price ratio 
series in levels; kmax=int(12*(T/100)^(0.25)), where kmax stands for the maximum augmentation 
lags allowed for.   
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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Table A.1.3 Unit Root Test with a Break 
_CZE _EST _HUN _LTU _LVA _POL _SVK _SVN _FRA _DEU _ESP _GRC _ITA _PRT
Break point 77.0 n/a 64.0 n/a n/a 54.0 109.0 110.0 65.0 65.0 14.0 24.0 29.0 14.0
Dummy_coeff. 0.0 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat -22.2 n/a -53.2 n/a n/a -23.7 -27.9 -17.9 0.5 0.6 -12.5 -9.3 -10.6 -10.3
Trend_coeff. 0.0 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat 9.4 n/a 72.1 n/a n/a 29.6 23.1 66.0 -0.8 3.1 15.0 15.7 11.0 11.8
Fixed lag 10.0 n/a 11.0 n/a n/a 11.0 1.0 7.0 0.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 8.0 9.0
y(a-1) -0.1 n/a -0.2 n/a n/a -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
ADF -3.0 n/a -4.4 n/a n/a -3.4 -3.7 -5.1 -2.2 -1.7 -3.7 -3.4 -2.7 -2.9
Break point 161.0 161.0 33.0 157.0 161.0 161.0 113.0 151.0 65.0 65.0 14.0 14.0 28.0 14.0
Dummy_coeff. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat 2.6 3.6 -11.2 4.6 3.1 1.9 -13.0 4.4 0.1 0.4 -9.3 0.9 -9.3 -6.5
Trend_coeff. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat -56.9 -18.6 4.9 -20.5 -15.0 -18.7 -46.2 -18.7 6.3 6.0 10.0 -2.0 7.5 6.1
Fixed lag 10.0 13.0 10.0 12.0 8.0 10.0 11.0 7.0 0.0 7.0 1.0 5.0 7.0 7.0
y(a-1) -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
ADF -2.4 -2.2 -3.3 -1.7 -2.1 -2.5 -4.0 -3.1 -2.4 -1.7 -3.1 -2.0 -2.2 -3.1
Break point 161.0 n/a 161.0 n/a n/a 161.0 18.0 151.0 24.0 44.0 65.0 86.0 14.0 65.0
Dummy_coeff. 0.0 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat 5.8 n/a 6.0 n/a n/a 6.1 7.0 9.2 -15.4 -7.7 4.0 6.6 2.0 -1.1
Trend_coeff. 0.0 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T-stat -23.0 n/a -35.6 n/a n/a -23.1 -11.2 -52.2 29.0 17.4 -31.1 -39.7 -6.2 -27.6
Fixed lag 10.0 n/a 3.0 n/a n/a 13.0 12.0 13.0 0.0 9.0 9.0 4.0 9.0 1.0
y(a-1) 0.0 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
ADF -2.1 n/a -2.5 n/a n/a -2.6 -1.1 -2.6 -4.9 -4.2 -2.0 -2.7 -2.6 -2.6
Perron (1997) NER
RER
PR
NER
RER
PR
 
 
Note: NER - nominal exchange rate; RER – real exchange rate; PR – price ratio.  
kmax=int(12*(T/100)^(0.25)), where kmax stands for the maximum augmentation lags allowed for. 
In the first column, ‘Break point’ indicates the position of the structural break. ‘Dummy_coeff’ stands 
for the estimated coefficient on the break dummy variable. ‘Trend_coeff’ stands for the estimated 
time trend coefficient. The lines ‘T-stat’ present t-statistics of the break dummy and time trend 
coefficients, respectively. In the line ‘Fixed lag’, the selected number of lags is reported. The ‘y(a-1)’ 
line stands for the estimate of the autoregressive parameter. Finally, ‘ADF’ is an ADF t-statistic (i.e. 
t-statistics on the autoregressive parameter). 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
Table A.1.4 Significance of Volatility Changes: NMSs 
93-98 96-07 93-98 96-07 93-07
Czech Republic 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.04
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.00
Hungary 0.75 0.98 0.77 0.00 0.05
Latvia 0.27 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.03
Lithuania 0.95 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
Poland 0.88 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.24
Slovakia 0.75 0.16 0.37 0.71 0.00
Slovenia 0.08 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.00
Country White Heteroskedasticity ARCH
 
Note: Columns ‘White Heteroskedasticity’ and ‘ARCH’ report p-values of the conducted heteroskedasticity and 
ARCH tests on the residuals obtained from the OLS estimated regressions of real exchange rate changes on their 
own lags in the two sub-samples, 1993-1998 and 1996-2007. Bolden magnitudes indicate significant values at the 
10% significance level. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
69 
 
Table A.1.5 Significance of Volatility Changes: OMSs 
Germany 0.01 0.15
France mean_eq 0.01
Italy 0.00 0.07
Greece 0.94 0.04
Portugal 0.03 0.10
Spain 0.88 0.51
Country White Heteroskedasticity ARCH
 
Note: Columns ‘White Heteroskedasticity’ and ‘ARCH’ report p-values of the conducted heteroskedasticity and 
ARCH tests on the residuals obtained from the OLS estimated regressions of real exchange rate changes on their 
own lags in the whole samples, 1993-1998. Bolden magnitudes indicate significant values at the 10% 
significance level. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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ANNEX A.2 TIME VARYING CONDITIONAL VARIANCES (REAL EXCHANGE RATES) 
 
Figure A.2. 1 Time Varying Conditional Variances (NMSs, OMSs, Monthly) 
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Note: Vertical axis present one-step ahead standard deviation σt for each observation in the sample. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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Figure A.2.2 Time Varying Conditional Variances (NMSs and OMSs, 
Quarterly) 
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Note: Vertical axis present one-step ahead standard deviation σt for each observation in the sample. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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ANNEX A.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND CHECKS 
 
 
Table A.3.1 Misspecification Tests 
Portmanteau p-val no cross terms cross terms
CZE 6 0.00 0.00
CZE_DUM 6 0.00 0.01
HUN 6 0.59 0.20
POL 3 0.14 0.08
SVK 1 0.00 0.00
SVK_93 7 0.00 0.00
SVN_96 6 0.05 0.01
DEU 1 0.81 0.79
ESP 1 0.01 0.02
FRA 1 0.83 0.90
GRC 3 0.62 0.58
ITA 3 0.00 0.00
PRT 1 0.01 0.02
PRT_DUM 1 0.00 0.02
0.0121 0.09
0.0023 0.39
0.1139 0.30
0.0000 0.10
0.0001 0.07
0.0000 0.19
White Hetero
Doornik-Hansen
0.0000 0.22
Country Lags Normality Autocorrelation
0.0000 0.21
0.1965 0.61
0.5493 0.26
0.0000 0.22
0.0000 0.13
0.6609 0.19
0.0970 0.33
 
Note: The lines CZE_DUM and PRT_DUM present results from estimating models specified with the 
dummy variable detected by structural break tests; lines SVN_93 and SVN_96 present results from 
estimating the models with the data spanning form 1993M4 to 2006M12 and from 1996M1 to 
2006M12, respectively. The column marked ‘Lags’ includes number of lags chooses by the AIC 
criterion for the final estimation of VAR models. Columns ‘Normality’, Autocorrelation’ and ‘White 
Hetero’ present p-values attached to estimated tests; figures in bold indicate that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
Source: Author‘s estimates based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data 
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Table A.3.2 ARCH Test on Individual Residuals from VAR Equations 
ARCH(12) LM Test Estimator Engel's LM Statistic
Probability Engel's LM 
Statistic
Probability
Czech Republic OLS 26.09 0.01 19.20 0.08
Czech Republic_DUM OLS 8.72 0.73 6.11 0.91
Hungary OLS 8.20 0.77 9.96 0.62
Poland OLS 18.88 0.09 18.16 0.11
Slovak Rep. OLS 17.32 0.14 30.36 0.00
Slovak Rep. WLS 8.66 0.73 14.33 0.28
Slovenia OLS 10.47 0.58 19.90 0.07
Slovenia WLS 8.93 0.71 4.22 0.98
Germany OLS 3.41 0.99 3.16 0.99
France OLS 10.50 0.57 10.14 0.60
Ita ly OLS 4.84 0.96 3.65 0.99
Ita ly WLS 14.12 0.29 10.18 0.60
Greece OLS 0.97 1.00 1.16 1.00
Portugal OLS 31.53 0.00 34.44 0.00
Portugal_DUM WLS 9.59 0.65 15.47 0.22
Spain OLS 24.47 0.02 13.66 0.32
Spain WLS 18.05 0.11 13.66 0.32
RER NER
 
 
Note: The lines CZE_DUM and PRT_DUM present results from estimating models specified with the dummy 
variable detected by structural break tests; 
Source: Author‘s estimates based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data 
 
Table A.3.3 Bai et al., Structural Break Test 
Country Sample Lags Sup-W-15% Exp-W-15% Est Break 90% Conf. Int.
CZE 1996:10-2007:11 6 0.58 0.80 _1999:3  (1998:12, 1999:6) 
HUN 1993:8-2007:11 6 1.00 1.00 _1997:5 (1996:9,1998:1)
POL 1996:3-2007:11 3 0.15 0.19 _2000:3 (2000:1,2000:5)
SVK 1997:3-2007:11 1 0.02 0.01 _2000:11 (1999:8, 2002:2) 
SVN 1996:8-2006:12 6 0.48 0.57 _2002:3 (2001:11, 2002:7) 
FRA 1993:3-1998:12 1 0.45 0.41 _1995:3 (1993:8,1996:10)
DEU 1993:3-1998:12 1 0.25 0.35 _1994:11 (1993:10,1995:12)
ESP 1993:3-1998:12 1 0.01 0.01 _1994:11 (1994:6,1995:4)
GRC 1993:5-2000:12 3 0.19 0.10 _1996:2 (1995:8,1996:8)
ITA 1993:5-1998:12 3 0.61 0.74 _1996:8 (1996:3,1997:1)
PRT 1993:3-1998:12 1 0.87 0.84 _1994:2 (X,1995:8)
 
Note: The highlighted p-values indicate the significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level. 
Source: Author‘s estimates based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data 
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Table A.3.4 Hansen Structural Break Test 
TEST Lags Breakpoint
EXCHANGE RATE SupF ExpF AveF SupF ExpF AveF SupF ExpF AveF
NER_CZE 6 29 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.03 0.03 0.22
RER_CZE 6 29 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.04 0.04 0.31
NER_HUN 6 151 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.23 0.00
RER_HUN 6 113 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.00
NER_POL 3 101 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.03
RER_POL 3 101 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.28 0.23 0.06
NER_SVK 1 25 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.38 0.28
RER_SVK 1 25 0.47 0.85 0.94 0.48 0.89 0.94 0.55 0.86 0.92
NER_SVN 6 22 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.27 0.10
RER_SVN 6 66 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.01
NER_FRA 1 18 0.72 0.56 0.61 0.69 0.60 0.66 0.76 0.70 0.72
RER_FRA 1 17 0.91 0.72 0.75 0.87 0.75 0.77 0.85 0.75 0.75
NER_DEU 1 25 0.23 0.50 0.74 0.19 0.50 0.75 0.14 0.41 0.65
RER_DEU 1 25 0.13 0.31 0.63 0.13 0.34 0.67 0.10 0.30 0.56
NER_ESP 1 10 0.24 0.22 0.43 0.23 0.26 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.47
RER_ESP 1 10 0.29 0.31 0.57 0.24 0.36 0.61 0.47 0.51 0.58
NER_GRC 3 60 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.64 0.66 0.59
RER_GRC 3 15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.73 0.61
NER_ITA 3 14 0.08 0.07 0.61 0.13 0.14 0.68 0.15 0.14 0.23
RER_ITA 3 14 0.09 0.06 0.60 0.15 0.14 0.69 0.12 0.10 0.24
NER_PRT 1 8 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.04 0.22
RER_PRT 1 8 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.03 0.03 0.35
Andrews Bootstarp Hetero-Corrected
 
Note: Highlighted p-values indicate the significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level.  
Source: Author’s estimates.  
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3.1 CUSUM Sum and Sum of Squared Residuals Test 
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Source: Author’s estimations based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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Figure A.3.2 Robustness Checks (NMSs) 
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Note: For each country, the first three panels in a first row present nominal exchange rates responses to real 
shocks with restrictions imposed on 1-year, 3-year and 5-year horizon, respectively. The second row is presented 
accordingly, but indicates nominal rates’ responses to nominal shocks. Dashed lines are the lines with the 
identifying restrictions imposed at infinite horizons; solid lines, in respective panels, represent restrictions 
imposed on 1-year, 3-year and 5-year horizons. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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ANNEX A.4 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION AND IMPULSE RESPONSES (OMSS) 
 
Table A.4.1 Variance Decomposition (OMSs) 
Variable RER NER 
Variance 
Decomposition 
RER shock NER shock RER shock NER shock 
GERMANY         
1-month 99.8 94.1-100 0.2 0.0-5.9 96.6 86.0-100.0 3.4 0.0-14.0 
3-month 100 98.0-100 0.0 0.0-2.0 97.5 92.6- 99.9 2.5 0.1-7.4 
12-month 100 99.5-100 0.0 0.0-0.5 97.8 94.6-99.7 2.2 0.3-5.4 
24-month 100 99.8-100 0.0 0.0-0.2 97.9 95.0- 99.7 2.1 0.3-5.0 
60-month 100 99.9-100 0.0 0.0-0.1 97.9 95.1- 99.7 2.1 0.3-4.9 
SPAIN         
1-month 87.2 14.0-100 12.8 0.0-86.0 67.4 0.0-94.6 32.6 5.3-100 
3-month 89.9 21.8-100 10.1 0.0-78.2 73.6 9.1-99.6 26.4 0.4-90.9 
12-month 97.2 74.0-100 2.8 0.0-26.0 84.8 34.2-99.1 15.2 0.9-65.8 
24-month 98.7 85.5-100 1.3 0.0-14.5 87.9 44.5-99.9 12.1 0.1-55.5 
60-month 99.5 89.5-100 0.5 0.0-10.5 89.8 45.3-100.0 10.2 0.0-54.7 
FRANCE          
1-month 99.9 96.1-100 0.1 0.0-3.9 93.2 83.2-100 6.8 0.0-16.8 
 3-month 100 97.8-100 0.0 0.0-2.2 93.9 87.6-98.3 6.1 1.7-12.4 
12-month 100 99.4-100 0.0 0.0-0.6 94.1 89.1-97.6 5.9 2.4-10.9 
24-month 100 99.7-100 0.0 0.0-0.3 94.1 89.4-97.7 5.9 2.3-10.6 
60-month 100 99.9-100 0.0 0.0-0.1 94.1 89.7-98.1 5.9 1.9-10.3 
GREECE         
1-month 96.2 72.6-100 3.8 0.0-27.4 76.7 31.2-100 23.3 0.0-68.8 
3-month 96.0 76.3-100 4.0 0.0-23.7 74.5 30.9-99.9 25.5 0.1-69.1 
12-month 98.6 92.3-100 1.4 0.0-7.7 70.2 29.9-97.1 29.8 2.9-70.1 
24-month 99.3 96.1-100 0.7 0.0-3.9 68.9 28.4-96.7 31.1 3.3-71.6 
60-month 99.7 98.4-100 0.3 0.0-1.6 68.0 27.9-96.8 32.0 3.2-72.1 
ITALY         
1-month 98.2 57.8-100 1.8 0.0-42.2 90.9 36.9-100 9.1 0.0-63.1 
3-month 99.5 71.9-100 0.5 0.0-28.1 96.5 61.3-100 3.5 0.0-38.7 
12-month 99.9 89.4-100 0.1 0.0-10.6 98.0 82.1-99.8 2.0 0.2-17.9 
24-month 99.9 93.5-100 0.1 0.0-6.5 98.2 86.0-99.7 1.8 0.3-14.0 
60-month 100 96.9-100 0.0 0.0-3.1 98.4 87.8-99.9 1.6 0.1-12.2 
PORTUGAL  
 
      
1-month 99.3 76.0-100 0.7 0.0-24.0 74.9 32.2-100 25.1 0.0-67.8 
3-month 99.8 83.9-100 0.2 0.0-16.1 71.4 32.3-99.1 28.6 0.9-67.7 
12-month 99.9 95.2-100 0.1 0.0-4.8 69.1 30.7-95.0 30.9 5.0-69.3 
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24-month 100 97.5-100 0.0 0.0-2.5 68.7 27.1-94.4 31.3 5.6-72.9 
60-month 100 99.0-100 0.0 0.0-1.0 68.4 26.6-95.9 31.6 4.1-73.5 
Note: Column I and III reflect contributions of the real and nominal shocks, respectively, to the forecast variance 
error of the real exchange rate; columns V and VII contain the contributions of the same shocks to movements of 
the nominal exchange rate; the numbers in columns II, IV, VI and VIII represent the bootstrapped confidence 
intervals calculated for a particular percentage of variance decomposition. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IMF IFS and EUROSTAT data. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPLAINING REAL EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS IN NEW 
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – A BASIC SMALL 
OPEN ECONOMY MODEL 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. First, within a SOE-DSGE IRBC model, to 
examine the extent to which real factors are responsible for the real exchange rate 
movements in the NMSs of the EU. A special emphasis is put on investigating the 
observed persistent appreciation in these countries since the early 1990s (see  
Figure A.1.1, Annex A.1 in Chapter 1), and in Poland in particular. Second, it seeks 
to generate within a DSGE framework the RER variability and persistence that is 
observed in the NMSs. A basic, one-sector, version of the model is presented here. 
An expanded, two-sector, version of the model is presented in Chapter 3. 
 
Although there has been much discussion about real exchange rate movements in the 
NMSs in recent years (mainly due to their obligation to join the eurozone, and thus 
the requirement to meet Maastricht criteria and eventually abandon independent 
monetary and exchange rate policies), formal analyses usually consist of empirical 
studies, which utilize time-series or panel data econometric methods of the kind 
presented in Chapter 156. To date very few DSGE models have been developed for 
the NMSs. Exceptions include Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007), Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003), Masten (2008), Vilagi (2005), Lipińska (2008, 2008a) and Kolasa 
(2009). This is surprising given the recent trends in macroeconomic modelling, and 
the usefulness of adopting DSGE models for policy purposes. Also, given the 
existing data constraints in the new members of the EU, and the fact that limited data 
is required for DSGE modelling, this type of analysis should be even more attractive 
in the context of these economies. Of the DSGE-based studies for the NMSs that 
                                                
 
56
 See also Egert (2002) or MacDonald and Wojcik (2004). 
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have been developed, none look explicitly at real exchange rate determinants, nor 
seek to match the magnitude of the real exchange rate volatility observed in the 
NMSs. For example, Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007), examine the choice of 
exchange rate regime in the NMSs of the EU during the process of accession to the 
eurozone in the presence of the HBS effect. Laxton and Pesenti (2003), use their 
model to assess the effectiveness of Taylor rules and Inflation-Forecast-Based rules 
in stabilizing variability of output and inflation. Vilagi (2005) analyses the results of 
different productivity growth rates in traded and nontraded goods sectors on the 
timing of the entry into the eurozone and argues that the HBS effect can be 
consistent with the NOEM model, but only when firms price to the market. Masten 
(2008) looks at similar issues to Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007) but unlike 
them uses a nonstationary DSGE model. Lipińska (2008, 2008a) investigates optimal 
monetary policy subject to Maastricht nominal convergence criteria. And finally, 
Kolasa (2009) presents an estimated DSGE model for Poland and the euro area and 
applies it to an assessment of the degree of heterogeneity between these two regions.    
 
The goals set out in this paper are important for a number of reasons. First, the 
absence of a SOE model that explains real exchange rate determinants for a typical 
NMS is a gap in literature, given that such a model would be a useful policy tool to 
help analyse macroeconomic imbalances. Second, if progress is to be made in real 
convergence, it is important to detect sources of real asymmetries between NMSs 
and the eurozone (as argued in Chapter 1, real exchange rate volatility is a good 
indicator of real convergence, as its variability reflects underlying economic 
conditions). Moreover, to the extent that shocks that lead to real exchange rate 
movements in the NMSs that are obliged to adopt the euro are persistent and real in 
nature, they will also lead to inflation differentials between the NMSs and the 
eurozone. Third, Engel’s (1999) empirical findings that in developed countries non-
tradeables can be ignored in understanding RER movements, the weak evidence of 
the HBS effect in the NMSs (Egert (2002), Błaszkiewicz, et al. (2004), Mihaljek and 
Klau (2004), Wagner (2005)), and the hypothesis suggested in empirical work (Egert 
and Lommatzsch (2004), Lommatzsch and Tober (2004), Hanousek and Filer (2004) 
or Broeck and Slok (2006)) that the international deviations of the relative price of 
tradable goods led by quality changes may be responsible for the observed real 
exchange rate appreciation in the NMSs, all suggest that a one-sector model of RER 
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determinants may also be suitable for the NMSs of the EU. Finally, identifying an 
economic model that can generate enough volatility as well as persistence of real 
exchange rates is not an easy task, even in the two-country symmetric DSGE set-up 
with nominal rigidities (see for example Chari et al. (2002), Søndergaard (2004)). 
The difficulty of explaining high and persistent RER volatility is regarded as 
‘puzzle’ in the international macroeconomic literature. Indeed, also SOE-DSGE 
models calibrated to the NMSs have tended not to be able to generate RER volatility 
of the degree observed in the data (see Lipińska (2008, 2008a) or  
Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007)). The exception is the model proposed by 
Laxton and Pesenti (2003), where modelled real exchange rate volatility is higher 
than that observed in the data. Therefore, it is of interest to see whether a standard 
international business cycle model of the kind proposed in this chapter can generate 
the volatile and persistent real exchange rates observed in the NMSs.    
 
The findings of this chapter support the hypothesis that deviations from relative 
prices of tradable goods (i.e. quality and productivity shocks) are important sources 
of RER movements in the NMSs, represented by Poland  (although a preference 
consumption shock also matters). It is further shown that, within the model, only a 
shock that improves the quality of domestically produced goods leads to RER 
appreciation. Positive changes to productivity bring about a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Surprisingly, the basic IRBC SOE-DSGE model performs reasonably 
well in delivering persistent real exchange rate. This result is robust to changes in the 
model parameters. However, the fit of the model in terms of the key moments of the 
data, when calibrated to the Polish economy, depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign tradable goods, and its best matched when the value of 
this elasticity is very low. Therefore, the model needs further modification for the 
NMSs in order to be of use for policy purposes – the subject of Chapter 3.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the main 
features of the model. Section 3 sets out the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the 
parameterization of the model, and evaluates the model results and its ability to 
match the moments of the observed data. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.2  THE BASIC SOE MODEL – A NON- TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The model developed in this chapter is a simple one-sector small open economy 
model, in which it is assumed that the large economy is exogenous. The model 
includes home bias in consumption.  The inclusion of home bias in the model of real 
exchange rate determinants is crucial for endogenous real exchange rate fluctuations 
to occur. With its presence, even if there are no barriers to trade, and if the LOOP 
holds continuously at the level of each individual good, equilibrium deviations from 
PPP are possible. Home bias depends on the relative size of the economy and its 
degree of openness as in Sutherland (2002) or de Paoli (2004). Due to this 
assumption it is possible to consider a limiting case in which the home economy is of 
zero size (see Section 2.3.1 and Annex B.2 for more details). Home bias also 
diminishes the expenditure-switching mechanism, adding to RER persistence and 
captures well documented quality changes in the NMSs of the EU (see below). 
Another feature of the model is the presence of an exogenous quality factor, which 
captures quality changes occurring in the NMSs, as does the home bias factor. 
However, unlike the home bias channel, which captures the shift towards higher 
quality products from the demand side, the exogenous quality factor captures 
changes occurring on the supply side. Prices and wages in the model are assumed to 
be flexible, but there are imperfections in the goods market (i.e. firms are 
monopolistically competitive). Small and large economies produce one type of good 
(but consume both), called home ‘H’ and foreign ‘F’, respectively57. Markets for 
internationally traded state contingent securities are complete.  
 
The model differs in a number of ways from either existing DSGE models for the 
NMSs, and / or DSGE models of real exchange rates determinants for developed 
countries (see Chari et al. (2002), Devereux and Engel (2002) or Benigno and 
Thoenissen (2003)). The three principal areas of divergences of the proposed model 
from existing models are set out below.   
 
                                                
 
57
 Domestic and foreign goods in the Foreign country are indexed *H and *F , respectively. 
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First, all existing DSGE models for the NMSs include nominal rigidities (i.e., they 
are open economy Keynesian monetary models) and analyse the role of monetary 
policy and / or money in economic fluctuations. The model in this chapter does not 
include monetary policy in explaining real exchange rate movements (and other 
business cycle statistics). This is for three reasons. The first reason is that the 
observed real exchange rate appreciation in the NMSs has been persistent despite 
lowering inflation rates in these countries, pointing to a possibly larger role of real 
(or supply-side) factors in real exchange rate movements in these countries – a 
hypothesis which was confirmed by the previous chapter’s findings58. The second 
reason is that if real exchange rate movements are defined so as to measure real 
convergence in the NMSs, it is only of interest to detect how much of real exchange 
rate volatility can be explained by asymmetric real shocks (if the degree of real 
volatility is high, it points to a low degree of real convergence). The third reason is 
that, as shown in Søndergaard (2004), unless monetary policy shocks are assumed to 
be ten times more volatile than they really are, relying on the combination of 
nominal rigidities and monetary shocks does not help explain the observed real 
exchange rate volatility. In respect of the absence of monetary frictions, these are 
excluded in the model based on recent advances in the monetary theory and policy, 
which attributes a very limited role to money (usually this role is limited to a unit of 
account). As such, the model proposed in this paper may be viewed as a limiting 
case of a money-in-the-utility model, in which the weight of real balances in the 
utility function is arbitrarily close to zero (the so-called cashless economy as in 
Woodford (2003, Chapter 2)) 59.  
 
Second, the model proposed in this chapter is a one-sector model in which all goods 
are traded – i.e., the model explains real exchange rate behaviour by the movements 
of the relative prices of domestic and foreign tradables – i.e., the external real 
exchange rate. The fact that the model includes the tradable sector only also 
                                                
 
58
 The role of nominal shocks in explaining real exchange rate volatility in the NMS turned out to be 
limited. In particular, in Poland which is characterized by the most flexible exchange rate regime, 
nominal shocks accounted for around 30 percent of the RER variability (see Chapter 1). 
59
 It should be, however, stressed that the chapter does not argue the neutrality of money in economic 
fluctuations (coming from either monetary shocks or monetary policy). Nonetheless, as the primary 
concern of the chapter is to answer the question of the extent to which real factors contribute to the 
real exchange rate fluctuations, the proposed approach is appropriate for the purposes of this model.  
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distinguishes it from other DSGE models developed for the NMSs, which include 
both the tradable and nontradable sectors60. In this respect the model can be 
classified as belonging to the ‘Engel’ school. Examples of such models for 
developed countries can be found in Chari, et al. (2002), Devereux and Engel (2002), 
Søndergaard (2004) among others. The hypothesis that a one-sector model can also 
be suitable for the NMSs of the EU is supported by recent empirical studies (Egert 
and Lommatzsch (2004), Lommatzsch and Tober (2004), Hanousek and Filer (2004) 
or Broeck and Slok (2006)). In particular, these studies argue that a quality factor 
may be an important determinant of real exchange rate movements in Poland. For 
example, Egert and Lommatzsch (2004) and Broeck and Slok (2006), using panel 
data techniques, find that quality improvements of tradable goods in catching-up 
economies are a source of tradable real exchange rate appreciation. Lommatzsch and 
Tober (2004) bring support to the hypothesis that productivity increases in industry 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can be regarded as one source of the 
observed PPI-based real appreciation of the accession countries’ currencies. Because 
the productivity gains experienced during economic catch-up occur as higher-quality 
goods are produced (implying increased export capacity and import substitution), 
they conclude that to some extent real appreciation can therefore be viewed as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. Similarly, Hanousek and Filer (2004) show that the 
quality bias in the CPI index in the Czech Republic led to the overstatement of 
inflation by around 5 percentage points a year in the first decade of economic 
transformation. Section 2.4.1 of this chapter also shows that it is not an implausible 
assumption that quality changes are an important element of RER appreciation in 
Poland, reflecting the fact that recent improvements in the Polish terms-of-trade have 
also been associated with increases in export unit values, which in turn have been 
accompanied by increases in quantities exported.  
 
Third, the SOE model put forward in this chapter does not include local-currency-
pricing (LCP), which is usually present in DSGE models that attempt to address the 
issue of the volatility and persistence of real exchange rates. For example,  
Chari et al. (2002) in their attempt to resolve the problem propose a complete market 
                                                
 
60
 As mentioned, in general there are no DSGE models of real exchange rate determinants for the 
NMSs of the EU. Nonetheless, all other DSGE models developed for the NMSs include a nontradable 
sector.  
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model with sticky prices, LCP, and without a nontradable good (see also Devereux 
and Engel (2002)). They find that a high degree of real exchange rate volatility can 
only be achieved with monetary shocks. However, even if the observed Polish real 
exchange rate is volatile and persistent (see previous chapter), this finding is not 
satisfactory. This is because, as stressed above, the majority of the real exchange rate 
movements in Poland (and other the NMSs) are real in nature. Moreover, integrating 
the LCP component into the DSGE model would not be an appropriate strategy as 
the real exchange rate pass-through in Poland is higher than that of the US, although 
not complete (see Goldberg and Campa (2006)). Instead, in the absence of nominal 
rigidities in the model, to slow down the expenditure switching mechanism, home 
bias in consumption is relied on. In the presence of home bias, the perceived 
similarity between Home and Foreign tradable goods is lowered and thus the degree 
of real exchange rate pass-through is diminished.  
 
Finally, unlike the majority of existing models for the NMSs, the model in this 
chapter is calibrated to the Polish economy61.  
 2.3 THE SOE / DSGE / IRBC MODEL – TECHNICAL DETAILS 
In the model there is continuum of infinitely lived agents of unit mass, [0, ]s n∈   
belonging to the home country (‘Home’), and * ( ,1]s n∈  belonging to the large 
economy (represented by the eurozone and called ‘Foreign’), where n is the size of 
the home country.  It is assumed that n→0, so only the home economy is considered  
(i.e., the SOE case). There is no migration. Households consume all varieties of 
home and foreign goods and have access to international markets where they can 
trade a state-contingent real bond. Households supply labour services to firms as 
well as rent out the capital they own. The firms in both economies are distributed 
along the same intervals as households, i.e. domestic firms are indexed by [0, ]f n∈ , 
                                                
 
61
 At the time of writing none of the DSGE models developed for the NMSs were calibrated to 
Poland. As of now, the most recent version of Lipińska’s (2008a) paper and the work of Kolasa 
(2008) focus on Poland. Lipińska investigates optimal monetary policy subject to Maastricht nominal 
convergence criteria and uses calibration techniques. Kolasa presents an estimated DSGE model for 
Poland and the euro area and applies it to assess the degree of heterogeneity between these two 
regions. Otherwise, all above mentioned papers try to match the moments for the Czech Republic. 
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foreign firms by * ( ,1]f n∈ . Each firm at home and abroad produces one of the 
varieties of the domestic and foreign goods, respectively, so that differentiated goods 
(varieties) in two countries are also indexed by f  and *f  . 
2.3.1 Households 
The utility function of a representative household s is separable in arguments and 
given by: 
 
(2.1) ( )0 0 0
0
, (1 )t ts s st t t t
t t
U E U C Nβ
∞
−
=
   = −    
∑  
  where tE - expectations conditional on the information set at date t, 0
t tβ −  is 
the intertemporal discount factor and 0< < 1β . Household s gets his utility stU ( )•  
from the consumption of the composite good 
0
s
tC discounted for the disutility of 
supplying labour 
0
s
tN . 
 
The composite good stC  consumed by household s is aggregated from home H and 
foreign F goods using the CES aggregator: 
 
(2.2) 
1 1 1
, ,
1 1
(1 )s s st H t F tC C C
φ
φ φ φφ φφ φλ λ
− −
− 
= + − 
  
 
where 0<φ <1 and φ >1 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods62, [0,1]λ ∈  represents the degree of home bias in the small open economy63.  
 
                                                
 
62
 φ  is restricted to be greater than zero (and different than one) for home and foreign goods to be 
substitutes. The larger the φ , the more substitutable H and F goods are. The Cobb-Douglas case 
(elasticity equal one) is not considered in this paper as it does not allow for the discussion about 
substitutability of goods. 
63
 Note, subscripts H and F refer to domestic and foreign goods consumed in the Home country. 
Subscripts H* and F* refer to domestic and foreign goods consumed in the Foreign country (i.e., F* is 
a foreign consumption good that is produced and consumed by foreigners). 
91 
 
Since the composite good aggregator is the zero-profit agent, he sells the composite 
good stC  at the price tP , which also corresponds to the country consumer price 
index64: 
(2.3) 
, ,
1
1 1 1(1 )t H t F tP P Pφ φ φλ λ− − − ≡ + −   
where 
,H tP and ,F tP are the prices of a composite Home and Foreign consumption 
good, respectively. 
 
Following Sutherland (2002) and de Paoli (2004), home bias λ  is assumed to be a 
function of the relative size of the home economy with respect to the rest of the 
world (eurozone) and its degree of openness ω  such that 1 (1 )*nλ ω− = − . Since 
n→0, we have 1 ω λ− = 65. This means the less open the economy, the larger the 
home bias66. Also, in the small open economy case, the presence of home bias breaks 
the PPP between countries (unless the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and foreign goods in both countries differs, without home bias, PPP would hold),  
 
Sectoral consumption goods H and F are derived by aggregation across individual 
varieties. Home and Foreign produced final goods, 
,
s
H tC  and ,
s
F tC , are composites of 
individual brands 
,
( )sH tC f  and , ( )sF tC f , i.e., the zero-profit agent buys individual 
brands 
,
( )sH tC f  and , ( )sF tC f  at the price , ( )H tP f and , ( )F tP f , respectively, bundles 
them into the aggregate goods 
,
s
H tC  and ,
s
F tC  according to the following Dixit-
Stiglitz indices67: 
 
(2.4) 
1
, ,
0
11
1 ( )H
H
HH
H
n
s s
H t H tC C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
σ
−
− 
  ≡    
 
∫    
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 See Annex B.1 for derivations. 
65
 See Annex B.2 for derivations. 
66
 The intuition is that smaller economies, because they cannot sustain themselves, tend to be more 
open.  
67
 It can be proved that in equation (2.4) 
,0
lim 0H t
n
C e−∞
→
= =
 for | | 1Hσ > . 
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(2.5) 
1 11
, ,
1
1 ( )
1
F
FF
F Fs s
F t F t
n
C C f df
n
σ
σσ
σ σ
−
− 
  ≡   
− 
 
∫  
 
where Hσ , Fσ >1 represents the elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated goods (brands) in the home and foreign sectors and is also the price 
elasticity of demand faced by each producer68.  
 
Then, the bundler sells them to households at the following sectoral price: 
 
(2.6) 
, ,
0
1
111 ( ) HH
n
H t H tP P f df
n
σσ −−  
≡   
  
∫  
(2.7) 
1
, ,
1
111 ( )
1
FF
F t F t
n
P P f df
n
σσ −−  
≡   
−  
∫  
 
Individual households also consume investment goods. It is assumed that the 
composite investment stI  is produced by the same final goods aggregator who is 
producing the composite consumption good, stC .  Specifically, it is assumed that the 
investment good is produced using a composite of domestic and foreign goods using 
the following CES index: 
(2.8) 
, ,
11 1 1 1
(1 ) ( )s s st H t F tI I I
φ
φφ φ
φ φ φ φ
ω ω
−
− − 
 
= − +
 
  
 
 
where again  
                                                
 
68The elasticity of substitution between different varieties of the consumption good is set to be greater 
then 1 to capture the idea that consumption varieties are good substitutes for each other (i.e., with this 
elasticity equal to 0, different varieties would be perfect complements to each other, the interior 
solution would not exist. If the elasticity was equal 1 then different varieties would be perfect 
substitutes to each other, which undermines the assumption about monopolistic competition).  
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(2.9) 
, ,
0
1 1 1
1 ( )
H
H H
H H
n
s s
H t H tI I f df
n
σ
σ σ
σ σ
−
− 
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(2.10) 
1
, ,
1 1 1
1 ( )
1
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F Fs s
F t F t
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−
− 
  
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− 
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∫  
 
The elasticity of substitution between H and F goods, φ , as well as price elasticities 
of demand, Hσ , are the same as in the corresponding consumption indices. Given the 
assumption about identical aggregation of consumption and investment goods, the 
price indices for consumption and investment goods are also identical. 
 
Individual consumption and investment demand functions for the representative 
consumer can be obtained from the optimal allocation of expenditure across the H 
and F goods69: 
 
(2.11) , ,
,
,
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σ φ
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(2.14) , ,
,
,
( )1( ) (1 )
1
F
F t F ts s
F t t
F t t
P f P
I f I
n P P
σ φ
λ
−
−
   
= −     
−   
 
                                                
 
69
 See Annex B.3 for detailed derivations of consumption demand functions. The functions for 
investment can be derived analogously. 
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Households Capital Accumulation 
 
Every firm rents capital services at the going rental rate K
t
r  from households. 
Households can increase the supply of capital services by accumulating more 
physical capital. Capital 1
s
tK −  is pre-determined at the beginning of each period (i.e., 
at time t). 
 
The stock of capital increases in accordance with the following law of motion (see, 
for example, Chari et al. (2002)): 
 
(2.15) 
2
1 1
1
(1 )
2
s
s s s st
t t t ts
t
IK K I K
K
νδ δ
− −
−
 
= − + − − 
 
 
where ν  is the adjustment cost in changing the capital stock employed by each 
intermediate good producer, and δ  is the depreciation rate (common for both 
sectors).  
The quadratic function assumes that the adjustment is slow70. Because stK is the end 
of period stock, the capital that will be available for use in period t+1. Note that 
because investment good tI is an aggregate of H and F goods, foreign goods 
contribute to capital accumulation in the small open economy. 
 
 Resource constraint 
 
There is a complete set of state contingent assets that can be traded across countries, 
i.e., international asset markets are complete. It is assumed that all households within 
the country have the same initial wealth, and share earned profits in equal 
                                                
 
70
 Here, capital adjustment costs are given by 
2
1
12
s
st
ts
t
I K
K
ν δ
−
−
 
− 
 
and are a strictly convex function 
of investment (i.e., any change in the capital stock away from its steady state value Iδ  is costly). 
Moreover, both the level and the slope of this function vanish at the steady-state so that the steady-
state value of investment equals to 1t tI Kδ −= . 
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proportion. This means that within the country all households face the same budget 
constraint (in units of domestic consumption good) 71: 
(2.16) ( ) 0, 1 1 1 1
( )
n
t
K
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
f dn
E Q B C Q B w N TR
n
I r K+ + + −
Π
Ξ + + ≤ + + ++
∫
 
 
Household expenditures (in units of domestic consumption good) are on the left 
hand side of (2.16). ( ), 1 1 1t t t t tE Q B+ + +Ξ  is the price of a portfolio of state-contingent 
real bonds traded internationally, denominated in foreign consumption units and 
expressed in home consumption units (therefore tQ  is a real exchange rate expressed 
as a unit of foreign consumption good per unit of domestic consumption good), 
, 1t t+Ξ  is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoff (contingent claim) 
1tB + . tI stands for households’ investment decisions, tC  expresses consumption 
expenditure. Household income sources (also denominated in units of domestic 
consumption good) are the right hand side of (2.16). t tQ B  is the payoff of the 
portfolio in period t, t tw N  expresses household’s labour income from working in the 
domestic sector, tTR  stands for real lump-sum government transfers, tΠ  is a real 
profit of a domestic firm f received by the household  in period t. Finally, 
1
K
t t
r K
−
 
depict household’s rental income from renting capital services to goods-producing 
firms (notice: /K tt
K
t Pr R= , /t t tw W P= ). Consumers face a no-Ponzi game 
restriction72. Transversality conditions apply73.  The short term net real interest rate 
tr  is the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of the domestic good in each 
contingency that occurs next period (i.e., in every state of period t+1):  
 
                                                
 
71
 Therefore, in what follows, the superscript s was suppressed. 
72
 No-Ponzi condition is an inequality constraint bounding debt or net worth from below (i.e., 
households cannot role over debt forever (i.e., consume more than lifetime income)). It is perceived 
by agents as set externally.  
73
 The TVC is a condition for optimization playing the role of ruling out solutions in which wealth 
grows rapidly forever but is never used to provide consumption or dividends. This essentially means 
that no-Ponzi restriction holds with equality. 
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(2.17) ( )0, 11(1 ) t t tt Er + += Ξ+  
In order to maximize utility, households choose a sequence of { } 0, , , , tt t t t t tC I K B N =∞=  
for all t=0….. ∞ , subject to the budget constraint and an equation describing capital 
accumulation, i.e. they solve the following maximization problem74:  
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where Mtλ is the marginal utility of the final home consumption, and Mtξ is the 
multiplier associated with the capital constraint of the household.  
 
Since all households face the same stochastic discount factor and start from the same 
level of wealth, their , ,  and M Mt t t tC Iλ ξ  will be the same in equilibrium. The first-
order conditions with respect to the maximization objects above are given by: 
 
(2.18) : ( , ) Mt C t t tC U C N λ=  
(2.19)  : ( , ) 0Mt N t t t tN U C N wλ+ =     
(2.20) 1 11
1
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 Notice that profits are zero in equilibrium. 
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(2.22)  
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2.3.2 Risk sharing condition 
 
Recall that the internationally traded bond is expressed in the foreign consumption 
units in both countries. This implies that the first order condition for bond holdings 
for the foreign economy is: 
 
(2.23) 
*
1
* *
1
1
M
t
t M
t tr
λβ λ
+
 
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Because the model assumes complete markets, all households in the small/domestic 
and large/foreign economy face the same contingent claims prices and probabilities: 
 
(2.24) 
*
1 1 1
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Using foreign and domestic first-order conditions for consumption, this can be re-
written as: 
 
(2.25) 
* * *
1 1 1 1 1
* * * *
( , ) ( , )1
( , ) 1 ( , )
C t t t C t t
C t t t t C t t
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Now, iterating backwards: 
 
(2.26) 
* * *
* * *
0 0 0 0 0
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
C t t t C t t
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U C N Q U C N
U C N Q U C N=  
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and rearranging: 
 
(2.27) 
* * * * * *
0 0
0 0 0
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
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C t t t C
U C N U C N
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one gets: 
(2.28) 
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* * *
0 0
0 0 0
( , )
where  ( , )
C
C
U C N
Q U C NΓ = and is determined by the initial consumption 
conditions (net foreign assets) at home and abroad. 
 
Assuming that household preferences are additively separable, their objective is to 
maximise the following utility function75: 
 
(2.29) 0 00
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∑ , 
 
where ρ  is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion (and 1/ ρ  is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution for consumption), η  is the Frisch  intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, 0η  is the parameter determining the level of labour supply, 0,C tϒ  is a 
consumption preference shock. 
0,N t
ϒ  is a shock to labour disutility.    
 
With the above utility function, the expression for the real exchange rate in the 
complete market set-up takes the following form: 
 
                                                
 
75
 Chari et al. (2002) stresses that a utility function that is separable in consumption and leisure is 
necessary to achieve high exchange rate volatility. This is because following a shock, a non-separable 
utility function gives small changes in marginal utility of consumption, as changes in leisure offset 
some of the changes in consumption. 
99 
 
(2.30) 
*
t
t
t
CQ
C
ρ
 
= Γ  
 
 
 
Assuming - without loss of generality - symmetric initial conditions, 1Γ = , it 
follows that consumption based real exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of 
marginal utilities of wealth across countries (notice: if the PPP condition was 
satisfied, the level of consumption would equalize across countries at all times 
*
t tC C= . Thus, consumption will differ across the two countries only to the extent 
that there are changes in the real exchange rate. 
 
While this condition simplifies aggregation, it directly links relative consumption to 
the real exchange rate. This implies the unitary (or almost unitary) correlation 
between the two, something not observed in the data. Moreover, it does not allow for 
wealth effects which maybe significant. 
 
2.3.3 Firms (supply side) 
Firms (indexed by [0, )f n∈ ) in the domestic sector behave as monopolistic 
competitors (i.e., each firm is large in its market but small with respect to the whole 
economy) but face flexible prices. Each firm at the beginning of period (time t) rents 
capital 1tK −  from domestic households at the rate t
Kr , hires labour at the rate tw  and 
produces one of the brands (varieties) of home intermediate goods using domestic 
capital and labour (labour is mobile between sectors, but immobile internationally).   
 
Each monopolist chooses its price and commits to satisfying demand at this price. 
His objective is to maximize profits (minimize costs). Firms take the wage rate, 
aggregate price indices and the world aggregates as given. Likewise, each 
monopolistic firm f in Home produces a homogenous good according to the 
following standard Cobb-Douglas production function:  
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(2.31) 1 1
, , 1( ) ( ) ( )H t H t t t t tY f Y A K Nα αιχ − −−= =   
where 
 tχ and tA  and are country specific quality and productivity shocks, 
respectively.  
 
Following Hobijn (2002) and Dury and Oomen (2007), a parameter ι  is introduced. 
This parameter determines the impact of quality changes on the marginal cost of the 
firm. Note that if 1 0ι − <  quality improvements increase the marginal costs of 
production (differently to the productivity improvements). 
 
Optimal price setting 
 
As discussed, it is assumed that firms in the domestic sectors face flexible prices 
although they behave as monopolists in selling their products. In setting their prices, 
they face the following optimal pricing problem. 
 
Profit maximization 
 
A domestic firm f chooses a price 
,
( )H tP f for the domestic market and * , ( )H tP f  for 
the foreign market (both expressed in the local currency). The earned profits 
(expressed in aggregate consumption) depend on the amount sold at those markets, 
the marginal cost of the firm and the revenue tax τ  in the domestic sector:  
 
*( ), ( )
, ,
max
f fH t H tP P
*
, , , , *
     
, ,*
  
( ) ( )(1- )  ( ) (1- )  ( ) H t H t H t H td dH t t H t
t tt t
P f MC P f MC
Y f Q Y fP PP Pτ τ
        
    
    
    
− + −  
(2.32) s.t: ,
, ,
,
( )( )
Hd H t
H t H t
H t
P f dY f YP
σ
 
 
  
 
−
=  
 
** *
,
, ,*
,
( )( )
Hd dH t
H t H t
H t
P f
Y f Y
P
σ
 
 
 
 
 
−
=  
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where ( )dH fY ( * ( )dH fY ) is a total  individual home (foreign) demand for variety f 
in the domestic sector, and 
,
d
H tY  ( *,dH tY ) is an aggregate home (foreign) demand for a 
home good (consumption and investment). 
 
Note further that since households supply a homogenous type of labour and capital 
(i.e., firms share common factor prices tw  and  Ktr ), and since they face the same 
productivity shocks, the real marginal cost is common across firms. Maximization of 
this function yields the following profit-maximizing prices76:  
 
(2.33) , , ,
,
( ) 1
11
H t H t H tH
H H t
t t H t
P f P MC
mk mc
P P P
σ
σ τ
= = =
− −
 
(2.34) 
* *
, , , ,
* *
( ) 1 1
11
H t H t H t H H tH
t t H t t t
P f P MC mk mc
P P P Q Q
σ
σ τ
 
= = = 
− −  
 
 
where 1
11
H
H
H
mk σ
σ τ
=
− −
 (domestic mark-up), ,
,
H t
H t
t
MC
mc
P
=  (real marginal 
cost). 
 
From the cost minimization problem of the firm (i.e. the producer chooses the 
amount of capital and labour in order to minimise the cost of production subject to 
the given production function): 
 
(2.35) 
1 1
, 1
min
s.t. ( ) ( )
K
Y t t t tt
H t t t t
R K W N
Y A K Nα αιχ − −
−
+
=
 
 
the following ratio is obtained: 
 
(2.36) 1
1
H
t t t tR K W N
α α
−
=
−
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 Given that each domestic firm faces the same marginal cost as well as flexible prices, prices of 
goods are the same across firms. This essentially means that 
, ,
( )H t H tP f P= . 
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And finally the nominal marginal cost is derived: (see Annex B.3 for details): 
 
(2.37) ( ) 1
, 1 1
,
1
( ) (1 )
K
t t
H t
H t t t
R WTCMC
Y f A
α α
α αι
δ
δ χ α α
−
− −
 
= =  
− 
 
 
2.3.4 Fiscal policy 
The Government in the domestic economy collects revenue taxes from firms. These 
taxes are then redistributed to households in the form of lump-sum transfers TR (the 
government subsidy is used to eliminate the steady-state mark-up distortions). This 
is done in a way that in each period there is a balanced budget.  
 
(2.38) 
,
0 0
( ( ) ( )) ( )
n n
H t t tP f Y f df TR f dfτ =∫ ∫  
 
2.3.5 Stochastic Environment and Equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium of the small open economy consists of: 
 
1) allocations and wages for home consumers: 
 , , ,t t t tC I B W  
2) allocations and prices for home firms: 
 1 ,, ,t t H tK N P−  
3) allocations and prices for foreign firms: 
 
* * *
1 ,, ,t t H tK N P−  
4) rental rate for capital: KtR  
5) fiscal policies, 
 
such that households and firms’ allocations solve the households’ and firms’ 
problems (i.e., the first order conditions), and that the following market clearing 
conditions are satisfied: 
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(2.39) 0tB =  
(2.40) dt stN N=  
 
Market clearing for domestic variety f must satisfy77: 
 
 
(2.41) ( ) ( )* * * *, , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )dH t H t H t H t H tY f n C f I f n C f I f= + + − +  
 
which using individual demand equations for domestically consumed and exported 
home goods (i.e., eq (2.11)-(2.12) and their counterparts for the Home export), and 
remembering that LOOP holds in the model, and that 1- (1- ) ,  1- (1- )  n nλ ω λ ω= = , 
* * * *
, 1- 1-n nλ ω λ ω= =  (and that n→0), can be re-written as: 
 
(2.42) 
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
, ,
,
 H,
* * * *
, , * *
* *
 ,  
, ,
 ,
                
0
               
( )( )
1 ( )
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H
H
H
d H t H t
H t t t
t t
H t H t
t t
H t t
H t H t
H t t
n
P f PnY f C I
n P P
n P f P
C I
n P P
P f P
P P
σ φ
σ φ
σ
λ
λ
ω
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
  
  
  
−
−
= + +
− −
+ + =
−
→
=
−
− ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
, ,* * *
* *
 ,  
, , * * *
 ,
   
1
                   
( )
( )
1
H
H
H t H t
t t t t
H t t
H t H t
t t t t
H t t
Qt
P f P
C I C I
P P
P f P
C I C I
P P
φ σ φ
σ φ φ
ω
ω ω
   
    
    
    
    
     
                      
− − −
+ + + =
−
−
−
= + + +−
 
Since in a symmetric equilibrium, each domestic producer charges the same price 
and produces the same level of output, so that 
, ,
( )d dH t H tY f Y=  and , ,( )H t H tP f P= , 
(2.42) can be further simplified: 
 
(2.43) ( ) ( ), * * *, 1(1 )H tdH t t t t t
t t
P
Y C I C I
P Q
φ φ
ω ω
− −    
 = − + + +   
     
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 The aggregate consistency condition requires that individual and per capita variables coincide for 
all t. Also, notice that given the relationship (2.4) and (2.9) and their counterparts for Home export, 
(2.41) can be expressed as * *
, , ,
, ,
H t H t H t H t H t
dY C I C I= + + + . 
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Market clearing conditions are as follows. Condition (2.39) requires that since only 
domestic consumers have access to domestic bonds, the net supply of these bonds 
must be zero in equilibrium. Condition (2.40) states that, in equilibrium, labour 
market requires equalization of total labour demand and supply. Goods’ market 
equilibrium condition (2.41) states that total demand in the H sector comprises of 
demand for goods demanded by domestic and foreign consumers ( )*, ,,H t H tC C  as well 
as domestic and exported investment goods ( )*, ,,H t H tI I .   
 
The exogenous driving forces in the economy include technology, quality and 
preference shocks (consumption and labour supply), which follow stochastic 
processes: 
 
(2.44) 1 , 1log logt A t A tA Aρ ε+ += +  
(2.45) 1 , 1( 1) log ( 1) logHt t tχ χι χ ρ ι χ ε+ +− = − +  
(2.46) 
, 1 , 1log log CCC t C t tρ ε
ϒ
+ ϒ +ϒ = ϒ +  
(2.47) 
, 1 , 1log log NNN t N t tρ ε
ϒ
+ ϒ +ϒ = ϒ +  
(2.48) *** *, 1 , 1log log F
F
A
F t F t tA
A Aρ ε+ += +  
 
 
Preference shocks are introduced to allow investigation of the effects of changes on 
the demand side of the economy in a non-monetary framework. 
 
The steady-state is solved analytically ‘by hand’. Then, the standard log-linearization 
techniques are used in order to analyze the dynamics of the model. The software 
package Dynare (see Collard and Juillard (2003) for details) is used to take a first 
order Taylor approximation of the model’s structural equilibrium equations around 
this deterministic steady state. Subsequently, Dynare assesses whether the 
Blanchard-Kahn conditions are met (i.e., the necessary condition for the uniqueness 
of a stable equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the steady state is that there are as 
many eigenvalues larger than one in modulus as there are forward looking variables). 
Then the program calculates the solution to the linearized system of equations. The 
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model is calibrated to match Polish variables such as output, consumption, 
investment, employment as well as several key international variables. 
 
2.3.6 Some definitions and identities 
Since the small open economy model is analysed in real terms, all domestic prices 
are normalized on tP , the home CPI index.  
 
Given that in the model the law of one price holds, but PPP is violated due to the 
presence of home bias, it is true that78: 
(2.49) * * *
, , , ,
/ ( / )( / )H t H t t t t H t t t H tp P P P P P P Q p= = =   
and  
(2.50) *
, ,F t t F tp Q p=  
However, since the model considers the small open economy case, *
,
1F tp =  (i.e. 
given that the relative size of Home is negligible relative to the rest of the world, and 
the fact that LOOP holds, * *
, ,F t F t tP P P= = ), and thus ,F t tp Q= . 
 
Terms-of-trade in the model is defined as a price of foreign tradable good in terms of 
home tradable good: 
(2.51) t , ,T /F t H tP P≡  
and in the foreign country: 
(2.52) * * *
, ,
T /t H t F tP P=  
 
Again, because LOOP  holds in the model, *
, ,
T /t H t F tP P= ,  this implies that: 
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 Country consumer price index (2.3) can be re-written as follows: 
( )( ), ,
,
1
1 1 1
1 1( (1 ) ( (1 )H t F t t
t H t
P P
T
P P
φ φ
φ φλ λ λ λ
−
−
−
−
= + − = + −
  
  
   
. Analogous equation can be derived 
for the foreign country.  
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(2.53) *tT 1/ Tt=  
which is the same as to say that foreign terms-of-trade are reciprocal to domestic 
terms-of-trade.  
 
Now, assuming that home and foreign consumers prefer to consume locally 
produced goods to the same degree (i.e. symmetric home bias is observed, 
*1λ λ= − ), and remembering that * *
,F t tP P=  because of the SOE assumption, and the 
fact that LOOP holds in the model (i.e., *
, ,F t F tP P=  and 
*
, ,H t H tP P= ), one can link the 
terms of trade and the real exchange rate in the following way:  
 
(2.54) 
1
*
,
,*
, ,
H tt t
t t t H t t
F t H t t
PP PQ T T p T
P P P
−
   
= = =     
  
 
 
Given that ( ) 1, 1 1( (1 ) ( )H t t tp T f Tφ φλ λ − −= + − ≡  (see footnote 78), the real exchange 
rate is a function of terms-of-trade: 
 
(2.55) ( ) ( )1 11 11 1( ) ( (1 ) ((1 )t t t t t tQ f T T T T Tφ φφ φλ λ λ λ− −− −= = + − = − +  
 
 
which in a loglinear form reads as: 
 
 
(2.56)   ( )  ( ), , , ,(1 )F t H t F t H ttQ P P P Pλ ω= − = − −  
where the variables with the hat represent the log deviations from the steady 
state. 
 
 
Notice that in the absence of home bias (i.e. when 0λ → ), the volatility of the real 
exchange rate is constant. This is because, in this case, even if the small open 
economy is fully open, its consumption basket collapses to the one of the rest of the 
world (i.e. 
,t F tC C= ), which, in turn, converges to a closed economy.  
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 2.4 UTILITY FUNCTION, PARAMETRISATION AND SIMULATION 
 
2.4.1 Baseline calibration 
 
As in 2.3.2, it is assumed that household preferences are additively separable and 
that the utility function is of the form described by (2.29). Structural parameters, 
where possible, are calibrated in a way that resembles the structure of the Polish 
economy. The chosen values were then cross-checked with values selected in 
previous work done on NMSs of the EU (i.e., Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Ravenna 
and Natalucci (2003, 2007), Lipińska (2008, 2008a), and Kolasa (2009)). For these 
parameters where no reliable values could be obtained for Poland or any other NMS, 
the values accepted in the business cycle literature (in particular for small open 
economies) are used. All the selected parameters are presented in Annex B.4,  
Table B.4. 1.  
 
Table 2.4.1 below presents the decomposition of Polish GDP together with the 
steady-state results obtained from the baseline calibration (i.e. the calibration in 
which parameters gathered in Annex B.4, Table B.4. 1 were applied):  
 
Table 2.4.1 Structure of the Polish and Model Economies 
Structure Polish economy Steady-state
I/GDP 21 19
C/GDP 82 81
M/GDP 33 30
 
Note: I – real investment, C – real consumption, M – import, GDP – Gross Domestic Product. 
Columns, ‘Polish economy’ and ‘Steady-state’, are expressed in percent of GDP. The values were 
calculated over the period 1995-2008.  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the OECD data and the steady-state solution of the model. 
 
The intertemporal discount factor equals 0.99, which implies a steady-state annual 
real interest rate of 4 per cent, the standard value in the literature (the steady-state 
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inflation rate is assumed to be 0). The coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ  
corresponds to that in Chari et al. (2002) and is set to 5. Even if this is a rather high 
value, it is justified on the basis that countries with relatively little wealth and high 
unemployment rates (like Poland) are more risk averse. In such countries, 
households’ preferences for consumption smoothing are higher, which means that 
they are less willing to reduce labour supply when wages fall.  
 
For the baseline model calibration, Frisch elasticity of labour supply is chosen to be 
0.3. There seem to be relatively little consensus as to the value of this elasticity in 
the literature (as pointed out by Canzoneri et al. (2008) it ranges from 0.05 to 0.35). 
In general, it seems reasonable to assume higher values of Frisch elasticity as in a 
country with borrowing constraints (like Poland), lower values would mean that 
households would have to reduce their consumption drastically if they did not 
increase labour supply in response to falling wages. Parameter 0η  is chosen so that, 
in the steady state, households allocate 1/3 of their time to work. The elasticity of 
substitution between home and foreign tradable goods φ , equals 2. This value is 
conventional for IRBC models and suggests that home and foreign tradable goods 
are close substitutes79. Price elasticity of demand faced by each producer σ  equals 
6. This, together with the revenue taxes of 0.180, ensures that the steady-state markup 
comes to 1.33, a plausible value in the literature (Morrison (1994) and Domowitz et 
al. (1988), in Laxton and Pesenti (2003), estimate the possible markup values 
between 1.2 and 1.7).  The home bias parameter λ  is set to be 0.7 (and lies between 
the 0.8 value put by Ravenna and Natalucci (2007) for the Czech economy, and 0.6 
                                                
 
79
 There is mixed evidence on the true value of this elasticity. Some studies employing Bayesian 
estimation of fully structural DSGE open macro models seem to support a range between 1.5 and 2 
(see, for example, Adolfson et al. (2005)). Also, Faruqee et al. (2005) assume a value of 2.5 (this 
number is also used in the IMF’s Global Economic Model). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) based on 
micro empirical-trade literature suggest even higher values for this elasticity, claiming that a high 
elasticity of substitution can explain the observed large home bias in trade. Nonetheless, a lot of 
current DSGE literature (among others Corsetti et al. (2008), Theonissen (2006)) relies on the values 
below 2. There also exists Bayesian studies (e.g., Rabanal and Tuesta (2005) or de Walque, Smets and 
Wouters (2005)), which support the values below 1. 
80
 Calculated as GDP at 1995 constant prices less GVA at 1995 constant prices for Poland and 
averaged over  1995 Q1-2008 Q1 (source: author’s calculation based on the OECD data). 
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chosen by Kolasa (2009) for Poland), which implies a degree of openness, ω , of 0.3. 
This matches the 0.3 share of imports in Polish GDP81.  
 
The capital share for the intermediate goods producers are set to be 0.35 (which is 
similar to the value of 0.42 chosen by Ravenna and Natalucci (2007)). The steady-
state rate of capital depreciation rate δ  is set to 10 per cent annually (see, for 
example, Allard et al. (2008)). The adjustment cost in changing the capital stock 
employed by each intermediate good producer, ν , is chosen to match the volatility 
of investment in the Polish economy (i.e. in the baseline calibration it is equal to 15).  
 
Given that there are no available estimates of the parameter ι  governing the impact 
of quality changes on the marginal cost of firms, this value is set below 1 (or more 
precisely to 0.1)82. This is because, if 1ι > , then the unit cost of production is a 
decreasing function of quality (i.e., quality improvements in the home sector lower 
the marginal cost); if 1ι < , marginal cost of the firm increases together with quality 
improvements (i.e., more labour / capital input is required to produce better quality 
products); and finally if 1ι = , then quality improvements have no impact on the 
production process. The most realistic scenario faced by Polish producers is the case 
when 1ι < . 
Calibration of shocks 
The lack of a long data span as well as the lack of reliable data on capital and 
employment83 make it difficult to estimate reliable productivity processes for Poland, 
and thus the variances (and covariances between Poland and the eurozone) of 
productivity innovations. The empirical studies on the issue are scarce84.  
 
                                                
 
81
 Different measure of openness were also looked at, i.e. the share of export and import in Polish 
GDP. As this would imply a lack of consumption home bias, the import-to-GDP ratio was relied on.  
82
 Different values below one were also tried. Since they did not impact the results significantly 
(neither in terms of the direction of the real exchange rate movements nor in terms of model 
moments), only the results for the baseline magnitude are presented in Table 2.4.3, Section 2.4.3. 
83
 The data on capital for Poland is virtually non-existent. Due to methodological changes, the 
Eurostat data on Polish employment begins only from 2000Q1 (data available before that was 
gathered only in four months of the year and was not recalculated to the quarterly basis).  
84
 The notable exception is Zienkowski (2000) who estimates productivity of labour and total factor 
productivity in Poland by sections of NACE. He reports that the average growth rate of labour 
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To the author’s best knowledge, the study by Kolasa (2009) is the only study to 
investigate the differences in parameters describing agents’ decision-making in 
Poland and in the euro area, as well as volatility and synchronization of shocks 
impacting both economies (his model is a multi-sector model comprising tradable 
and nontradable good). In his Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model for Poland, he 
chooses the priors for standard deviations of the stochastic disturbances that are three 
times larger than in the euro area. His choice is supported by the cross-country 
differences in volatility of the observable variables used in the estimation. The 
results (posterior estimates of shock volatilities) confirm that the magnitude of 
shocks impacting Poland is substantially larger than the size of shocks identified for 
the euro area (on average, the shocks are more than three and a half times larger than 
those hitting the euro area. The smallest discrepancy was estimated for the 
productivity shocks in the nontradable sector, but still its standard deviation in 
Poland turns out to be more than two and a half times larger than in the euro area). In 
terms of persistence of the productivity improvements, Kolasa’s (2009) finds that the 
AR(1) coefficients for Poland are rather homogenous when compared with the euro 
area. 
 
Despite difficulties described above, an attempt was made to estimate the persistence 
of the productivity process and the variance of its innovation. First, in the absence of 
available data for capital, the productivity process was approximated as a quasi-
Solow residual, holding capital stock constant. In particular, the productivity series 
was constructed in the following way (see, for example, Heathcote and Perri (2002)):  
 
, , ,
ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )H t H t H tA Y Nα= − −  
 
where α  is the share of capital and it is assumed to be 0.35.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
productivity in manufacturing in Poland between 1992 and 1998 was equal to around 10.7 percent, 
ranging from 37 percent to 4.4 percent depending on the branch, while total factor productivity was 
increasing at the rate of 8.6 percent. He also points out that the period 1992-1998 can be divided into 
two subperiods: 1992-1994 and 1995-1998. The growth rates of productivity were distinctly higher in 
the first subperiod than in the second one (13.2 percent versus 8.9 percent). Unfortunately, he does 
not provide the numbers for variances or persistence associated with the stochastic productivity series. 
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To calculate the above series, the data on employment and gross value added for the 
years 2000Q1-2008Q4 was sourced from Eurostat85. Next, HA  series were detrended 
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Having constructed productivity series, the 
exogenous process for productivity was specified as a lognormal AR(1) process. 
Although the more standard way of specifying the exogenous processes for 
productivity between the two economic zones is of the form of a bivariate VAR(1) 
model, this strategy was not executed here. This is because of the relatively weak 
correlation between structural shocks within the euro area, the evidence provided by 
Jondeau and Sahuc (2006) (in Kolasa (2008, 2009)). Specifying exogenous process 
for productivity as a lognormal AR(1) process implies zero correlation between the 
shocks and no spillover effects.  
 
Given that the estimated AR(1) coefficient for the lognormal productivity process 
turned out to be very low (0.45), that such a low value resulted in a volatility of 
output which is not observed in the Polish data, and that low persistence of the 
productivity process is inconsistent with Kolasa’s (2008, 2009) findings (he finds 
that the AR(1) coefficients for Poland are rather homogenous when compared with 
the euro area), an AR(1) coefficient for the productivity process for Poland was 
scaled up to match the volatility of its output in years 1995Q1-2008Q186. 
 
The quality shock was estimated in the same manner. In the absence of available 
priors for quality adjustments, available data on export unit values is used. There are 
few papers which take into account quality changes within the dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework. The exceptions (Roeger et al. (2008),  
Corsetti et al. (2008)) either explicitly introduce R&D sector into the model or allow 
the possibility of trade in new varieties (with an entry cost)87. However, this 
approach is not appropriate for the NMSs, where R&D expenditures are not 
significant and are mostly borne by multinational firms in their country of origin (see 
                                                
 
85
 Due to methodological changes, the reliable Eurostat data begins only from 2000Q1 (data available 
before that was gathered only in four months of the year and was not recalculated to the quarterly 
basis).  
86
 One should also keep in mind the low quality of the Polish data on employment and the fact that 
high persistence of productivity shocks is generally assumed in the RBC literature. 
87
 Aiginger (2000) lists the following inputs to quality upgrading: R&D expenditures, skilled labour, 
sophisticated capital, information and communication technology, extra stage of processing as well as 
knowledge service input. 
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van de Klundert and Smulders (1998)). Therefore, a better way to approximate 
quality changes in the NMSs is to use export unit values (gross value of exports 
divided by quantity) as an indicator of quality. Aiginger (1997) suggests that for 
many industries, unit values are a good indicator of quality. At the same time, he 
does point out that higher unit values could simply reflect high costs of exports. 
However, even if unit values only reflected high costs, quantity exported would have 
to be low for a high cost country. Since in the NMSs terms-of-trade (defined as a 
relative price of foreign and domestic tradable good) improvements are combined 
with good export performance, increasing unit values of export should reflect quality 
improvements in those countries and not increasing costs. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
trends in export unit values, quantity exported as well as terms-of-trade between 
Poland and the group of 25 EU countries between January 1999 and March 2007. It 
is clear that increases in export unit values are accompanied by increases in 
quantities exported. This suggests that export unit values can be used as a proxy for 
quality changes in a country like Poland. 
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Figure 2.1. Trade Indicators, Poland 
20
60
100
140
180
220
Jan
.
 
19
99
Ma
y. 
199
9
Se
p. 
19
99
Jan
.
 
20
00
Ma
y. 
200
0
Se
p. 
20
00
Jan
.
 
20
01
Ma
y. 
200
1
Se
p. 
20
01
Jan
.
 
20
02
Ma
y. 
200
2
Se
p. 
20
02
Jan
.
 
20
03
Ma
y. 
200
3
Se
p. 
20
03
Jan
.
 
20
04
Ma
y. 
200
4
Se
p. 
20
04
Jan
.
 
20
05
Ma
y. 
200
5
Se
p. 
20
05
Jan
.
 
20
06
Ma
y. 
200
6
Se
p. 
20
06
Jan
.
 
20
07
Export unit values (total)
TOT
Quantity (2000=100)
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD data. 
 
The euro area economy-wide productivity shock was taken from  
Mykhaylova (2009). Finally, the starting point of reference for the assumptions on 
consumption and labour preference shocks (and their persistence) comes from 
Laxton and Pesenti (2003)88.  
 
The calibrated magnitudes of shocks and their persistence are presented in  
Table 2.4.2 below: 
 
Table 2.4.2 Volatilities of shocks 
Shocks to: Productivity Quality Cons. Prefer. Labour Prefer. Foreign Prod.
E(ε2) 1.08E-04 1.69E-04 1.60E-05 1.60E-03 1.60E-05
AR 0.95 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.95
 
Source: Author’s calibration based on own estimates as well as values proposed by Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003) and Mykhaylova (2009). For details, see the discussion in the main text. 
                                                
 
88
 Given that the magnitude of labor preference shock proposed by Laxton and Pesenti (2003) resulted 
in the too high volatility of hours worked as well as its too high correlation with output when 
compared with the data, they were scaled down accordingly.  
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Admittedly, these are only rough guesses, but they do provide some indication of 
shock processes in the Polish economy. Also, given the uncertainty assigned to the 
proposed values of shocks and their persistence, a sensitivity analysis is performed 
with respect to some of them.  
 
2.4.2 Simulation Results  
In what follows, before matching the moments of the variables calculated for the 
Polish economy, the effects of individual 1 percent positive shocks are graphed as 
impulse response functions (with all the AR(1) coefficients equal to 0.95). The 
purpose of this exercise is to find out in which direction the shocks affecting the 
economy pull the real exchange rate. Five types of stationary shocks are considered: 
productivity (home and foreign), quality, consumption preference, and labour 
disutility. The shocks are assumed to be non-correlated and to follow a first order 
autoregressive process:   
 1 t ttA A ε+ = Ω +  
where tA  is a vector of shocks *
, ,
, , ,
, , , ,
C t L tH t t tF
A A A A Aχ ϒ ϒ   , and Ω  is a 5x5 
matrix of AR(1) coefficients. The disturbances to tA  are *, , , , ,, , , ,C LA t t t t F tχε ε ε ε εϒ ϒ    
and the variance-covariance matrix is [ ]tV ε . 
 
In particular: 
(2.57) 
0.95
0.95
0
0
 
 
 
 
 
Ω =     [ ]
0.01
0.01
0
0
tV ε
 
 
 
 
 
=   
 
As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, within the model, productivity improvements lead to 
real exchange rate depreciation. This is because this type of shock causes decreases 
in the price of traded Home goods, leading – through home bias -  to terms-of-trade 
and real exchange rate deterioration (as equation (2.56) indicates, the real exchange 
rate is a positive function of terms-of-trade). On a contrary, a positive quality shock 
does lead to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Egert and Lommatzsch (2004). Initially the consumption 
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preference shock pulls the real exchange rate towards depreciation, after which the 
real exchange rate appreciates. This is because even though the expansion of output 
is observed (driven by higher consumption and increased labour input) real wages go 
down (due to price increases). The labour disutility shock causes unambiguous 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is because an increase in the weight of 
leisure in consumers’ utility causes labour input to decline. This translates into lower 
consumption, investment and output. Real wages, and thus prices increase. The real 
exchange rate also appreciates unambiguously when improvements in foreign 
productivity are observed. 
 
Figure 2.2. Orthogonalized Responses to Stationary Disturbances 
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Matching the moments 
 
This section addresses the performance of the model in respect of matching the 
moments observed in for the Polish economy data. Table 2.4.3 and Table 2.4.4 
present the business-cycle properties of the Polish data together with the results 
obtained from model simulations. The theoretical and empirical business-cycle 
statistics were obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott
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time-series (with the smoothing parameter λ=1600). The data for Poland was 
sourced either form Eurostat or OECD. Given that the role of the elasticity of 
substitution between H and F tradable goods φ  in determining the behaviour of the 
real exchange rate is well documented in the literature (e.g. Corsetti et al. (2008), 
Theonissen (2006)), and the fact that there is no consensus on the value of this 
parameter (neither there exists estimates of this elasticity for the NMSs of the EU), 
three different values were tried and discussed below. Sensitivity analysis was also 
performed with respect to the magnitude of the preference shock as well as the 
persistence of the productivity shock. Also, to see the impact of an individual shock 
on the model performance, Table 2.4.3 reports the results when the shocks are added 
one-by-one, starting from the productivity shock only. The results are presented 
below. 
 
As in the case of the business-cycle data for developed countries, in Poland 
consumption is less volatile than output. Investment is almost 5 times as volatile as 
output. Employment is slightly more volatile than output. These volatilities are 
comparable (although on the higher end) with the results usually reported for the 
EMU countries. Still, the volatilities of international variables (terms-of-trade, trade 
balance and RER) are higher.  
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Table 2.4.3: Model and Data Volatility 
high pref. p p+q p+q+f p+q+f+l low qual. all shocks
ϕ=2 ϕ=0.6 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=2 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=0.1 ϕ=2
AH(1)=0.7
 GDP 1.34 2.35 2.00 1.54 2.41 1.08 1.49 1.49 1.57 1.39 2.23
 Consumption 1.06 0.30 0.53 0.85 0.37 0.40 0.68 0.68 0.77 0.73 0.29
 Investment 6.52 6.55 6.57 6.49 6.54 5.41 6.50 6.50 6.51 6.55 6.48
 Employment 1.48 1.46 1.23 1.32 1.77 0.45 0.85 0.86 1.31 1.21 1.33
 Terms-of-Trade 4.47 1.87 3.80 6.24 2.31 2.84 4.89 5.04 5.65 5.39 1.80
 Trade balancea 1.46 1.25 0.44 2.06 1.71 1.10 1.75 1.80 1.97 1.79 1.23
 Real exchanage rateb 5.30 1.31 2.66 4.37 1.61 1.99 3.42 3.53 3.95 3.77 1.26
Variable
data all shocks
Standard Deviation
model
AH(1)=0.95
 
Note:  The column titled ‘all shocks’ presents the model simulations with all the shocks being 
switched on for different values of trade elasticity. The column titled ‘high pref.’ corresponds to 
simulations when higher magnitudes of a consumption preference shock are tried. Columns ‘p’, 
‘p+q’, ‘p+q+f’, and ‘p+q+f+l’ report results of simulations when productivity, quality, foreign 
productivity, and labour preference shocks are added one-by-one.  ‘low qual.’ column reports results 
of simulations with lower magnitudes of a quality shock. Finally, the last column looks at the model 
results when the memory of the productivity shock is lowered; a. Statistics for net exports are based 
on the HP-filtered ratio of real net exports to the real GDP; b. Statistics for the empirical RER are 
based on the HP-filtered real effective exchange rate.  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Eurostat and OECD data and the model simulations; 
 
Comparing actual volatilities with those predicted by the model when the elasticity 
of substitution between H and F tradable goods φ  is set to 2, it is obvious that except 
for the number for employment, investment and to a large degree trade balance, 
modelled volatilities do not match the data. Output is too volatile, and consumption 
and international variables are significantly less volatile. Moreover, terms-of-trade 
are more volatile than in the RER (this is not surprising given that real exchange rate 
is only a fraction of terms-of-trade, see eq (2.56)). When the elasticity of substitution 
between H and F tradable goods is lowered to 0.6, the business-cycle statistics - 
except for employment – are slightly more comparable with the data. However, the 
performance of international variables – except for the trade balance – improves 
considerably. Therefore, given that lowering φ  improves the fit of the model, in the 
next step, its value was lowered to 0.1. This time all the variables but the terms-of-
trade (which became too volatile) came relatively close to what is observed in the 
data. Increasing the magnitude of the preference shock (to 0.009; see column ‘high 
pref.’ in Table 2.4.3) for the value of φ equal to 2 makes all the variables more 
volatile. Nonetheless, the gain in terms of the fit of the consumption is minimal. 
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Simulation of the model with subsequent shocks switched off, shows that output is 
mainly moved by productivity and quality shocks. In addition to these three supply 
side shocks (domestic and foreign productivity as well as domestic quality), 
consumption and employment are governed by preference and labour disutility 
shocks, respectively. Surprisingly, the impact of the consumption preference shock 
on consumption volatility is not as big as it could be expected, and is almost 
equivalent to the impact of the labour preference shock on the volatility of this 
variable. International variables become more volatile each time a new shock is 
added. However, they are mainly moved by domestic productivity and quality 
preference shocks. Finally, given the lack of reliable estimates for the magnitude of 
the quality shock, its size was lowered to 0.007. This improved the fit of the model 
output, terms of trade and trade balance, at the expense of the fit of the rest of 
variables. 
 
Table 2.4.4: Model and Data Autocorrelations and Correlations 
AH(1)=0.95 AH(1)=0.75 ϕ=2 ϕ=0.6 ϕ=0.1 low qual.
 GDP 0.68 0.71 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 Consumption 0.41 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.91 0.93 0.87
 Investment 0.77 0.62 0.59 0.78 0.54 0.78 0.94 0.92
 Employment 0.94 0.70 0.59 0.83 0.50 0.14 -0.39 -0.19
 Terms-of-Trade 0.05 0.68 0.64 0.29 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.84
 Trade balancea 0.55 0.64 0.60 -0.24 0.78 -0.88 -0.93 -0.90
 Real exchanage rateb 0.80 0.68 0.64 -0.02 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.84
model
Corr with GDP
Variable
Autocorrelation
model, ϕ=2, datadata
 
Note: ‘low qual.’ column reports results of simulations with lower magnitudes of a quality shock. 
‘AH(1)=0.95’ and ‘AH(1)=0.75’ columns report the model results when the memory of the 
productivity shock is 0.95 and 0.75, respectively. a. Statistics for net exports are based on the HP-
filtered ratio of real net exports to the real GDP; b. Statistics for the empirical RER are based on the 
HP-filtered real effective exchange rate.  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Eurostat and OECD data and the model simulations; 
 
In terms of the first-order autocorrelation coefficients (AR(1)) of the chosen 
variables of the Polish data (see Table 2.4.4), they range from 0.05 to 0.94, with the 
highest persistence recorded for employment and real exchange rate. Comparing 
these coefficients with those obtained from the model (as they are almost identical 
for different values of elasticity of substitution as well as other sensitivity checks, 
only the statistics for φ = 2 are presented), the most significant discrepancy is 
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recorded for the terms-of-trade variable – the data exhibits no memory and the model 
predicts it to be quite high and equal to 0.71. Lowering the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign tradable goods did not change the persistence of the 
model variables. Lowering the persistence of the home productivity shock to 0.75 
did diminish the memory of the model, but not significantly (with the larger impacts 
on employment and investment).  
 
The model correlation of the investigated business cycle variables with the output, 
for the φ = 2, is of the correct sign. In terms of international variables, the correlation 
of output with terms-of-trade seems to be too strong. The largest discrepancy is 
however observed between the co-movements of trade balance and the output and 
the RER and output; it is very high in the model and either negative or nonexistent in 
the data. When φ  is set to 0.6, the sign of correlation between trade balance and the 
output becomes correct, but the relationship between the RER and output is still of 
the wrong sign. Lowering φ even further to 0.1 does not alter model correlations 
much. However, it does produce a negative correlation between output and 
employment – something not observed in the data. 
 
In respect of the contribution of particular shocks to the variance of the Polish real 
exchange rate (see Table 2.4.5 below), the model predicts that the quality shock is 
the main factor responsible for RER movements for the baseline model as well as for 
the models when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable 
goods is lowered. Nonetheless, the productivity and preference shocks are also fairly 
important (although the productivity shock seems to be somewhat more important in 
all cases, except for when the preference shock is increased). The labour preference 
shock moves the RER in a little more than 10 percent. Its importance diminishes 
when the size of the quality shock is increased. The foreign productivity shock does 
not add much to the RER volatility. These results confirm that quality changes may 
be responsible for the real exchange rate appreciation in the NMSs89. However, it is 
also clear that the consumption demand shock cannot be ignored.   
 
                                                
 
89
 Variance decomposition for the RER was almost the same for the lower value of the elasticity of 
substitution between H and F goods and thus is not presented. 
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Table 2.4.5: Variance decomposition 
εA εχ εϒϲ εϒL εF*
27.96 35.39 21.60 10.92 4.14
28.97 36.67 18.76 11.32 4.29
30.87 39.08 13.42 12.06 4.57
36.92 22.40 20.80 14.42 5.46
22.45 28.42 37.04 8.77 3.32
ϕ=0.1
higher preference shock
ϕ=0.6
lower quality shock
RER
baseline
 
Note: Author’s calculation. * and ( )  A F χε ε ε represent domestic (foreign) productivity and quality 
shocks, respectively. and 
C L
ε εϒ ϒ stand for consumption and labour preference shocks.  
 
 2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter a basic one-sector small open economy model of the real exchange 
rate determinants for the NMSs of the EU was proposed. Two questions were asked. 
First, it was asked to what extent quality changes can be attributed to the observed 
persistent appreciation of real exchange rates in the NMSs in general, and in Poland 
in particular. Second, it was asked whether a basic version of the SOE-DSGE IRBC 
model with only tradable goods can generate the highly volatile and persistent real 
exchange rates observed in the NMSs.  
 
The results broadly show that a basic model featuring only tradable goods, and in 
which real exchange rate fluctuations are exclusively caused by the presence of 
home bias in consumption, performs poorly in terms of matching the moments of the 
Polish data for the conventional levels of the elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign tradable goods. In particular, it was shown that, within the model, real 
shocks are not able to explain the recorded variability of the Polish terms-of-trade 
and real exchange rate unless very low levels of this elasticity are assumed. 
However, for such levels of elasticity, terms-of-trade becomes too volatile and the 
model produces negative correlation with employment. Nevertheless, the model 
performs quite well in terms of mimicking RER persistence. It also highlights that 
quality changes could be consistent with appreciating real exchange rate in the 
NMSs.   
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ANNEX B.1. PRICE INDEX AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
 
Households need to decide how to allocate consumption home and foreign goods. 
The CES price aggregator tP  (equation (2.3) in the main text) can be derived from 
the following household minimum expenditure problem: 
 
(B1) 
                             
, ,
1 11 1 1
                           min
s.t. ( ) (1 )
t tt
t H t F t
C PC
C C C
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φλ λ
− −
− 
=  + − 
  
 
(B2) 
, , , , ,
1 11 1 1
+ ( ) (1 )H t H t F t F t t t H t FtP C P C C C CL
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φλ λµ
− −
−
 
  
+ −  + −  
   
 
=   
 
Note: Solving for the Lagrangian multiplier tµ  is equivalent to solving for the home 
goods price index tP  since tµ  is a proxy for the amount required to purchase one 
extra unit of consumption basket tC  (i.e.,  t tPµ = ). 
First order conditions are: 
(B3) ( ) ( )F,t F,t
F,t
1 1
1-:  P - 1- Ct tC
L C φ φλµ
−
∂
∂
 
(B4) ( ), ,
,
1
-1
1-:  -H t t t H t
H t
P C
C
L C φ φλµ∂∂  
(B5) 
,
-1 -11 1
-1
:  ( ) (1- )H t Ft t
t
C C CL
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φλ λ
µ
 
 +  =
  
∂
∂  
(B3), (B4), (B5) can be re-written as: 
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(B3a) ( )( ), , 1-F t F t t tC P Cφ φλ µ−=  
(B4a) ( )
, ,
-
 H t H t t tC P C
ε φλ µ=  
(B5a) 
,
1 11 1 1
 ( ) (1 ) 1H t Ft tC C C
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φλ λ
− −
− 
 + −  = =
  
 
where (B3a) and (B4a) are final demand functions for home and foreign tradable  
consumption goods. 
Now, substituting (B3a) and (B4a) into (B5a), it is possible to solve for tµ  and 
thus tP  (which is the equation (2.3) in the main text). 
 
Individual Demand Functions  
 
Individual demand functions for the representative consumer s are obtained from the 
optimal allocation of expenditure across H, and F goods. 
(B6) 
, ,
,
0
1
, ,
0
11
min ( ) ( )     
1
. . ( )H
H
HH
H
n
H t H tH t
n
H t H t
C P f C f df
s t C C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
σ
−
− 
  ≡    
 
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∫
                               
(B7) 
1
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0 0
111( ) ( ) + ( )
H
H
H
H
H
n n
H t H t H t H t H tL P f C f df C C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
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−
−
 
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−     
   
∫ ∫=   
First order conditions are: 
(B8) ( )( )
, , , ,
,
1
:  C ( )( )
HH
H t H t H t H t
H t
f C P f
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L σ σµ −∂ =
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(B9) 
,
:
H t
L
µ
∂
∂
       
1
, ,
0
11
1 ( )H
H
HH
H
n
H t H tC C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
σ
−
− 
  =    
 
∫  
 
To solve for 
,H tµ it is enough to substitute (B9) into (B8): 
(B10) 
, , ,
0
1
111 ( )
n
H t H t H t
HHP f df P
n
σσµ
−
−
=
  
=   
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∫  
 
So that the individual demand for the unique good 
,
( )H tC f  can be written as: 
(B11) ,
, ,
,
( )1( )
H
H t
H t H t
H t
P f
C f C
n P
σ−
 
=   
 
 
 
Now substituting (B4a) into (B11) produces the equation (2.12) in the main text. 
 
Individual demand for the unique good 
,
( )F tC f  can be obtained in the similar 
manner, i.e. by solving the following household’s minimum expenditure problem: 
(B12) 
1
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1
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So that: 
(B13) ,
, ,
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( )1( )
1
F
F t
F t F t
F t
P f
C f C
n P
σ−
 
=   
−  
 
124 
 
Now substituting (B3a) into (B13) produces the equation (2.13) in the main text. 
 
ANNEX B.2. HOME BIAS 
 
Preferences in home and foreign country can be respectively described as: 
(B14) 
1 1 1
, ,
1 1
(1 )t H t F tC C C
φ
φ φ φφ φφ φλ λ
− −
− 
= + − 
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(B15) 
1 1 1
* * * * *
, ,
1 1
( ) (1 )t H t F tC C C
φ
φ φ φφ φφ φλ λ
− −
− 
= + − 
  
 
where λ and *(1 )λ−  stand for home bias in the home and foreign economy, 
respectively. 
 
Recall that demand functions for home and foreign goods are represented by (B3a)  
and (B4a). The demand functions for Home export can be derived analogously so 
that: 
 
(B16) 
*
,* * *
, *
 
H t
H t t
t
P
C C
P
φ
λ
−
 
=   
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Now, dividing (B4a) by (B3a) and (B16) by (B17) gives: 
 
(B18) , ,
, ,
 
1
H t H t
F t F t
C P
C P
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 
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(B19) 
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λ
−
 
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It is obvious that home bias in foreign preferences requires: 
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(B20) *(1 ) (1 )λ λ− > − ( *or that λ λ> ) 
Now, given that  
 
(B21) 1- (1- ) * ,  1- (1- ) *  n nλ ω λ ω= =  
(B22) * * * *, 1- 1-n nλ ω λ ω= =  
where * and ω ω stand for the degree of home and foreign country openness. 
  
and using (B20), it can be shown that: 
 
(B23) *1 ( )nω ω ω− > −  
 
(or that *1- (1- ) *  >n nω ω ), which means that for the home bias to occur, it must 
be also that <1ω . In a limiting case when  0n → , 
* *1- ,  1- ,  and 0,  1- 1 λ ω λ ω λ λ= = = = (i.e. home does not matter from the 
perspective of the foreign economy). 
 
ANNEX B.3. MARGINAL COST DERIVATIONS 
 
In order to derive the expression for the marginal cost 
,H tMC , the following cost 
minimisation problem is solved: 
 
(B24) 
1
,
11
, 1
min  
   .     ( ) ( )
t t
K
t t t t tK N
H t t t t
TC R K W N
s t Y A K Nα αιχ
−
−−
−
= +
=
 
where tTC  stands for the total cost of the firm with the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
 
The values of 1tK −  and tN  that minimize this cost respectively are: 
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From the above, the following ratio can be obtained: 
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Now the total cost can be expressed in terms of 
,H tY : 
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So nominal 
,H tMC  equals: 
 
(B27) ( ) 1
, 1 1
,
1
(1 )
K
t tt
H t
H t t t
R WTCMC
Y A
α α
α α ι
δ
δ α α χ
−
− −
= =
−
 
 
To get real marginal cost 
,H tmc , nominal ,H tMC  is divided by tP . 
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ANNEX B.4. CALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES 
 
Table B.4. 1 Baseline parameter values 
Description Symbol Value 
Intertemporal discount factor 
Coefficient of risk aversion 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  
Elasticity of substitution between H and F goods 
Price elasticity of demand in the H sector  
Steady-state revenue tax  
Mark-up 
Home bias  
Degree of openness  
Capital share in the H sector 
Steady-state capital depreciation rate  
Adjustment cost in changing capital stock  
Impact of quality changes on marginal cost of the firm 
β 
ρ 
η 
ϕ 
σ 
τ 
µ 
λ 
ω 
α 
δ 
ν 
ι 
0.99 
5 
0.3 
2 
6 
0.1 
1.33 
0.7 
0.3 
0.35 
0.025 
16 
0.1 
    Source: Author’s calibration 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPLAINING REAL EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS IN NMSS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION – AN EXPANDED SOE MODEL 
 
 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The task of this chapter is to improve the overall performance of the SOE model of 
real exchange rate determinants for the NMSs of the EU put forward in Chapter 2. 
Special attention is drawn to matching the empirical volatilities of international 
variables, and the possible channels of real exchange rate appreciation observed in 
the NMSs. 
 
First, given the mixed success of the one-sector model presented in Chapter 2 in 
replicating RER volatility, the nontradable sector is added to the model economy. 
This allows for testing of the degree to which RER movements in the NMSs can be 
accounted for by the deviations of relative price of nontradable goods between these 
countries and the eurozone. Although the empirical literature on the HBS effect in 
the NMSs stresses that this effect alone is not enough to explain the recorded real 
appreciation in the NMSs (see Chapter 2 for details), most papers investigating this 
effect do find evidence for its positive contribution to the RER appreciation observed 
in these countries. Also, as will be shown in the next section, the limited relevance of 
the HBS effect for the NMSs may be related to measurement problem. Furthermore, 
testing for the relevance of the nontradable sector for the RER movements is 
justified by newer research findings, which question Engel’s (1999) conclusion that 
the nontradable sector is insignificant in explaining real exchange rate movements, 
and may also add to its volatility (see, for example, Selaive and Tuesta (2006)). For 
example, Burstein et al. (2005), point out that Engel’s measures do not separate the 
distribution cost component of tradable good prices. When these authors adjust 
traded good prices for a tradable component, they find that around 50 percent of 
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RER movements should be attributable to the movements in the relative price of 
nontraded goods (see also Betts and Kehoe (2006)90 )91.  
 
Second, the complete market assumption is revoked – i.e. in this modified model 
risk-sharing is incomplete. As argued by Theonissen (2006) in his two-country 
intertemporal optimising model, incomplete financial markets are a necessary 
condition for the terms-of-trade and the real exchange rate to display realistic levels 
of volatility92. Furthermore, a model with incomplete financial markets allows for 
another channel of possible real exchange rate fluctuations, namely the impact of 
international payments on the real exchange rate93. More precisely, in the absence of 
a complete set of state-contingent claims, shocks between countries can also be 
transmitted via the current account. A shock that results, for instance, in a current 
account deficit redistributes wealth from the country experiencing this deficit to the 
surplus economy. This international transfer of resources, called the wealth effect, 
can of course affect relative prices and thus the real exchange rate. There are various 
ways in which wealth effects can operate in a model with incomplete markets. For 
example, as discussed in Benigno and Thoenissen (2006), following a positive 
supply-side shock to the home economy’s traded goods sector, Home becomes richer 
and demands more goods of all types. As a risk-sharing mechanism, the terms-of-
trade depreciate, improving the purchasing power of foreign consumers. However, 
because risk-sharing is incomplete, the terms-of-trade do not have to depreciate as 
much as they would have if a full set of state contingent claims were available – i.e. 
with less risk-sharing, the required transfer of purchasing power from Home to 
Foreign, and thus the required improvement of the trade balance, is smaller. Thus, in 
a two-sector model with incomplete markets, the contribution of terms-of-trade to 
the real exchange rate depreciation in response to tradable productivity 
                                                
 
90
 Specifically, Betts and Kehoe (2006) find that the measured relation between the bilateral RER and 
the relative price of non-traded to traded goods is strong on average. 
91
 Also, recall that the evidence of the contribution of non-tradable prices to the inflation differentials 
in the EMU Member States is mixed (see Andrés et al. (2006) and Altissimo et al. (2005) quoted in 
the introduction to this thesis).  
92
 As in Chapter 2, throughout this chapter terms-of-trade is defined as the relative price of domestic 
imports in terms of exports. 
93
 Additionally, as shown in Chapter 2, the complete market assumption implies unitary (or close to 
unitary) correlation between relative consumption and the RER. This implication is however rejected 
by the data, where this correlation is either low or negative – the so-called ‘Backus-Smith puzzle’ 
(see, Chari et al. (2002), Benigno and Thoenissen (2006) among others). 
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improvements should be smaller. Additionally, with incomplete markets and in the 
presence of nontradable goods, it is also possible to look at the redistribution of 
wealth associated with another transfer effect – namely, the impact of the wealth 
effect on labour supply, which should work similarly to the HBS effect and thus lead 
to RER appreciation (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000), Selaive and Tuesta (2003, 
2006))94. As before, a positive productivity shock to the tradable sector increases the 
relative price of imported goods, which makes Home consumers substitute away 
from imported towards domestic tradable goods. Other things being equal, this 
improves the current account (i.e. an accumulation of net foreign assets is observed). 
This transfer of resources to Home exerts a positive wealth effect, which in the 
presence of nontradable goods should reduce the labour supply to this sector, thus 
increasing the relative price of nontradables and inducing a real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
Unfortunately, even if markets are incomplete, standard two-sector DSGE models 
fail to explain a significant divergence of domestic relative prices and real exchange 
rate appreciation (Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) and Vilagi (2005) among others). 
This is because, in this type of model, a positive productivity shock typically causes 
a terms-of-trade depreciation, which offsets an appreciation caused by the HBS or 
positive wealth effects. For instance, Vilagi (2005) argues that the HBS-like effect 
can only be achieved in NOEM models when pricing-to-market is incorporated into 
the model. Therefore, in the third modification to the model of  
Chapter 2, here, a distribution sector (a form of pricing-to-market) is introduced, a 
feature which breaks the LOOP in the tradable sector95. Moreover, Betts and Kehoe 
(2006) do find significant bilateral deviations from the LOOP for baskets of goods 
that are traded, and they do confirm that these deviations play a large role in real 
exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore it is important not only to develop a two-sector 
model, but also to include a mechanism that allows for breaking from the LOOP for 
                                                
 
94
 For simplicity, the model does not provide for the possibility of a steady-state net foreign asset 
position which is different from zero.   
95
 The empirical failure of the LOOP due to the price discrimination is reviewed in Rogoff (1996) and 
also documented, for example, in Goldberg and Knetter (1997). Recall that in the model proposed in 
Chapter 2 even though PPP did not hold due to the presence of home bias in consumption, for 
simplicity, the LOOP was maintained. 
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individual tradable commodities. Introducing distribution trade costs in the model is 
also relevant because of the findings of Burstein et al. (2005) described above.  
 
How does the introduction of the distribution sector help induce RER appreciation in 
response to a positive productivity shock? As shown in Corsetti et al. (2008), in the 
two-country, two-sector, symmetric DSGE model with incomplete markets, both the 
RER and terms-of-trade can improve, provided that the economy has a sufficiently 
high degree of home bias in absorption (another way through which the transfer 
effect can operate) and a sufficiently low trade elasticity, where this low trade 
elasticity arises from the presence of distribution trade costs96. This is because in the 
case when Home has a preference for domestic tradables, a positive productivity 
shock in the domestic tradable sector creates a negative income effect (a terms-of-
trade depreciation reduces relative home wealth) implying a decline in global 
demand for domestic goods. However, since domestic households are the main 
consumers of domestic tradable goods, their wealth cannot drop too much, i.e. the 
relative price of home tradable goods must go up to generate enough demand to clear 
the global market97. According to Corsetti et al. (2008), this can happen if the 
demand effect arising from the presence of home bias is reinforced by a sufficiently 
low elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign traded goods (i.e., they set 
the implied trade elasticity to 0.5). This is because low trade elasticity is associated 
with high volatility of international prices, which brings about strong wealth effects 
from price changes. Moreover, as stressed by these authors and demonstrated in 
Heathcote and Perri (2002), low trade elasticity contributes to the increased volatility 
of the real exchange rate, helping to match the moments of the data.  
 
In summary, in contrast to the basic SOE-DSGE model of Chapter 2, the model 
proposed in this chapter is characterised by a nontradable sector, incomplete 
financial markets and distributive trade costs. Otherwise the model presented in this 
                                                
 
96
 Derivations of equation 16 of Corsetti et al. (2008), which shows the impact of distribution services 
on the elasticity of demand can be found in Annex C.4. 
97
 Notice that the presence of home bias is important for two reasons. First, home bias ensures that 
changes in the price of domestically produced traded goods affect the relative price of traded goods. 
Otherwise, if the weights were the same, the relative price of traded goods would not change as the 
domestic and foreign aggregate price indices for traded goods would increase by the same amount. 
Second, it generates additional demand for domestically produced goods, which results in their higher 
prices to clear the market. 
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chapter retains the characteristics of the basic model of Chapter 2. Namely, given the 
importance of the demand effect arising from the presence of home bias, and its 
contribution to terms-of-trade (and thus real exchange rate) improvements in 
response to the positive productivity shock described above, the model presented in 
this chapter continues to assume that Home and Foreign consumers prefer to 
consume domestically produced tradable goods98. It also maintains the exogenous 
quality factor, given that quality improvements are well documented in the NMSs of 
the EU (see Chapter 2), and because a positive quality shock in the basic version of 
the model did trigger the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Also, as the variance 
decomposition conducted in the previous chapter showed, quality improvements 
were not insignificant in explaining RER fluctuations. However, because the 
extended model put forward below is a two-sector model, and because quality 
improvements are more likely to occur in the tradable sector (see the discussion on 
the developments in terms-of-trade and export unit values in Poland in Chapter 2), in 
this chapter, quality innovations are placed in this sector.  
 
The model presented in this chapter, calibrated to the Polish economy, shows that 
positive productivity shocks indeed generate real exchange appreciation consistent 
with the HBS theory and positive wealth effects99. This appreciation is possible 
despite the country’s terms-of-trade deterioration. The obtained result is in contrast 
to standard two-sector DSGE models, which have difficulties in generating the RER 
appreciation related to a positive productivity shock. Even if recent papers by 
Selaive and Tuesta (2006) or Corsetti et al. (2008), do show that such appreciation is 
possible in the two-country symmetric model, to the author’s best knowledge there 
are no models which show this outcome in the small open economy IRBC 
framework, which is the contribution of this paper100. The model further shows that 
such appreciation depends on the value of elasticity of substitution between domestic 
                                                
 
98
 The role of home bias in a two-sector model of the UK equilibrium exchange rate was investigated 
by Benigno and Thoenissen (2003). Similar to the results of simulations run on the one-sector model 
of Chapter 2, in Benigno and Thoenissen, the presence of home bias was not enough to generate 
strong demand effects which would trigger terms-of-trade improvements.   
99
 Note that for the HBS effect to hold various assumptions must be satisfied. For example, LOOP 
must hold, sectoral wages must equalize, domestic and foreign tradable goods should be close 
substitutes, etc. Unless these are met, what is often called the HBS effect should be understood as the 
impact of a positive productivity shock in the tradable sector on the internal real exchange rate.  
100
 Unlike here, in both papers by Corsetti et al. (2008) and by Selaive and Tuesta (2006), RER 
appreciation is combined with terms-of-trade improvement. 
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and foreign tradable goods as well as the value of the parameter governing bond 
holding costs. The value of the parameter governing bond holding costs also 
determines whether the RER appreciates or depreciates in response to the positive 
quality shock. This confirms the importance of the current account channel in the 
real exchange rate modelling. The expanded model is also able to deliver a good 
match in terms of RER volatility and persistence of the Polish RER without recourse 
to nominal rigidities, monetary shocks or extremely low values of trade elasticity. 
Although the model shows that positive tradable productivity and quality shocks 
could be consistent with an appreciation of the Polish zloty, the results of the 
variance analysis run counter to the view that either productivity or quality 
improvements in the tradable sector lead to inflation differentials between New and 
Old Member States. The model suggests that tradable productivity, and to lesser 
extent quality improvements are only important in explaining movements of terms-
of-trade, i.e. the shocks originating in the tradable sector are not relevant for the 
movements of the Polish real exchange rate. Instead, asymmetric shocks originating 
in the nontradable sector are of importance.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 discusses and evaluates the 
additional possible sources of real exchange rate movements in a typical NMS of the 
EU represented by Poland. Section 3.3 sets out the theoretical model. Section 3.4 
presents the parameterization of the model, evaluates the model results and its ability 
to match the moments of the observed data. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
 3.2 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF REAL EXCHNAGE RATE APPRECIATION 
IN THE NMSs – MODEL BUILDING BLOCKS  
The aim of this section is to empirically verify the importance of the two additional 
proposed building blocks of the SOE DSGE model of the real exchange rate 
determinants in a typical NMS of the European Union, represented by Poland. 
 
As a first step, and in light of the existing controversy as to what extent nontradable 
prices influence the real exchange rate movements in the NMSs, an attempt is made 
below to establish the degree to which RER fluctuations can be explained by 
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movements in the relative price of nontraded goods in Poland. As a second step, the 
possibility is investigated of introducing a distribution sector in the model, through 
an evaluation of the role of distribution trade costs in breaking the LOOP in Poland. 
 
3.2.1 Nontradable goods 
To establish the extent to which the relative price of nontraded goods can impact real 
exchange rate movements, an ‘Engel-type’ exercise is performed, where three 
different price indices for tradable (T) and nontradable (NT) sectors are considered 
(see Annex C.1 for details)101. Then, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the change in 
the RER is used as a measure of volatility (an uncentered measure of volatility). A 
measure is made of the how much of the MSE of changes in the RER is attributable 
to changes in the nontradable component of RER ( RELtRER ): 
 
(3.1) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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−
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− + −
 
where RELtRER  is the weighted difference of the log of the relative price of 
nontraded to traded goods in each country102.  
 
Graph 1 in Figure 3.1  below presents a decomposition of the Polish real exchange 
rate into tradable and nontradable components where the price indices were 
calculated from the different sub-categories of the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) with the weights proposed by Engel (1999). Based on this 
decomposition, the importance of nontradable prices in overall real exchange rate 
fluctuations seem to be quite low, although increasing in time (around 10 per cent). 
Graph 2, where tradable prices were approximated by the PPI index, and nontradable 
prices approximated by the HICP index, points to the higher importance of 
                                                
 
101
 Due to data constraints, quarterly data is used in constructing the tradable and non-tradable price 
indices for Graph 3, Figure 3.1, while monthly data is used in the construction of the price indices for 
Graphs 1 and 2, Figure 3.1. 
102
 Betts and Kehoe (2006) call the non-tradable component RERNT. For differences between the two 
see Appendix 1. 
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nontradable prices in the RER movements (around 20 per cent). Finally, Graph 3 
presents the decomposition of the real exchange rate using price indices proposed by 
Betts and Kehoe (2006)103. Here the importance of the nontradable component 
appears to be mostly significant and equals around 60 per cent. 
 
Figure 3.1. Decomposition of the Movements of Polish Real Exchange Rate 
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'Betts and Kehoe's indices were used
 
  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Eurostat data (the horizontal axis in Graph 1 and 2 
measures time in months, in Graph 3 in quarters). The vertical axis measures how much of the MSE 
of changes in the RER is attributable to changes in the nontradable component of RER. 
 
Clearly, the importance of nontradable prices in explaining real exchange rate 
fluctuations in Poland varies depending on the construction of price indices in both 
sectors. This is because the correct split between the tradable and nontradable sectors 
is extremely difficult to determine, and subject to measurement problem (related to 
the availability of disaggregated data and classification of tradable and nontradable 
goods), and because of the presence of regulated prices in the NMSs (see 
Błaszkiewicz et al. (2005) for more details on the issue). For example, the share of 
tradable goods in CPI indices is typically larger than in other price indices as it 
                                                
 
103
 More precisely, Betts and Kehoe (2006) use gross output by sector data. Here, due to data 
availability, sectoral Gross Value Added is used instead. 
136 
 
excludes a large part of GDP consumed by the government sector (Ravenna and 
Natalucci (2007)).  
 
In the calculations above, the share of the tradable price in the Polish HICP index 
constitutes 70 percent. This is a very high value, especially when compared with the 
share of 30 percent based on Gross Value Added deflators used for the Betts and 
Kehoe’s decomposition (and also when compared with openness of the Polish 
economy, which is around 30 percent (see Section 2.4.1)). Moreover, the assumption 
made by Engel, that all goods are tradable, is questionable as some goods sub-
categories do include services and are subject to regulated prices. Therefore, 
additional analysis is necessary. As pointed out in Engel (1999) and evaluated in 
more depth in Betts and Kehoe (2006), the RER and the relative nontradable price 
series (i.e. tRER and RELtRER series in Annex C.1) should be uncorrelated if 
nontradable prices were not to matter for the real exchange rate movements.  
 
Table 3.2.1 presents the correlations and standard deviations of 
the tRER and
REL
tRER series. The results are in contrast with Engel’s predictions: 
irrespective of the price indices used, the correlation between tRER and 
REL
tRER is 
not insignificant. 
 
Table 3.2.1 Basic statistics for tRER and RELtRER series 
CORR_L STD_L CORR_D STD_D
ENGEL 0.64 0.25 0.66 0.65
PPI_HICP 0.82 0.27 0.58 0.28
BETTS AND KEHOE 0.63 0.56 0.30 0.68
 
Note: Author’s calculations based on the Eurostat data. Columns CORR_L and CORR_D present 
correlations between the respective pairs of series: ( RERt , RELtRER ) and ( RERt∆ ,
REL
t
RER∆ ).  
Columns STD_L and STD_D present relative standard deviations between REL
t
RER  and RERt and 
REL
t
RER∆ and RERt∆ . 
 
In summary, the results above show that in contrast to Engel’s (1999) findings for 
the US/Japan real exchange rate, nontradable prices do contribute to fluctuations of 
the Polish real exchange rate, even if tradable prices also matter. Therefore, in order 
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to build a model of real exchange rate determination which would also match data 
for the Polish economy, the relative internal exchange rate movements between 
Poland and the eurozone should be taken into account, in addition to deviations from 
the LOOP.  
 
3.2.2 Distribution Services 
A body of evidence suggests that final goods contain a substantial nontraded 
component, which accounts for a large fraction of deviations from the LOOP in 
developed countries (Burstein et al. (2003), McDonald and Ricci (2001), Corsetti 
and Dedola, (2005)). Therefore, Corsetti et al. (2008) propose adding a distribution 
sector to the standard DSGE model. They further demonstrate that this feature not 
only contributes to breaking the LOOP, but also – by lowering the elasticity of 
substitution between home and foreign tradable goods104 – helps generate the terms-
of-trade and real exchange rate improvements  in response to a positive productivity 
shock observed in the US data. Because the real exchange rate appreciation and 
terms-of-trade improvements are also observed in the NMSs, and because there is 
empirical evidence  that this facts could be related to productivity improvements in 
these countries (see Annex A.1, Figure A.1.1 in Chapter 1 and Figure 2.1 in  
Chapter 2), following Corsetti et al. (2008), the distribution sector is also included in 
the SOE model proposed for Poland.   
 
Unfortunately, there are virtually no empirical studies showing the significance of 
this sector in generating deviations from the LOOP in Poland. The only study that 
addresses the issue in the context of the NMSs is that of MacDonald and  
Wojcik’s (2004), which shows that distribution trade costs in Estonia and Slovenia 
play an important role in real exchange rate dynamics in these countries (over and 
above the HBS effect). The authors report that distribution services in Estonia and 
Slovenia account for 15 and 12 per cent of total value added, respectively105.  
 
                                                
 
104
 See Annex C.4 for the exposition of the mechanism at work. 
105
 Although they do not explain the definition of the distribution sector that they use.   
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Given the lack of other evidence, the share of the distribution sector in the Polish 
value added is calculated to estimate the potential role of distribution services in 
explaining real exchange rate movements in Poland. Based on data from the Polish 
Ministry of Finance, the share of distribution services (classified as transport, storage 
and communication) in the Polish value added in 2006 was around 7 per cent. 
However, if wholesale and retail trade are included in distribution services (the 
standard classification), this jumps to 26 per cent (i.e. wholesale and retail trade 
constitutes 19 per cent of the domestic value added). This number is lower than the 
32 per cent shown by Goldberg and Campa (2006) for Poland for 2000106.  
 
In summary, the SOE DSGE model proposed in this chapter will take into account 
the following factors/channels, which from the empirical point of view seem to be 
important determinants of the RER in Poland and could also contribute to its 
appreciation in response to tradable productivity improvements: internal real 
exchange rate channel, the distribution services channel (pricing-to-market), and the 
impact of international payments on the RER. This is in addition to the terms-of-
trade channel of the real exchange rate determination proposed in Chapter 2  
(i.e. quality adjustments and home bias). 
 
An observed in the NMSs RER appreciation could, of course, result from a number 
of other factors, which are not included in this model. For example, a RER 
appreciation could arise in response to a risk premium shock and the associated 
increased capital inflow to the NMSs (see for example von Hagen and Siedschlag 
(2008)). This additional transfer of resources from abroad would have to be met by 
increased domestic absorption. If increased spending occurred in the nontradable 
sector, the price of these goods would have to increase, causing real appreciation of 
the domestic exchange rate (if it fallen on tradables, it could be absorbed by a trade 
deficit) (see, for example, Calvo et al. (1993)). This outcome is not unlikely, given 
the favourable investment opportunities, including ‘convergence play’, in these 
countries. This has already been observed in credit booms, and where increased 
                                                
 
106
 In Goldberg and Campa’s analysis the share of distribution services in the Polish value added is 
the lowest out of 21 analysed economies. Goldberg and Campa’s results for industrial countries are in 
line with those recorded by Burstein et al. (2003) (around 50 percent), but higher than the average 
level of 15 percent reported by McDonald and Ricci (2001).  
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growth of real money exceeds the real GDP growth (see von Hagen and Siedschlag 
(2008))107.  RER appreciation could also arise from the nominal appreciation 
observed in the NMSs. However, as shown in Chapter 1, in almost all NMSs, real 
factors are responsible for movements of real exchange rates.  
 3.3  THE SOE / DSGE / IRBC MODEL – A NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The core analytical framework developed in this chapter is an optimizing, two-sector 
(tradable and nontradable), small open economy model along the lines of Benigno 
and Thoenissen (2003) or Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007).  
 
Following Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), but in contrast to  
Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007), in the model the assumption regarding perfect 
competition and homogeneity of goods in the traded sector is lifted. This provides 
for the role for terms-of-trade in movements of the real exchange rate in a typical 
NMS of the EU (i.e., the prices for the tradable sector are no longer exogenously 
given and are affected by differentiated products, home bias and distribution costs). 
Modifying the aforementioned papers, the model introduces a perfectly competitive 
distribution sector (in accordance with Burstein et al. (2003), Corsetti and Dedola 
(2005), Corsetti et al.  (2008), and Selaive and Tuesta (2003, 2006) and the evidence 
provided in Section 3.2.2), which together with home bias in consumption minimises 
the degree of the exchange rate pass-through.  
 
Similar to the model of Chapter 2, but unlike the aforementioned papers, for the 
reasons discussed in Chapter 2, the model does not include nominal rigidities and the 
potential role of monetary policy and/or money in economic fluctuations. However 
neither the LOOP nor purchasing power parity (PPP) hold in the model. On the one 
                                                
 
107
 ‘Convergence play’, a combination of real appreciation and declining long-term interest rates due 
to falling inflationary expectations and country-risk premiums, makes these economies even more 
attractive for short-term capital inflows and portfolio investment. For example, in Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal in the late 1980s and early 1990s, convergence play exacerbated domestic demand for non-
tradables, leading to economic overheating and inflationary pressures (due to limited supply). With a 
fixed exchange rate, increases in price levels leads to a real appreciation of the domestic currency. 
With a floating rate, the central bank can do more to suppress inflationary pressures and allow the 
nominal exchange rate to appreciate (see von Hagen and Siedschlag (2008) for details). 
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hand, the existence of home bias together with the presence of a nontradable good 
violates PPP. On the other hand, market segmentation caused by distribution services 
drives a wedge between producer and consumer prices and thus violates the LOOP. 
As both traded and nontraded sectors are monopolistically competitive, the LOOP is 
also broken at the producer level. As previously, the model focuses on the SOE case, 
which means that home bias in consumption depends on the relative size of the 
economy and its degree of openness (see Sutherland (2002) or de Paoli (2004) 
quoted in Chapter 2 and Annex B.2 for more details).   
 
The model also features incomplete risk-sharing, which makes it possible to account 
for wealth effects108. However, in the absence of a complete set of state-contingent 
claims, the associated redistribution of assets affects the steady-state of the model, 
causing it to change in response to temporary shocks, which means that the steady-
state can become nonstationary. In order to ensure stationarity of the model, in 
addition to an endogenously well defined steady-state, the convex cost of 
undertaking positions in the international asset markets is introduced109. This means 
of inducing stationarity into small open economy models with incomplete markets 
was discussed at length by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and can be found in the 
work of Benigno (2001) or Kollmann (2002) 110.  
 
Because intermediate goods are the largest component of imports in the NMSs, 
following Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007), the production function proposed in 
the model is the composite of domestic value added and imported goods. On the 
nontradable sector side, imported goods enter the nontradable sector production 
function through capital accumulation (investment goods are the aggregate of 
nontradable, home and foreign goods).  
 
The model is then calibrated to a typical NMS, represented by Poland. Numerical 
methods are used to solve the model (see the discussion in Chapter 2).  
                                                
 
108
 The existence of wealth effects means that changes in a consumer’s wealth cause changes in the 
amounts and composition of his consumption. 
109
 See footnote 125 and 126 for more details.  
110
 Nataluci and Ravenna (2003, 2007) preferred way of achieving stationarity of the model is an 
introduction of a debt elastic interest rate premium. However, as shown by Lubik (2007), this 
approach can imply non-existence of the rational expectations equilibrium. 
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 3.4 THE SOE / DSGE / IRBC MODEL – TECHNICAL DETAILS 
For the model developed below, assumptions about the distribution of infinitely 
lived agents (in the small and large economy), the size of the country, migration, and 
households’ consumption of goods’ varieties remain the same as in Chapter 2. 
However, now, in each country there are two sectors producing differentiated 
tradable and nontradable goods. The tradable home good is distributed along the 
continuum [0,1)h ∈ , tradable foreign good along (1, ]f n∈  and the nontradable 
good along [0,1)nt ∈ . Moreover, as mentioned, this time households do not have 
access to contingent securities markets against which they can insure at the domestic 
as well as the international level, i.e., the markets are incomplete. Each firm at home 
and abroad produces one of the varieties of the domestic and foreign goods, 
respectively, so that differentiated goods (varieties) in two countries are also indexed 
by h , f , and nt . 
 
3.4.1 Households 
The utility function of a household s is the same as in Chapter 2. However, given the 
multi-sector set-up, labour stN  is supplied to the H and NT sectors: 
 
(3.2) 
, ,
s s s
t H t NT tN N N= +  
The time endowment is normalised to 1 (i.e., the sum of leisure and the number of 
hours work is normalized to one).  As previously, it is assumed that labour
  
s
tN is 
mobile among sectors in each country and immobile internationally. 
 
 
Consumption and Price Indices  
 
A representative household s can choose between three types of goods: H, NT and F 
(home tradable and nontradable and foreign tradable, respectively). The composite 
good stC is aggregated from T and NT goods. Household’s s preferences over 
consumption goods are defined as follows: 
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(3.3) 
, ,
1 1 1 1 1
( ) (1 )s s st T t NT tC C C
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε εγ γ
− −
− 
= + − 
  
  
 
where 0<ε <1 and ε >1 is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and 
nontradable consumption good111, 0 1γ≤ ≤  is the share of traded goods in 
consumption. Traded consumption good 
,
s
T tC  is a composite of the domestically 
produced traded good H and foreign produced traded good F: 
 
(3.4) 
1 1 1
, , ,
1 1
(1 ) ( )s s sT t H t F tC C C
φ
φ φ φφ φφ φω ω
− −
− 
= − + 
  
 
 
where, as in Chapter 2, 0<φ <1 and φ >1 is the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign tradable goods112, and where [0,1]ω ∈  represents the degree of 
openness of the small open economy (see Chapter 2 for the discussion on the 
relationship  between the degree of openness and home bias in the SOE and Annex 
B.2 for derivations).  
 
Consumption sub-indices are a continuum of differentiated home, nontradable and 
foreign goods (i.e., aggregates across brands in home, nontradable and foreign 
sectors (
,
( )sH tC h , , ( )sNT tC nt , , ( )sF tC f ) within a country) and are defined as follows (for 
eq. (3.5) the analogous remark as in footnote 67 in Chapter 2 applies): 
  
(3.5) 
1
, ,
0
1 1
1 ( )j
j
j j
j
n
s s
j t j tC C j dj
n
σ
σ
σ σ
σ
−
− 
  ≡    
 
∫ ,j H NT=  
 
                                                
 
111 ε must be positive and greater than zero for tradable and non-tradable goods to be substitutes. The 
larger the ε , the more substitutable T and NT goods are. The Cobb-Douglas case (elasticity equal 
one) is not considered in this chapter as it does not allow for the discussion of substitutability of 
goods. 
112
 For restrictions on φ  see footnote 62. 
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(3.6) 
1
1
, ,
1
1
1 ( )
1
F
FF
F F
F t f t
n
C C f df
n
σ
σσ
σ σ
−
− 
  ≡   
− 
 
∫  
                                                                                                 
where jσ , Fσ >1 represents the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
goods (brands) in the tradable home and foreign sectors and is also the price 
elasticity of demand faced by each producer113.  
 
Given the above preferences and the fact that the final good aggregator is a zero-
profit agent the following price index for the composite consumption good can be 
derived (see Annex C.2): 
 
(3.7) 
, ,
1
1 1 1(1 )t T t NT tP P Pε ε εγ γ− − − ≡ + −   
 
where 
,T tP and ,NT tP are the prices of a composite Home and Foreign consumption 
good, respectively. 
 
Similarly, for the tradable good: 
(3.8) 
, , ,
1
1 1 1(1 )T t H t F tP P Pφ φ φλ λ− − − ≡ + −    
 
where 
,H tP and ,F tP are the prices of a composite Home and Foreign consumption 
good, respectively, and where, as in Chapter 2, λ  represents home bias in the SOE. 
 
Sectoral price sub-indices of H, NT and F goods are defined as follows114: 
 
(3.9) 
, ,
0
1
111 ( )
n
j t j t
jjP P j dj
n
σσ −−  
≡   
  
∫       ,j H NT=  
                                                
 
113
  See footnote 68 in Chapter 2. 
114
 It can be proved that in equation (3.9) 
,0
lim 0j t
n
P e−∞
→
= =
 for | | 1jσ > . 
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(3.10) 
1
, ,
1
111 ( )
1F t F t
n
FFP P f df
n
σσ −−  
≡   
−  
∫  
 
where 
,
( )H tP h , , ( )NT tP nt , , ( )F tP f are prices of individual brands set by individual 
firms producing those brands in home, nontradable and foreign sectors. 
 
Distribution trade costs 
 
As discussed above, one of the features of the model is the existence of the 
competitive distribution sector, which delivers goods to consumers and is located 
between the intermediate and final producers. As in Burstein et al. (2003), and 
Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Selaive and Tuesta (2006), it is assumed that 
bringing one unit of traded intermediate goods to consumers requires ζ units of a 
basket of differentiated nontraded goods115 116: 
(3.11) 
0
1 11
1 ( )
n
t t nt dnt
n
σ
σσ
σ σζ ζ
−
−
 
  
=    
  
∫  
 
The profit maximizatation problem for distribution sectors reads as follows: 
 
 
(3.12) 
,
, , , , , ,
max
H t
P
H t H t H t H t NT t H tY
P Y P Y P Yζ− −  
 
and yields the following profit maximization price: 
 
(3.13) 
, , ,
P
H t H t NT tP P Pζ= +  
 
where 
,
P
H tP  stands for the wholesale price of the domestic tradable good. 
 
                                                
 
115
 Note here that the Dixit-Stiglitz index above also applies to the consumption of differentiated non-
traded goods. This means that in equilibrium, a basket of non-traded goods required to distribute 
tradable goods to consumers will have the same composition as a basket of non-tradable goods 
consumed by the representative domestic household (Corsetti and Dedola (2002)). 
116
 See footnote 114. 
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An analogous equation can be derived for the price of the foreign good: 
 
(3.14) 
, , ,
P
F t F t NT tP P Pζ= +  
 
where 
,
P
F tP  stands for the wholesale price of the foreign tradable good. 
  
Thus there is a difference between the producer (wholesale) and consumer (retail) 
prices117. The presence of distribution services in the tradable sector allows a 
representative firm to charge different prices at home and abroad, i.e., LOOP does 
not hold even at the producer level: *
, ,
( ) ( )P PH t H tP h P h≠   and  *, ,( ) ( )P PF t F tP f P f≠   (as 
shown in (3.13) a tradable price contains a nontradable component in it, which, 
absent international competition, does not have to equalise, even after assuming the 
same share of distribution services in countries in question)118. Or to be more 
specific, in the production chain, distribution costs are realized before firms 
(retailers) combine each intermediate input variety into a composite traded  
good. The presence of distributive trade costs decreases the elasticity of demand (see 
Annex C.4).  The domestic distribution margin Dµ  is defined as a fraction of the 
final tradable price accounted for by distribution costs, and is equal to 
, ,
/NT t i tP Pζ  
(the share of the nontradable price in the price of the final home (foreign) tradable 
good), where ,i H F= . For simplicity it is assumed that nontradable firms do not 
incur distribution costs (i.e. delivering nontradable goods to consumers does not 
require distribution services) and so: 
 
(3.15) 
, ,
( ) ( )PNT t NT tP nt P nt=                                                                        
 
The real exchange rate is defined as:  
 
                                                
 
117
 The same relationship applies to the price of the imported final good.  
118
 To see differences in producer prices of the domestic tradable good sold at home and abroad see 
equations (3.50) and (3.51) as well as Annex C.5 for derivations. Expressions for producer prices of 
the foreign good sold at home and abroad can be derived analogously.  
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(3.16) 
*
t
t
t
PQ
P
=  
 
Individual demand functions for the representative consumer (household) can be 
obtained from the optimal allocation of expenditure across the NT, H and F goods 
(see Annex C.2): 
 
(3.17) , ,
,
,
( )1( ) (1 ) Nt t NT tS SNT t t
NT t t
P nt P
C nt C
n P P
σ ε
γ
−
−
   
= −     
  
 
(3.18) , , ,
,
, ,
( )1( ) H t H t T tS SH t t
H t T t t
P h P P
C h C
n P P P
σ φ ε
λγ
− −
−
     
=         
    
 
(3.19) , , ,
,
, ,
( )1( ) (1 )
1
F t F t T tS S
F t t
F t T t t
P f P P
C f C
n P P P
σ φ ε
λ γ
− −
−
     
= −         
−     
 
 
Similar to Benigno and Theonissen (2003), it can be shown that home bias arises 
when  
(3.20) 
*
, ,
*
, ,
S S
H t H t
S S
F t F t
C C
C C
>  
 
where: 
(3.21) , ,
, ,
1
S
H t H t
S
F t F t
C P
C P
φ
λ
λ
−
 
=   
−  
 
(3.22) 
* **
, ,
* * *
, ,
1
S S
H t H t
S S
F t F t
C P
C P
φ
λ
λ
−
 
=   
−  
 
 
and requires λ>λ* and 1ω < 119.  
 
 
 
                                                
 
119
 See also Annex B.2. 
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Investment 
 
Households not only purchase final consumption goods, but also consume final 
investment goods. Investment, similar to consumption, requires tradable and 
nontradable inputs and is produced using the following CES technology: 
(3.23) 
, ,
11 1 1 1
( ) (1 )s s st T t NT tI I I
ε
εε ε
ε ε ε εγ γ
−
− − 
 = + −
 
 
 
 
Tradable goods consist of H and F goods (foreign component of the capital good): 
(3.24) 
, , ,
11 1 1 1
(1 ) ( )T t H t F tI I I
φ
φφ φ
φ φ φ φ
ω ω
−
− − 
 
= − +
 
  
 
 
and 
(3.25) 
, ,
0
11 1
1 ( )
n
j t j t
j
j j
jjI I j dj
n
σ
σ σ
σσ
−
− 
  
≡   
  
 
∫ ,j H NT= 120 
 
(3.26) 
1
, ,
1 1 1
1 ( )
1
F
F F
F F
F t F t
n
I I f df
n
σ
σ σ
σ σ
−
− 
  
≡   
− 
  
∫  
 
The elasticity of substitution between T and NT goods, ε , and the elasticity of 
substitution between H and F, φ , are the same as in the corresponding consumption 
indices. It is assumed that the composite investment good is produced by the same 
final good aggregator that is producing the composite consumption good. This 
assumption implies the same price indices for consumption and investment goods. 
Individual investment demand functions are analogous to those for consumption. 
                                                
 
120
 See footnote 114. 
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Household Capital Accumulation 
 
Every firm rents capital services at the going rental rate 
,
K
j tr  ( ,j H NT= ) from 
households. Households can increase the supply of capital services by accumulating 
more physical capital. They can choose to augment a composite investment good tI  
(i.e., the aggregate investment expenditure for the whole economy) to the existing 
physical capital stocks by investing 
,
S
j tI  units of either the composite domestic 
tradable good or nontradable good121. Capital
, 1
S
j tK − is pre-determined at the 
beginning of each period and thus is non-transferable between tradable and 
nontradables sectors. However, given that there are no constraints on investment, 
cross-sectional capital mobility is possible in subsequent periods. The stock of 
capital increases in accordance with the following law of motion (see, for example, 
Chari et al. (2002)): 
(3.27) 
2
,
, , 1 , , 1
, 1
(1 )
2
s
j ts s s s
j t j t j t j ts
j t
I
K K I K
K
νδ δ
− −
−
 
= − + − −  
 
 
and ,j H NT=  
 
where ν  is the adjustment cost in changing the capital stock employed by each 
intermediate good producer, and δ  is the depreciation rate (common for both 
sectors). The quadratic function assumes that the adjustment is slow122. Because stK is 
the end of period stock, the capital that will be available for use in period t+1. 
 
Note that because investment good stI is an aggregate of H, NT and F goods, foreign 
goods contribute to capital accumulation in the small open economy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
121
 The relation between equations (3.23)-(3.24) and (3.27) becomes clear once the economy wide 
constraint on investment is imposed (see market clearing condition (3.64)). 
122
 See Footnote 70 in Chapter 2. 
149 
 
Resource constraint 
 
As discussed, incomplete international asset markets are assumed. Households have 
access to two risk-free one-period real bonds. One bond is denominated in the 
domestic currency, the other in the foreign currency. 
 
It is assumed that all households within the country have the same initial wealth, 
share earned profits in equal proportion, and own all domestic firms. This means that 
within the country all households face the same budget constraint (in units of 
domestic consumption good) 123: 
 
(3.28)  
( )
, , ,
, , , 1 , 1 , ,*
,
, ,
, , , 0 0
, , , 1 , 1, ,
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )
P
H t t F t H t
t H t NT t H t t F t H t H t
t tt t F t
n n
H t NT tP
NT t H t NT tK K t
NT t NT t H t NT t
t t t t
H t NT t
B Q B P
C B Q B w N
r Pr Q B
h dh nt dnt
P P TR
w N
P P P n P
I I
P
r K r K
− −
− −
+ + + + ≤ + +
+ + Φ
Π + Π
+ + ++ +
∫ ∫
 
 
where real household expenditures (normalized on tP ) are the left hand side of 
(3.28). 
,H t
B and 
,F t
B  are the time t holdings of the risk-free real domestic and 
foreign bonds expressed in home consumption units, respectively. tr  and 
*
tr represent 
domestic and foreign net real interest rates on these bonds, 
,H t
I
 and 
,NT t
I are 
households’ investment decisions, tC  expresses consumption expenditure. Real 
household income sources are on the right hand side of (3.28). The remaining terms 
in the budget constraint express households’ labour income from working in either 
the tradable or nontradable sector, 
, ,H t H tw N  and , ,NT t NT tw N  (where ,H tN  and ,NT tN  
stand for hours worked in the tradable and nontradable sectors; ,
,
,
 
H t
H t P
H t
W
w
P
= and 
                                                
 
123
 Therefore, in what follows, the superscript s was suppressed. 
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,
,
,
 
NT t
NT t
NT t
W
w
P
= ), nominal lump-sum government transfers, tTR , real profits of a firm 
i received by the household s in period t, 
,H tΠ  and ,NT tΠ . Finally, 
, , 1
K
H t H t
r K
−
 and 
, , 1
K
NT t NT t
r K
−
 depict household’s rental income from renting capital services to goods-
producing firms (similar to real wages, rental rates are also expressed in terms of 
sectoral prices)124. Consumers face no Ponzi game restriction. Transversality 
conditions apply.  
 
Note that ( )Φ •  is a function which depends on the real holdings of the foreign assets 
of the entire economy in terms of home goods125. It introduces a convex cost that 
allows for a stationary NFA position and a well defined steady-state (i.e., model’s 
steady-state is independent of its initial conditions)126. It captures the costs of 
undertaking positions in the international asset markets (see Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2003), Selaive and Tuesta (2006)) 127.   
 
In order to maximize utility, households choose a sequence of 
{ }, , , , , , , , 0, , , , , , , tt H t NT t H t NT t H t F t H t NT t tC I I K K B B N N =∞=  for all t=0….. ∞ , subject to the 
budget constraint and two equations describing capital accumulation in the tradable 
and nontradable sectors: 
                                                
 
124
 Notice that factor prices are valued at producer prices. This is because firms sell their output to 
distributors at this price, who in turn deliver goods to consumers at the consumer price. See also profit 
equations (3.48) and (3.60).  
125
 ( )•Φ = ( )t
υ b-b
2e , where υ is a constant, t t F, tb = Q B , and b  is the steady-state level of foreign assets. 
As in Benigno (2001), ( )•Φ is equal to one only when the NFA position is at its steady state level, 
i.e. tb b= , and is a differentiable decreasing function in the neighbourhood of zero. 
126
 With incomplete markets, without these assumptions the wealth distribution in the deterministic 
steady state would be indeterminate and the first-order approximation around it would contain a unit 
root. In turn, this unit root would imply that the wealth distribution in the approximate solution to the 
stochastic economy does not converge to the stationary distribution. This would occur despite the 
stationarity of the shocks in the nonlinear stochastic economy under some further conditions.  
Conversely, this implies that a wealth distribution exists which is not sensitive to initial conditions 
(e.g., Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) in Corsetti (2008)).  
127
 Because in open economy models with incomplete asset markets the deterministic steady state 
depends on the initial conditions of the economy, without this function the steady state would be 
compatible with any level of net foreign assets. This means that in a stochastic environment the 
variables in the model become non-stationary as net foreign assets follow a unit root process. 
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( )0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0
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Q B
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K
P r r
νβ ξ δ
+ + + +
+
+ + + + +
+
+ + − +
+ −
+ +
+ +
Π + Π∫ ∫
 
 
 
 
 +
 
 
 + − − − − −
 + + Φ 
+ − + −
+
( )
0
0
0 0 0 0
2
, 1
, ,
                                                                                                     ,
j t t
t M
t t t t H t t NT t t
K
N N N
j H NT
δ
β κ
+ −
+ + + +
  
 
− +     
+ − −
=
 
 
where instantaneous utility U is a function of a consumption index and 
leisure 1t tL N= − , 
M
tλ , ,Mj tξ  are the marginal values of consumption and investment, 
respectively; 
0
M
t tκ + is a disutility of labour supply
128
.
 
 
 
By setting and solving the sequential Lagrangian problem, one gets the following 
first order conditions for a representative household: 
 
 
(3.29) :  ( , ) 0Mt C t t tC U C N λ− =  
(3.30) :  ( , ) 0Mt N t t tN U C N κ+ = ,      
(3.31) 
, ,
:  0j M Mt j t j t tN P wλ κ− =  
(3.32) 1
,
1
:  
1
M
t
H t t M
t t
B E
r
λβ λ
+
=
+
 
                                                
 
128
 Given the fact that all households are identical their marginal utilities of consumption Mstλ  and 
investment 
,
Ms
j tξ , and disutility of labour 0Mst tκ + are also identical, and the superscript M could be 
dropped in the following derivations (notice also that in the steady-state M Mjλ ξ= ). See also 
footnote 126. 
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(3.33)   ( )* 1, , 1 1:  ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) tF t C t t t t F t t c t t
t
QB U C N r Q B U C N Qβ
+
+ +
 
= + Φ Ε  
 
 
(3.34)   ,
, , ,
, 1
:  
K
j tK M M M
j t t j t j t
j t
I
I
K
λ ξ ξ ν δ
−
 
= − −  
 
 
 
(3.35)  ( )
, , 1 , 1
, 1
2
, 1 , 1 , 1
, 1
, , ,
:  
1
2
M M
j t j t t t j t j t
K K K
j t j t j tM
t j t
j t j t j t
KK E P
I I IvE v
K K K
rξ β λ
β ξ δ δ δ
+ + +
+ + +
+
=
     
 + − − − + −              
 
 
where ,Pj H NT=  and PH  is an index for the home tradable price at the 
producer level.   
 
Now, combining (3.29) and (3.32) one obtains a standard consumption-savings 
decision equation for households (i.e., the consumption Euler equation): 
 
(3.36) 1 1( , )1(1 ) ( , )
C t t
t
t C t t
U C N
r U C N
β + + = Ε  +  
 
 
Equations (3.29), (3.30) and (3.31) determine the labour/ leisure choice (i.e., 
households set wages as a markup over the marginal disutility of labour, which is to 
say that at the margin, the ratio between marginal utilities of effort and consumption 
should equal the real wage).  
 
(3.37) 
, ,
( , )
( , )
N t t
j t j t
C t t
U C NP w
U C N
=  
 
Equation (3.32) represents the home consumers’ optimal holdings of home bonds. 
The equivalent of equation (3.32) for the large country and equation (3.33) set 
conditions for portfolio holdings of foreign bonds: 
 
(3.38) ( )
, 1 1
* 1( , )( , ) 1 )( F t t C t t tC t t t
t
tB Q U C N
QU C N r Qβ + +
+ 
 
 
= + Φ Ε  
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And finally, equations (3.34) and (3.35) pin down the optimal path for capital.  
 
(3.39) 
1 1
1 1 , 1 , 1
1
1
2
1 1 1
( , ) ( , )( , )
1 1
               * (1 )
2
C t t C t t
t C t t j t j tj j
t t
j j
t t
j j j
t t t
j j j
t t t
U C N U C NU C N P r
I I
K K
I I I
K K K
β
ν δ ν δ
νδ δ ν δ
+ +
+ + + +
+
−
+ + +
 
 
 
= Ε +    
− − − −       
      
− − − + −            
    
 
Two things should be noted here. First, when markets are incomplete, the risk-
sharing between countries is incomplete. To set up the condition for risk-sharing one 
needs to combine a foreign consumption Euler equation with the expression for 
portfolio holdings i.e., eq. (3.38) is combined with the equivalence of equation (3.36) 
for the foreign country. This yields: 
 
(3.40) ( )
,
1
* * *
1 1 1 1 1
* * *
( , ) ( , )1
( , ) ( , )F t t
C t t C t t t
t t
C t t C t t tB Q
U C N U C N Q
U C N U C N Q
−
+ + + + +
      
 Ε = Ε     
       
Φ
 
 
Thus, the difference between a model in which financial markets are complete and 
one in which they are incomplete is that in the later case the link between the real 
exchange rate and marginal utilities of home and foreign consumptions holds only in 
expectations and is affected by the NFA position of households129. So as long as 
there is asset accumulation/ de-cumulation the real exchange rate will be affected. 
Ceteris paribus, there is a negative correlation between the NFA and RER (see also 
Selaive and Tuesta (2006)). Second, unlike models in which markets are complete, 
here, since there are costs associated with holdings of foreign currency-denominated 
bonds, the uncovered interest parity, obtained from combining equation (3.32) and 
(3.38), does not hold: 
 
(3.41)        ( )
,
1
*
(1 )
(1 ) F t t
t t
t t
tB Q
r Q
r Q
+ +
 +  
= Φ Ε  
                                                
 
129
 This in turn implies that the equilibrium dynamic response to productivity shocks can generate 
endogenous wealth effects. 
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and the spread in the real interest rates reflects a premium on top of the expected real 
exchange rate depreciation130. This equation implies a negative relationship between 
the interest rate differential and the NFA position of the economy. A country that 
accumulates assets faces a smaller implicit cost of bond holding in consequence of 
which the interest rate differential is smaller.   
 
3.4.2 Firms (supply side) 
 
Intermediate goods producers 
 
In each sector of the economy (T and NT) monopolistic competition is assumed. In 
the nontradable sector, monopolistic competitors produce a continuum of 
nontradable intermediate goods using domestic capital and labour (labour is mobile 
between sectors, but immobile internationally). In the tradable sector, given the 
importance of the imported intermediate goods in the production process in the 
NMSs (Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007), firms also 
use the intermediate imported goods, in addition to capital and labour.  
 
Firms supply nontradable output and produce in accordance with the following 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:  
 
(3.42) 1
, , , . 1 .( ) ( ) ( )NT NTNT t NT t NT t NT t NT tY nt Y A K Nα α−−= =  
 
where and 
,NT tA is a sector (and country) specific productivity shock.  
The production function for the tradable output 
,
( )H tY h  is of a CES form131: 
 
                                                
 
130
 The risk premium is positive if the home country is a borrower (and negative if the country is a 
lender). The interest rate differential is larger if the country de-cumulates net foreign assets and 
smaller if accumulation is observed.  
131
 Tradable production function for the large economy is also of the CES form. However, because 
SOE does not impact the large country, foreign tradable production function comprises of domestic 
value added and the intermediate domestic good. The demand for the domestic intermediate good 
exported to the large economy is therefore not modelled explicitly, but described by the ad hoc 
demand function. See Annex C.3 for details.  
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(3.43) 
1 11 1 1
, ,,
(1 )( )
H
H H H
H H H H
H t H H t H tH tY h VA MY
µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ µυ υ
− −
− 
+ − 
  
= =                         
where 
,H tVA  stands for domestic value added and tM  is an imported intermediate 
input (i.e., goods which are not considered as capital or consumption goods).  
 
Domestic 
,H tVA  evolves in accordance with the standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
 
(3.44) 11
, , , , 1 ,( ) ( )H HH t H t H t H t H tVA A K Nα αιχ −− −=                   
 
Unlike the production function defined for the NT sector, domestic 
,H tVA  is subject 
not only to productivity, but also to quality adjustments – i.e., 1
,H t
ιχ −  is a sector 
specific quality shock. As in Chapter 2, following Hobijn (2002) and Dury and 
Oomen (2007), a parameter ι  is introduced. It determines the impact of quality 
changes on marginal costs of the firm. Note that if 01ι − <  quality improvements 
increase the marginal costs of production (differently to the sectoral productivity 
improvements) 132. 
 
Finally, for simplicity and given the ongoing debate in the literature on whether 
prices are indeed sticky, in each sector flexible prices are assumed. Each monopolist 
chooses its price and commits to satisfying demand at this price. His objective is to 
maximize profits (minimize costs). Firms take the wage rate, aggregate price indices 
and the world aggregates as given.  As in Selaive and Tuesta (2003, 2006), it is 
assumed that firms in the nontradable and tradable sectors face flexible prices 
although they behave as monopolists in selling their products. In setting their prices, 
they face the following optimal pricing problems: 
 
 
                                                
 
132
 Recall that in Chapter 2 quality changes had an economy-wide impact. 
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( )(1- ) ( ) ( )
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NT t t
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 
 
 
(3.45) s.t: ,
,
,
,
( )( )
NT
NT t
NT t NT t
NT t
d dP ntY nt Y
P
σ−
 
=   
 
 
where 
,
( )dNT t ntY  is a total  individual demand for variety n in the nontradable 
sector, and where 
,
d
NT tY  is aggregate demand for a nontradable good (consumption 
and investment).  
 
Note further that since households supply homogenous labour and capital (i.e., firms 
share common factor prices 
,NT tW and , NT tR ), and since they face the same 
productivity and quality shocks, the nominal marginal cost NTtMC is common across 
firms. NTτ  is a revenue tax in the nontradable sector. Maximization of this function 
yields the following profit-maximizing price (which is the same at the consumer and 
producer level) 133:  
 
(3.46) , ,( ) 1
11
NT
NT t NT t NT NTNT t
t
t t NT NT t
P nt P MC
mk mc
P P P
σ
σ τ
= = =
− −
 
where 
1
11
NT
NT
NT NT
mk σ
σ τ
=
− −
 (NT sector’s mark-up), 
and where NTtmc  is the real marginal cost in the nontradable sector.  
 
Nominal marginal cost NTtMC is given by:  
 
(3.47) 
1
, ,
1
, ,
1
( ) (1 )
NT NT
NT NT
NT t NT tNT
t
NT t NT t NT NT
R WTCMC
Y nt A
α α
α α
δ
δ α α
−
−
 
= =  
− 
 
 
and can be calculated analogically to HtMC in Chapter 2 (see Annex B.3 for details).  
                                                
 
133
 Given that each non-tradable firm faces the same marginal cost as well as flexible prices, prices of 
goods are the same across firms. This essentially means that 
, ,
( )NT t NT tP nt P= . 
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Real profits in the nontradable sector (in units of home consumption) are: 
 
(3.48) ,
, , , , , , , , ,
0
( )n NT t
NT t NT t NT t NT t NT t NT t NT t NT t NT t
nt dnt
P Y P r K P w N
n
Π
= Π = − −∫  
 
In the tradable sector, each domestic tradable firm, given the demand for its good h 
determines the price that maximises its profits134. Therefore, each tradable firm 
solves the following optimal pricing problem:  
 
(3.49) 
*
*, , , ,
, ,**
, ,
, ,
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(1- ) ( ) (1- ) ( )
( ), ( )
, ,
,
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                               ( )
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d dH t H t H t H t
H H t H tP P
H t H t t t t t
d d
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Y h Y
P
τ τ
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     
    
    
 +
=   
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, ,* *
, ,*
,
( )
                          ( )
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H t NT td d
H t H t
H t
P h P
Y h Y
P
σζ − 
  
 
+
=
 
 
where ( )dH hY ( ( )*dH hY ) is a total  individual domestic (foreign) demand for variety 
f in the tradable home sector, and where 
,
d
H tY  ( *,dH tY ) is an aggregate domestic 
(foreign) demand for a tradable home good (consumption and investment). 
 
From the problem above, the following optimal prices for producers are obtained 
(note that they are not the same as for consumers) 135 136:  
 
(3.50)   , , ,( ) (1 )1
11
P P H
H t H t NT ttH H
t t H H t H t
P h P PMC
P P P P
σ ζ τ
σ τ σ
 
−
= = + 
− −  
               
                                                
 
134
 Notice that since a small country case is considered here, demand for foreign goods is a negligible 
part of the total exports of the Foreign (large) country. 
135
 Since each tradable firm faces the same marginal cost and faces flexible prices, goods prices 
charged at the domestic market are the same across firms (similar to the NT sector), but different 
between domestic and foreign markets. 
136
 See Annex C.5 for derivations. 
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(3.51) 
* * *
, , ,
* * *
( ) (1 )1 1
11
P P H
H t H t NT ttH H
t t H H t t H t
P h P PMC
P P P Q P
σ ζ τ
σ τ σ
 
−
= = +  
− −  
                      
 
Note that (3.50) and (3.51) can be re-written as137:  
 
(3.52) , (1 )1 1
11
P NT H
H t t tH H
NT H
t H H H t t
Hmk
P MC MC
mk
P MC P
σ ζ τ
σ τ σ
 
−
= + 
− −  
 
(3.53) 
* *
,
*
(1 )1 1
11
P NT H
H t t tH H
t NT H
t H H H t t
Fmk
P MC MCQ mk
P MC P
σ ζ τ
σ τ σ
 
−
= + 
− −  	
 
 
It is clear that sectoral mark-ups both within a country (i.e. H NTmk mk≠ ) and 
between the domestic and foreign economy (i.e. *F Hmk mk≠ ) do not equalize138. 
Because domestic and foreign tradable mark-ups do not equalize, the LOOP at the 
producer level does not hold either. The exchange rate pass-through is incomplete139. 
 
Using (3.13), the tradable price for consumers in the domestic economy can be 
expressed as: 
 
(3.54) , , , ,( ) (1 )1
11
H
H t H t NT t NT ttH H
t t H H t H t t
P h P P PMC
P P P P P
σ ζ τ ζ
σ τ σ
 
−
= = + + 
− −  
 
 
and for the exported good: 
 
(3.55) 
* * * *
, , , ,
* * * *
( ) (1 )1
11
H
H t H t NT t NT ttH H
t t H H t t H t t
P h P P PMC
P P Q P P P
σ ζ τ ζ
σ τ σ
 
−
= = + +  
− −  
 
                                                
 
137
 See Annex C.5 for derivations. 
138
 Sectoral markups within and between countries equalize when the distribution cost parameter is set 
to zero, i.e. 0ζ = , and when price elasticities of demand faced by each producer and tax rates 
equalize.  
139
 See Corsertti and Dedola (2005) for a discussion on the role of elasticity of demand for domestic 
goods in explaining the break in LOOP, and the role of distributive trade in lowering this elasticity (as 
well as derivations in Annex C.4). 
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Foreign consumer prices can be expressed analogously. Thus, the presence of 
distribution services is also one of the channels violating PPP.  
 
As in the nontradable sector case, in order to calculate marginal cost of production of 
tradables, HtMC , the same approach is used as that described in Annex B.3,  
Chapter 2, for the whole economy. However, given the CES production function in 
the H sector, the calculated nominal HtMC  is of the CES form: 
 
(3.56) 
1
1
, ,1
, ,
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,
,
1
11 1
1(1 )
1
     (1 )( )
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 
 
 
 
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−
−
= =
−
− +
−
−
−
+ −
       
 
where 
,M tP  is a domestic currency price of the imported intermediate good for 
which the law of one price holds140. Unlike in the nontradable sector case, HtMC cost 
can change in response not only to changes in quality but also productivity.  
 
The tradable goods producer chooses the inputs of production (capital, labour and 
imported good) to minimise the cost of production of the required output: 
 
(3.57) 
, , , , ,
,
1 11 1 1
, ,
min
      . . (1 )
H
H H H
H H H H
Y H t H t H t H t M t tH t
H t H H t H t
R K W N P M
s t VA MY
µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ µυ υ
− −
−
+ +
 
+ − 
  
=
 
 
From the cost minimisation problem above the following ratio is obtained: 
                                                
 
140
 Notice that 
,M tP is the price of the imported intermediate good used in domestic production. This 
domestic production is available for sale as a consumption or investments good either at home or 
abroad at the price 
,H tP and 
*
,H tP , respectively. Analogously, 
*
,F tP  and ,F tP are the foreign and  
domestic price of the foreign consumption good and *
,M tP is the price of the imported intermediate 
good used in the foreign production (see Annex C.3).  
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(3.58) , , 1 , ,
1
H t H t H t H t
H H
R K W N
α α
−
=
−
 
as well as a functional form determining demand for the imported intermediate  
good tM :  
(3.59) , ,
, ,
11 ( )(1 )M t H tt HP P
H t H t t
HH
HP Y hMC
P P M
µµυ
 
= −  
 
 
 
Real profits in the tradable sector (in units of domestic consumption) read as: 
 
(3.60) ,
, , , , , , , , ,
0
( )n H t P P P
H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H t H t
h dh
P Y P r K P w N
n
Π
= Π = − −∫  
 
3.4.3 Fiscal policy 
 
The Government in the domestic economy collects revenue taxes from firms. These 
taxes are then redistributed to households in the form of lump-sum transfers TR (the 
government subsidy is used to eliminate the steady-state mark-up distortions). This 
is done in a way that in each period there is a balanced budget.  
 
(3.61) 
, , , ,
0 0
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( )
n n
P t
NT NT t NT t H H t H t
t
TRP nt Y nt P h Y h di h dh
P
τ τ+ =∫ ∫  
  
3.4.4 Stochastic Environment and Equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium of the small open economy is characterized upon aggregation of: 
 
1) allocations and wages for home consumers: 
 
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
K K
t H t NT t H t F t H t NT tC I I B B W W  
2) allocations and prices for home firms: 
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, 1 , 1 , , , , ,, , , , ,
P
H t NT t H t NT t H t NT t M tK K N N P P P− −  
3) allocations and prices for foreign firms: 
 
* * * * * * *
, 1 , 1 , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,
P P
F t NT t F t NT t H t H t M t NT tK K N N P P P P− −  
4) rental rates for capital: 
, ,
,H t NT tR R  
5) fiscal policies; 
  
such that households and firms’ allocations solve the households’ and firms’ 
problems (i.e., the first order conditions), and that the following market clearing 
conditions are satisfied141: 
 
(3.62) 
,
0H tB =  
(3.63) 
, ,H t NT t
d
t
s
tN N N N= + =  
(3.64) 
, ,
K K
H t NT ttI I I= +  
(3.65) * *
, , , , ,H t H t H t H t H tY C C I I= + + +  
(3.66) 
, , , , , , ,
( )NT t NT t NT t H t F t H t F tY C I C C I Iζ= + + + + +  
(3.67) , , , ,
P
H t H t NT t NT t
t
t t
P Y P Y
Y
P P
= +  
  
Market clearing conditions are as follows. Condition (3.62) requires that since only 
domestic consumers have access to domestic bonds, the net supply of these bonds 
must be zero in equilibrium. Condition (3.63) states that, in equilibrium, labour 
market requires equalization of total labour demand and supply. Condition (3.64) is 
the constraint imposed on an economy-wide investment processes (as stressed above, 
there are no constraints on investment, ensuring capital mobility across sectors), and 
is necessary given the two separate capital stocks. Goods’ market equilibrium 
condition (3.65) states that total demand in the H sector comprises demand for goods 
demanded by domestic and foreign consumers ( )*, ,,H t H tC C  as well as domestic and 
                                                
 
141
 Note that market clearing for domestic variety h must satisfy: 
* *
, , ,, ,
( ) ( ) (1- ) ( ) ( ) (1- ) ( )H t H t H tH t H tY h nC h n C h nI h n I h= + + + , i.e., the aggregate consistency 
condition requires that individual and per capita variables coincide for all t. 
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exported investment goods ( )*, , ,H t H tI I . Goods’ market equilibrium condition (3.66) 
states that total demand in the NT sector is made up of consumption and investment 
demand in the NT sector, and the demand from distributors who need to distribute 
tradable domestic and foreign consumption goods, as well as tradable domestic and 
foreign investment goods used in the H sector. Finally, the last market clearing 
condition (3.67) indicates that total real domestic output must be equal to the sum of 
H and NT production142.  
 
The model closes with the specification of balance of payments (in real terms), 
which can be obtained from (3.28) and after substituting for goods’ market 
equilibrium constraints: 
 
(3.68)              
( ) ( )
( )
, , ,* * *
, , 1 , ,*
,
, ,
, ,
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P
t F t H t M t
t F t H t H t t
t tt t F t
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F t M t
F t F t t
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Q B P PQ B C I M
P PQ B
P
C I M
P
r
P
P
−
∆
+ +
− + −
− =
+ Φ

 
where  *tM   stands for the large country import of the intermediate input from 
the small open economy143. 
 
Equation (3.68) equates the change in net foreign assets (NFA) with the trade 
balance (i.e. the difference between export and import). For example, if domestic 
imports are greater than exports (i.e. domestic investment is bigger than savings), 
then the discrepancy must be balanced by the inflow of foreign capital (i.e. current 
account deficit and de-accumulation of the NFA). 
 
The current account, CA, is equal to the change in NFA: 
 
(3.69) 
, 1, F tt F t BCA B −−=  
 
                                                
 
142
 To see why output is valued at producer prices, see the tradable producer maximization/pricing 
problem as well as footnote 124.  
143
 See Annex C.3 for details. 
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The exogenous driving forces in the economy include technology, quality and 
preference shocks, which follow stochastic processes: 
 
(3.70) 
, 1 , 1log log HH
A
H t A H t tA Aρ ε+ += +  
(3.71) 
, 1 , 1log log NTNT
A
NT t A NT t tA Aρ ε+ += +  
(3.72) 
, 1 , 1( 1) log ( 1) logH HH t H t tχ χι χ ρ ι χ ε+ +− = − +  
(3.73) 
, 1 , 1log log CCC t C t tρ ε
ϒ
+ ϒ +ϒ = ϒ +  
(3.74) 
, 1 , 1log log NNN t N t tρ ε
ϒ
+ ϒ +ϒ = ϒ +  
(3.75) *** *, 1 , 1log log F
F
A
F t F t tAA Aρ ε+ += +  
(3.76) *** *, 1 , 1log log NTNT
A
NT t NT t tAA Aρ ε+ += +  
 
Preference shocks are introduced to allow investigation of the effects of changes on 
the demand side of the economy in a non-monetary framework. 
 
 
Decompositions of some international variables: 
 
Given the price indices in the model, and the presence of nontradable goods, home 
bias and distribution services, real exchange rate can be decomposed in the following 
manner: 
(3.77) 
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= =
	
 
 
where 
,EXT tQ  is the external real exchange rate and ,INT tQ  is the internal real 
exchange rate. 
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External real exchange rate,
,
 EXT tQ , can be further decomposed (recall from  
Chapter 2 that in the SOE set-up * *
,F t tP P=  (or * *, ,F t T tP P= in the two-sector model)) 
into: 
 
(3.78) 



1
1 1*
, , ,
,
, , ,
(1 )F t F t F tEXT t
F t H t H t
LOOP TOT
ELASTICY
P P PQ
P P P
φ φ
ω ω
−
−  
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These three elements which impact the movements of the external real exchange rate 
are called as follows. The first is called ‘LOOP’ as it is related to the price 
discrimination across countries. If LOOP holds (i.e., if distribution services are 
absent in the model), the first component is equal to 1144. The second element is 
called ‘TOT’ as it represents terms of trade movements. It equals 1 when distribution 
services are excluded from the model and when home bias is symmetric. The third 
element of this decomposition is called ‘Elasticity’, and is inversely proportional to 
the terms of trade, i.e., when TOT appreciates (depreciates), it always depreciates 
(appreciates) for the values of φ  different from one. For φ =1 and 0.5ω =  
(symmetric home bias), this component of the external real exchange rate equals 1.  
To see more explicitly how distribution services affect the movements of the real 
exchange rate, it is useful to re-write tQ  in the following way:  
(3.79) 
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which in the log-linear form reads as: 
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 Notice that for simplicity the model assumes identical elasticities of demand for the same good 
across countries (this is not the case in Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), who however do not include 
distribution services in their model). This means that without distribution services the LOOP holds in 
the model, as firms are unable to price discriminate across the different markets. 
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and where the terms 1, 2 and 3 represent market segmentation channels ( MStQ ) 
caused by the international price discrimination due to the presence of distribution 
services and the presence of home bias. The term (4) is the internal real exchange 
channel ( inttQ )145. 
 
The respective channels (features of the model) affect the real exchange rate in the 
following way. Home bias, which arises as domestic consumers prefer home over 
foreign goods (i.e. 1λ λ> − 146) together with the presence of the nontraded good in 
the model, violate purchasing power parity (i.e. the real exchange rate is no longer 
equal one).  At the same time, the presence of the nontraded good in the model, as 
mirrored by the inttQ  channel, represents the international version of the HBS effect 
where movements in the real exchange rate are caused by movements of relative 
prices of nontraded and traded goods between countries. Distribution services result 
in a difference between the price at which the same good is sold to consumers and 
producers, i.e., *
, ,
 
P P
H t H tP P≠  ( *, ,  P PF t F tP P≠ ) and *, ,H t H tP P≠  ( *, ,F t F tP P≠ ), and thus 
inviolate LOOP (see Annex C.5 for details). This also contributes to the violation of 
PPP in the model and - because of its impact on the elasticity of substitution between 
H and F tradable goods – should increase the volatility of the real exchange rate.  
 
                                                
 
145
 The technical details of the method used to perform the log-linearization above can be found in 
Annex C.6. The same Annex also presents detailed steps taken to log-linearize the simpler 
decomposition of the RER, in the model without distribution services.  
146
 For home bias to occur in the large economy, the reverse is true. 
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It should be stressed that in the presence of distribution services the real exchange 
rate is not only affected through movements of the relative price of traded goods, as 
well as nontraded to traded goods (as would be the case in a model with nontradable 
goods and home bias in preferences only), but also through movements of the 
relative price of nontraded goods between the two economies (see term 1 in (3.80)). 
Thus, the movements of this price add one more element, which can contribute to the 
volatility of the real exchange rate. 
 
Equation (3.80) can be further simplified by assuming a symmetric home bias, (i.e. it 
is assumed that both, home and foreign country value the consumption of locally 
produced goods to the same degree, *1λ λ= − ), and equal shares of tradable goods 
in the consumption basket between small and large economy, *γ γ=  (this 
assumption is also made in model simulations):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.81)  
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From the last equality of equation (3.81), it can be seen that without distribution 
services, the RER decomposition in (3.81) is equivalent to equation (C52) presented 
in Annex C.6, which means that ˆ ˆ ndst tQ Q= , where ˆ ndstQ  stands for the real exchange 
rate without distribution services (if 0ζ = , prices at the consumer and producer 
level equalize, LOOP holds (as equal elasticities of demand for the same good across 
countries were assumed)); and PPP deviations are only caused by the standard HBS 
effect (channel 3).  
 
Now, the relationship between terms of trade at the consumer and producer level can 
be also established. Since at the consumer level, TOT is defined as ,
,
F t
t
H t
P
T
P
≡ , and at 
the producer level as ,
,
P
F tP
t P
H t
P
T
P
≡  , the relationship between these variables in the log-
linear form reads as: 
 
(3.82)  ( ) 1Pt tT Tζ≡ +  
Without distribution services (i.e. 0ζ = ), the LOOP at the border holds. As a result, 
terms-of-trade at the producer and consumer level equalize. 
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 3.5 UTILITY FUNCTION, PARAMETRIZATION AND SIMULATION 
 
3.5.1 Baseline Calibration 
 It is assumed that household preferences are additively separable and that the utility 
function takes the same form as proposed for the basic model of Chapter 2 (see 
equation (2.1)). The strategy for the calibration of structural parameters is the same 
as described in Chapter 2. The calibrated parameter values are compiled in Table C.1 
in Annex C.9. As the values of the parameters which are common to both models are 
discussed in depth in Chapter 2, here, only the values of the parameters which are 
unique to the expanded model are evaluated. 
 
Consequently, following Stockman and Tesar (1995), the elasticity of substitution 
between traded and nontraded consumption and investment goods, ε , is set to 
0.44 147. The price elasticity of demand faced by each producer in the nontradable 
sector,
 NTσ , equals 6. This value, together with the revenue taxes of 0.1 in both 
sectors148, and the size of the distribution margin D NT
T
P
P
µ ζ=  set at 37.5 percent 
(i.e., the distribution parameter ζ  is set at 0.6), implies the elasticity of substitution 
between differentiated goods in the Home tradable sector, Hσ , of 9.6 (see Annex C.8 
for derivations).  Notice that the chosen size of the distribution margin is not only 
lower than the 49.7 percent adopted by Corsetti et al. (2008), Selaive and Tuesta 
(2006) or Thoenissen (2006) for the two-country symmetric DSGE models, but also 
lower than the 50 percent value picked for the Polish economy by  
Kolasa (2008, 2009). The choice of the more conservative value is motivated by two 
factors. First, as documented by Goldberg and Campa (2006), the Polish exchange 
rate exhibits a higher degree of pass-through when compared with the US exchange 
rate. Second, as discussed in Section 2, the share of distribution services in the Polish 
                                                
 
147
 Some papers adapt higher values for this elasticity following the findings of Mendoza (1991). 
However, Mendoza, unlike Stockman and Tesar, does not include developing countries in his sample. 
148
 Calculated by the author, based on OECD data for Poland, as GDP at 1995 constant prices less 
GVA at 1995 constant prices and averaged over 1995Q1-2008Q1. 
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value added is around 26 percent (Goldberg and Campa (2006) show that in 2000 
this number was 32 percent). Moreover, the calibration above ensures that the 
steady-state markups µ  in both sectors equalize and come to 1.33, which is a 
plausible value in the literature (see Chapter 2).   
 
As in Chapter 2, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded 
goods φ  is assumed to be 2 in the baseline calibration. However, in the model with 
distribution services, for the chosen size of distribution margins, this means the 
implied value of this elasticity Ω  as low as 1.25 (i.e. 1.25Ω = , see Annex C.4 for 
derivations).  
 
The shares of traded goods in the consumption and investment indices γ  are equal 
to 0.4. The choice of this value is governed by the calculation of the shares of T and 
NT goods in the Gross Value Added (GVA) in Poland between 1995Q1 and 
2008Q1. They are 0.3 and 0.7, respectively149. As in Chapter 2, the home bias 
parameter λ  is set to be 0.7, which implies a degree of openness ω  of 0.3. This, 
together with the share of domestic value added Hυ  in the production of home 
tradable good of 0.5, matches the 0.3 share of imports in Polish GDP150. The 
elasticity of substitution between domestic value added and imported good M, Hµ , 
equals 0.5, as in Natalucci and Ravenna (2002, 2007). Following Selaive and Tuesta 
(2006), for simplicity, the capital shares in the nontradable and tradable sectors for 
the intermediate goods producers equalize and are set to 0.4 (see also Thoenissen 
(2006) for the model with distribution services). The parameter governing the costs 
of undertaking positions in the international asset markets ( _ '( )NFA P b Y= −Φ  ), is 
set to 0.007 following Rabanal and Tuesta (2006)151. This implies that a decrease in 
                                                
 
149
 A higher value of this share is also tried as the share of tradable goods in HICP indices in Poland is 
larger and equals 0.7 (see Section 2 for the discussion on the issue). Since this choice almost equalises 
the steady-state shares of the non-tradable and tradable sectors in the total output – something not 
observed in the data - the GVA values are relied on. 
150
 The share of exports and imports in Polish GDP was also considered as a measure of openness. 
However, as this would imply a lack of consumption home bias in preferences, the import-to-GDP 
ratio was used instead.  
151
 The parameters’ NFA_P measures the elasticity of the interest rate differential to changes in the 
NFA position. The bigger the elasticity the bigger the effect of the current account channel on the 
interest rate differential (e.g. current account deficits in less developed countries should require higher 
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the net foreign assets to the steady-state output ratio by 100 basis points is associated 
with a 70 basis point higher domestic interest rate than foreign interest rate. This 
value is higher than the 0.001 proposed by Benigno (2001) and used by Benigno and 
Theonissen (2003), but lower than 0.01 used by Theonissen (2006)). As this value 
measures the elasticity of the interest rate differential to changes in the net foreign 
asset position in the, it seems reasonable to choose a higher value for a relatively less 
developed economy (as these countries need to compensate investors for higher risks 
and thus pay higher risk premium) (see also footnote 130).  
 
Table 3.2.2 presents the decomposition of the steady-state GDP that results from the 
baseline calibration described in Chapter 2 and above:  
 
Table 3.2.2 Structure of the Polish and model economies 
Structure Polish economy Steady-state
I/GDP 21 18
C/GDP 82 82
M/GDP 33 31
GDP_T/GDPa 30 29
GDP_NT/GDPa 70 71
 
Note: I – investment, GDP - Gross Domestic Product, C – consumption, I – import, GDP_T – GDP in 
the tradable sector, GDP_NT – GDP in the nontradable sector (a. sectoral empirical GDP was 
calculated using the sectoral Gross Value Added (GVA) data. Therefore, the presented shares of 
sectoral output are expressed in terms of the GVA).  Columns, ‘Polish economy’ and ‘Steady-state’, 
are expressed in percent of GDP. The values were calculated over the period 1995-2008. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the OECD data and the steady-state solution of the model 
 
From Table 3.2, it is clear that the proposed parameter values result in the model 
steady-state values of the decomposed GDP that resembles the structure of the Polish 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
spreads between domestic and foreign interests rates to reflect higher risk premium faced by those 
economies). 
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Calibration of shocks 
 
In what follows, the calibration of exogenous driving forces in the economy is 
reviewed. As a reminder, the dynamics of the model economy are driven by seven 
exogenous processes: 5 domestic (tradable and nontradable productivity shocks, a 
quality shock originated in the tradable sector and shifts in households’ preferences 
regarding consumption and labour), and 2 foreign (tradable and nontradable 
productivity shocks)152.   
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the absence of a long data span as well as the lack of 
reliable data on capital and employment make it difficult to estimate reliable 
productivity processes for Poland, and thus the variances (and covariances between 
Poland and the eurozone) of productivity innovations. This is even more so for the 
sectoral data. Despite clear difficulties, as in Chapter 2, an attempt is made to 
estimate sectoral variances and the persistence of the productivity innovations as 
lognormal AR(1) processes153 (as discussed in Chapter 2, given the weak evidence 
on correlation of shocks among the euro zone countries (see Jondeau and Sahuc 
(2006)  in Kolasa (2008, 2009)), the exogenous processes for productivity were not 
specified as a VAR model)154. With no priors for correlations between sectoral 
shocks, none was assumed (although Lipińska (2008, 2008a) assumes strongly 
correlated sectoral productivity shocks, Kolasa (2008, 2009) assumes zero)).  
 
However, the AR(1) coefficients turned out to be too low to be able to replicate the 
volatility of sectoral outputs in Poland (similar to the results obtained in Chapter 2). 
Therefore, and given the ambiguous findings of other studies on productivity 
processes (Backus et al. (1992) or Baxter and Crucini (1995)), an alternative strategy 
                                                
 
152
 The foreign preference shock was also tried. Since it did not alter the results much, it was not 
included in the final model simulations. 
153
 Sectoral productivity series are calculated as country-wide series in Chapter 2 (with the exception 
that the share of capital in both sectors is assumed to be 0.4). The data on employment and gross 
value added for the years 2000Q1-2008Q4 was sourced from Eurostat. The obtained series were then 
de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
154
 Also, as stressed by Baxter and Farr (2005), even for developed countries, it is impossible to 
estimate with great precision the parameters of the exogenous process for de-meaned, de-trended 
productivity specified as a bivariate VAR(1). Therefore, for example, studies by Backus et al. (1992) 
or Baxter and Crucini (1995), suggest qualitative features of the standard Solow residual measure of 
productivity shocks, such as it’s high persistence and a positive cross-country correlation (although it 
is less clear whether the cross-country spillover effects are positive or not). 
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for calibrating the exogenous processes for the de-meaned, de-trended sectoral 
productivity is followed. 
 
In terms of persistence, sectoral productivity shocks for Poland are assumed to be 
highly persistent (although a sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to the 
ARH(1) coefficient). A first order serial correlation process of 0.95 is assumed in 
both sectors – a value commonly used in the literature in respect of technology 
shocks (see, for example, King and Rebelo (1999)). As in Chapter 2, the correlation 
of structural productivity shocks between Poland and the euro area is assumed to be 
zero. Similarly, the sectoral shocks are assumed to be orthogonal in the baseline 
calibration. However, as a part of sensitivity analysis, the case where tradable and 
nontradable productivity shocks are moderately correlated (0.2) is also analysed. In 
terms of variances of sectoral productivity shocks, values are calibrated which best 
match the volatility of the sectoral outputs in the Polish data in years 1995Q1-
2008Q1. As the selected magnitudes coincide with the variances of productivity 
innovations obtained from the estimated AR(1) models and since they lie 
comfortably within the margins estimated by Kolasa (2008, 2009), some confidence 
can be put in them155. In terms of quality processes, only quality improvements 
originating in the tradable sector are described, as there is no way of measuring them 
in the nontradable sector. In the absence of available priors for quality adjustments, 
the quality process Hχ  is modelled as a lognormal AR(1) process (as proposed in 
Chapter 2, available data on export unit values is used). Finally, the size of the 
consumption preference shock is the same as chosen by Natalucci and Ravenna 
(2007) in the two-sector DSGE model for the Czech Republic. The persistence of the 
preference shocks is also taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2007), and is slightly 
higher than that assumed in the one-sector model of Chapter 2 (0.85 versus 0.7). The 
labour preference shock and its persistence is the same as in Chapter 2. Productivity 
processes for the euro area are in line with the priors chosen by Kolasa (2008) and in 
line with business cycle literature for developed countries (see, for example, 
Kollman (2002) for UK, Japan in Germany). Admittedly, calibrated shocks are only 
rough guesses, but they do provide some indication of innovation processes in the 
                                                
 
155
 The calibration of shocks in this paper is similar to that of Baxter and Faar (2005). 
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Polish economy. Table 3.2.3 below sets out the structure of the shocks used in the 
model calibrated for the Polish economy:  
 
Table 3.2.3 Volatilities of shocks 
Shocks to: Prod. H Prod. NT Quality H Cons. Prefer. Labour Prefer. Prod. F* Prod. NT*
E(ε2) 7.29E-04 2.25E-04 1.69E-04 8.10E-05 2.50E-03 6.40E-05 6.40E-05
AR(1) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.95 0.95 0.95
 
Note: Author’s calculations. The tradable and nontradable productivity, quality, consumption and 
labour preference shocks are labelled: Hε , NTε , Hqε , and C Lε εϒ ϒ , respectively.
*
Fε ,
*
NTε , stand for 
tradable and nontradable productivity shocks occurring in the large economy. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
3.5.2 Simulation Results 
 
Matching the Moments 
 
The aim of this section is to see how well the model performs in terms of matching 
the moments of the key business cycle statistics for Poland as well as its selected 
international variables.  
 
Table 3.2.4 and Table 3.2.5 present the empirical as well as theoretical standard 
deviations, autocorrelations and correlations of the selected variables. The data for 
the calculation of the statistics for Poland covers the period 1995Q1 through 2008Q1 
(current account and employment data was only available from 2000Q1)156. To 
retrieve the cycle data, all variables (in logs) were Hodrick-Prescott filtered with the 
smoothing parameter of 1600. 
 
In terms of matching the moments, the model performs reasonably well on some, but 
not all the investigated variables. For the baseline parameterisation (i.e., column II in 
                                                
 
156
 Due to the lack of data on average hours worked, Eurostat values for number of people employed 
were used as a proxy for a measure of labour in the model.  Sectoral employment was calculated in 
the same manner as sectoral GVA. See Annex C.1 for details. 
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Table 3.2.4), the model is able to roughly match the observed volatility of economy 
wide and tradable output, consumption and investment, as well as economy wide and 
nontradable employment. The volatility of nontradable output is slightly higher than 
in the data, but is comparatively similar. Also, the model does appear to match the 
volatility of the real exchange rate (and its persistence) relatively well. Although, 
this volatility is still around 20% lower than the actual observed for Poland, this may 
be regarded as a relatively good outcome given that there are no monetary 
disturbances in the model157, and the fact that the baseline simulations were run for 
the more conventional for the IRBC models value of the trade elasticity (i.e., for the 
values which makes the domestic and foreign tradable goods more substitutable to 
each other). It is also noteworthy that, as in the data, the real exchange rate is more 
volatile than the terms-of-trade (recall that in the model with tradable goods only, 
real exchange rate was less volatile than the terms of trade). However, the model 
underpredicts the observed trade balance, current account and – despite the presence 
of distributive services - terms-of-trade volatility. It also overpredicts tradable 
employment and internal real exchange rate volatility (notice that although the model 
generates more volatile internal RER, this gap may in fact be smaller. This is 
because the volatility of the internal RER may depend on the choice of indices and 
may very as indicated by the results presented in 3.2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
157
 i.e., many IRBC models find it difficult to replicate the documented in the data volatile and 
persistent real exchange rates (see Chari, et al. (2002), Heathcote and Perri (2002) or the volatility of 
RER reported for the baseline calibration in Chapter 2). 
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NFA_P=0.001
ϕ=0.6 ϕ=0.6
I II III IV V VI VII
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.95 0.95
0 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
all all all prod. only all all all
GDP 1.61 1.54 1.55 1.38 1.53 1.29 1.30 1.34
   GVA_T 2.61 2.04 1.95 1.82 1.94 1.21 1.22 2.15
   GVA_NT 1.83 1.69 1.69 1.51 1.69 1.66 1.67 1.28
Consumption 1.11 1.11 1.12 0.44 1.08 1.10 1.11 1.06
Investment 6.55 6.31 6.55 5.53 6.52 6.39 6.44 6.52
Employment 1.53 1.52 1.52 0.30 1.55 1.51 1.51 1.48
Employment_T 2.03 3.56 4.10 2.42 3.34 3.40 3.39 1.80
Employment_NT 1.57 1.64 1.63 0.73 1.75 1.60 1.61 1.60
Trade balancea 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14 1.46
Current accounta 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.15 1.13
Terms-of-Trade 1.81 2.23 2.48 1.92 2.12 3.50 3.40 4.47
RER 2.11 4.44 5.45 3.52 4.49 6.06 5.92 5.30
Internal RER 2.29 1.70 1.49 1.37 1.70 1.81 1.79 1.11
Shocks
Variable
Standard Deviations
          Model
Data
NFA_P=0.007
ϕ=2
Column Number
ARH(1)
ζ
Table 3.2.4 Model and Data Second Moments 
 Note: NFA_P refers to the parameter governing the costs of undertaking positions in the international 
asset market, φ  is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods. In the line 
‘Column Number’ a number is assigned for every performed model simulation. (1)HAR  stands for 
the persistence of the tradable productivity shock. ζ  is the share of distribution services. In the line 
called ‘Shocks’, the kinds of shocks affecting the SOE are stated (i.e., ‘all’ stands for the model 
scenario in which all shocks are switched on; ‘prod. only’ stands for the case in which only domestic 
and foreign productivity shocks, and a domestic quality shock are at work). 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the OECD data and the model simulations. 
 
 
In terms of the AR(1) coefficients (see Table 3.2.5), the model underpredicts the 
persistence of the employment  variable, which is close to the unit root in the data. 
The persistence of the NT and T employment as well as RER and internal RER are 
slightly lower in the model. Nonetheless, given the so-called ‘persistence anomaly’, 
which is usually a feature of the DSGE models, the persistence of the RER appears 
to be relatively well predicted by the model (notice that this was also the case in 
Chapter 2). As in Chapter 2, in contrast to the data, the model exhibits significant 
terms-of-trade persistence. Persistence of consumption is also too high (although 
less so).  
 
Looking at the correlations of selected variables with output (see Table 3.2.5), the 
model matches the procyclicality of all business cycle variables observed in the 
Polish data. The best match is observed for tradable output, consumption, 
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investment, tradable employment and terms-of-trade. However, the procyclicality of 
nontradable output appears to be too high in the model, while economy wide and 
nontradable employment exhibits a correlation with output that is too low. In terms 
of international variables, the terms-of-trade, as in the data, are procyclical. They are 
also positively correlated with the RER.  
 
 
Table 3.2.5 Model and Data Autocorrelations and Correlations 
 
Note: AR(1) refers to the first order autocorrelation coefficient. NFA_P refers to the parameter 
governing the costs of undertaking positions in the international asset market, φ  is the elasticity of 
substitution between home and foreign tradable goods. (1)HAR  stands for the persistence of the 
tradable productivity shock. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the OECD data and the model simulations. 
 
Also, the negative correlation of the trade and CA balances are reasonably matched 
by the model (recall that in Chapter 2 the model’s trade balance was positively 
correlated with output). The most significant discrepancy between the data and 
model appears in the correlation between output and the RER and internal RER, 
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which is very low and negative in the data, but high and positive in the model. 
Looking at correlations of the selected variables with the RER, the model 
overpredicts the co-movements of this variable with investment and internal RER. 
Likewise, unlike in the data, the co-movement of the RER with nontradable output, 
nontradable employment and current account is negative. However, the model does 
correctly mimic the correlation of tradable output, economy wide employment, 
tradable employment, trade balance and terms-of-trade with the RER. Although, the 
model still finds a positive correlation between consumption and the RER, this 
correlation is significantly lower than in the complete market model of Chapter 2. 
 
In what follows below, a sensitivity analysis is conducted and the results are 
described. In the first step, in an attempt to improve the performance of the model in 
terms of the terms-of-trade and real exchange rate volatility, the distributive 
parameter,ζ , was increased to 0.9 (for 2φ = , see column IV in Table 3.2.4). With 
the higher share of distribution services, the business cycle statistics did not change 
much (the volatility of tradable output, trade balance and current account dropped 
marginally and the volatility of tradable employment increased marginally). 
However, the match of international variables improved. Now, the real exchange rate 
volatility is only slightly higher than in the data (column IV in Table 3.2.4). Also, the 
volatilities of terms-of-trade and internal RER better reflect the data. With the higher 
share of distribution services in the model, the persistence of selected variables 
remains the same (Table 3.2.5). Also, the correlations of selected variables with the 
output and the RER remain unaltered (the largest change is observed for correlations 
of trade balance and current account variables with output, i.e. they acyclicality 
becomes more pronounced).  
 
In the second step, the distribution channel was shut down (i.e., 0ζ =  with 2φ = , 
column I in Table 3.2.4). This resulted in a significant drop in RER volatility as well 
as the terms-of-trade. The internal RER became much too volatile. The volatility of 
output (including nontradable and tradable) also increased. However, the volatility of 
employment (tradable in particular), as well as trade balance and current account fits 
the data better. Given that the AR(1) coefficients as well as the direction of 
178 
 
correlations of output and RER with other variables did not change much without the 
distribution channel, they are not reported. 
 
Given the importance of elasticity of substitution between home and foreign-
produced goods for the volatility and persistence of exchange rates, in the third step, 
the value of this elasticity was lowered to 0.6 (i.e., column VI in Table 3.2.4). This 
means that the value of the implied elasticity, Ω, became 0.38. Although, it is a fairly 
low number, it is not implausible (for example, Corsetti et al. (2008) use the implied 
value of 0.5 for the baseline calibration, Taylor (1993) estimates for the trade 
elasticity, for the U.S., is 0.39), and allows a better sensitivity check. Lower φ  
brings the volatility of output, tradable employment, terms-of-trade and RER closer 
to the data. This however happens in expense of the tradable output and internal 
RER fit.  
 
In the fourth step, the persistence of the productivity shock was lowered to 0.75. This 
hardly impacted both business cycle and international variables158. If anything, 
tradable output, employment and terms-of-trade became slightly less volatile. On the 
other hand, real exchange rate, trade balance and current account became more 
volatile. With less memory in the tradable productivity shock, AR(1) coefficients are 
somewhat lowered, but not drastically. Again, given that correlations with output 
and RER did not change significantly, they are not reported in Table 3.2.5. 
 
Given that the true value of the parameter measuring bond holding costs, NFA_P is 
uncertain, in a separate simulation the value was lowered to 0.001 (for the 0.6φ = ). 
Second moments in result of this simulation are reported in column VII of 
Table 3.2.4. Business cycle statistics as well as the statistics for trade balance, 
current account and internal exchange rate remained unaltered when compared with 
those presented in column VI. However, with higher risk sharing, the volatility of 
terms-of-trade and the RER became lower. Intuitively, when households are less 
constrained to borrow abroad following an increase in domestic productivity 
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 Only when the persistence of the productivity shock was lowered to 0.45 – the number obtained 
from the estimation of the AR(1) processes – were the business cycle statistics significantly different 
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(i.e., they face lower NFA_P), a smaller rise in the terms of trade is required to clear 
the market. Looking at the correlation of model variables with output and the RER, 
with the smaller cost of bond holdings, they are hardly changed. Given that AR(1) 
coefficients also hardly changed, they are not reported.  
 
Finally, in the last step of the sensitivity analysis, to see how much of the observed 
RER volatility is due to the presence of demand shocks in the model, these shocks 
were shut off. The results are presented in column IV of Table 3.2.4. Clearly, the 
RER is still fairly volatile, indicating that productivity shocks are an important 
source of its movement. However, with productivity shocks only, the model cannot 
account for the volatility of consumption observed in the data.    
 
In summary, the performed sensitivity analysis show that the model second moments 
are mostly sensitive to changes in the elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign tradable goods. Lower elasticity mainly improves the fit of terms-of-trade 
and RER volatility. These improvements occur irrespective of whether the elasticity 
is lowered directly or indirectly via the higher share of distribution services in the 
model (however, increasing the share of distribution services, also improves the fit 
of the internal real exchange rate). Nonetheless, the fit of some business cycle 
statistics worsens. In terms of model autocorrelations and correlations, they do not 
react much to changes in model parameters. Given that there exists a trade-off 
between the fit of terms-of-trade and RER and other variables, and taking into 
account that the fit of the model is already fairly good for the baseline calibration, 
this calibration is preferred159.   
   
Impulse responses  
 
Before the impulse response functions are presented below, it is useful to set out how 
the model can be expected to reflect the impact of each supply-side shock on the real 
                                                
 
159
 As mentioned above, the model does not include monetary disturbances, which empirically – to 
some degree - matter for the movements of the Polish real exchange rate, Therefore, and given the 
relatively high values of the terms-of-trade and RER variance for the baseline calibration even 
without nominal shocks, this calibration seems even more plausible.  
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exchange rate, and the expected impact of changes in the elasticity of substitution 
between H and F tradable goods, φ 160.  
 
Positive productivity shock originating in the tradable sector 
 
RER appreciation is ambiguous. In the model with a nontradable good, a positive 
productivity shock in the tradable sector puts pressure on real exchange rate 
appreciation via the internal real exchange rate channel (see term 3 in equation 
(3.81)), as predicted by the HBS proposition161, and via a positive wealth effect 
associated with the transfer problem discussed in the introduction to Chapter 3. 
However, in response to a positive productivity shock, the terms-of-trade must 
depreciate to clear the market for the domestic tradable output, which may lead to an 
overall real exchange rate deterioration.  
 
Which channel of RER movements prevails is not entirely clear, and depends 
 – among other things – on the elasticity of the substitution of home and foreign 
tradable goods φ . The larger the elasticity, the less prices of tradable domestic 
consumption have to drop for the market to clear (H and F goods are closer 
substitutes; a smaller terms-of-trade deterioration is required to switch demand from 
foreign to home produced tradable goods). Thus a higher φ  makes the HBS and 
transfer effects more likely to prevail, and result in the overall real exchange rate 
appreciation.  But adding distributive trade costs to the model lowers the elasticity of 
demand (see Annex C.4). Therefore, two opposite effects can be observed. On one 
hand, the presence of distribution services, because it lowers  Ω , also lowers the 
impact of a shock on the real exchange rate appreciation arising from an appreciation 
of the internal real exchange rate. On the other hand, provided wealth effects are 
strong enough, in a model with home bias and a distributive sector, there is a 
                                                
 
160
 The focus here is on supply-side shocks, as the recent productivity and quality improvements in 
the NMSs are believed to be the most important contributors to the persistent RER appreciation 
observed in these countries.  Emphasis is also placed on the elasticity of substitution between H and F 
tradable goods φ , given its significance in determining the behaviour of the real exchange rate. 
161
 Although a positive tradable productivity shock decreases the prices of tradable goods, it leads to 
increases in the price of non-tradable goods. This is because the resulting increase in the tradable 
sector wage is passed on to the nontradable sector due to the homogeneity of wages across sectors. 
This drives nontradable prices upwards, which in turn causes a reduction in the relative price of 
tradable to nontradable goods (see Błaszkiewicz et al. (2005) for more detail). 
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possibility that terms-of-trade may in fact appreciate, contributing to overall RER 
appreciation (see Corsetti et al. (2008)). This is because in a model with home bias, 
provided the elasticity of the substitution of home and foreign tradable goods φ  is 
sufficiently low, a negative income effect (arising from lower prices of tradable 
goods) should more than offset the substitution effect (arising from the increased 
domestic demand for domestic tradables). Then, for the world market to clear, terms-
of-trade (and the real exchange rate) must appreciate, boosting domestic wealth and 
demand. Moreover, distributive trade costs may actually diminish the tradable price 
decreases associated with the positive productivity shock, as both the HBS and 
transfer effects drive the cost of distribution services up, putting an upward pressure 
on the relative price of domestic and foreign tradable goods at the consumer level 
(see term 1 in equation (3.81)). 
 
And finally, because of lower risk-sharing in the model with incomplete markets, in 
response to a positive tradable shock, the terms-of-trade do not have to depreciate by 
as much as in the complete market case, as there is less risk sharing (Home does not 
need to transfer as much purchasing power to Foreign, and the required improvement 
in trade balance is smaller). The fact that terms-of-trade depreciate less in the 
incomplete market framework should contribute to overall real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
Positive quality shock originating in the tradable sector 
 
RER appreciation is ambiguous. Although in the case when the quality parameter, ι , 
is less then one, the marginal cost is an increasing function of quality, a resulting 
increase in the tradable price should lead to real exchange rate appreciation (via the 
terms-of-trade channel), but may also result in the depreciation of the internal real 
exchange rate. This is because quality improvements in the tradable sector may in 
fact result in price decreases in the nontradable sector (because of their lower relative 
quality). This would mean that although term 2 in equation (3.81) should lead to a 
RER appreciation, terms 1 and 3 are likely to bring about a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Which element prevails depends on the importance of nontradable 
prices in real exchange rate movements.   
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Positive productivity shock originating in the nontradable sector 
 
RER depreciation is expected. This is because when the economy is impacted by a 
positive productivity shock in the nontradable sector, an increase in the relative price 
of traded to nontraded goods in the home country with respect to the foreign country 
results in real exchange rate depreciation. Moreover, given the presence of 
distribution services in the model, the positive productivity shock to the NT sector 
should also lower the price of the domestic tradable good, as the nontradable 
component constitutes a fraction of that good. Therefore, all the terms of (3.81) are 
expected to depreciate.  
 
In what follows below, the model driving processes are graphed as impulse response 
functions. Each of the three figures (Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4) comprises 6 
graphs. The first graph presents the RER movements itself. The second represents 
the movements of the internal real exchange rate. The next three graphs are the 
elements of the external RER decomposition presented in equation (3.78). The sixth 
graph presents the dynamics of net foreign assets, which are crucial to understanding 
movements of the RERs associated with wealth effects.  
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Figure 3.2. Orthogonalized Positive Productivity Shock - Tradable Sector 
20 40 60 80 100
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 Real Exchange Rate
20 40 60 80 100
-0.01
-0.005
0
Internal Real Exchnage Rate
20 40 60 80 100
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 LOOP
20 40 60 80 100
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Terms-of-Trade
20 40 60 80 100
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 Elasticity
20 40 60 80 100
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Net Foreign Assets
 
Note: Solid line: the share of distribution services is 0.6 and NFA_P=0.007. Dash-dotted line: the 
share of distribution services is zero and NFA_P=0.007. Dotted line: the share of distribution services 
is zero and NFA_P=0.001.  
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 presents impulse responses to a positive productivity shock in the tradable 
sector. For the baseline calibration (solid line) the model generates an appreciation of 
the RER in response to a positive productivity shock despite the terms-of-trade 
deterioration (proportionally diminished by the ‘Elasticity’ channel as explained in 
section 3.4.4). This is because, terms-of-trade deterioration is outweighed by the 
increases in the relative price of nontraded to traded goods (the internal real 
exchange rate), which means that the substitution effect is greater than the income 
wealth effect. The RER appreciation is strengthened by the presence of distribution 
services in the model, i.e., the ‘LOOP’ channel.   
 
When distribution services are excluded from the model, the LOOP holds and the 
observed RER appreciation is lower (dash-dotted line)162. This is despite the fact 
that, without distribution services, the contribution of the internal RER channel and 
                                                
 
162
 Notice that without distribution services, given the flexible price assumption, the real variables in 
the model resemble the stochastic properties of the shocks, which means that impulse response 
functions capture not only short but also long run components of real exchange rate movement. 
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‘Elasticity’ channel toward RER appreciation is greater. However, since there is no 
contribution from the LOOP channel and since the price of distribution services also 
impacts terms-of-trade, which depreciates more in the model where distributive trade 
costs are absent (i.e. the nontradable price increases are not passed onto tradable 
prices), the overall real exchange rate strengthens less. Nonetheless, similar to the 
specification with distribution services, negative wealth effects related to the lower 
price of domestic tradable goods are not strong enough to lead to the ultimate terms-
of-trade improvement that arises in the model. In fact, in the model without 
distribution services, positive wealth effects arising from the fact that consumers 
substitute away from imported goods are higher (i.e., larger NFA accumulation is 
observed). Although this result differs from Corsetti et al. (2008) and Selaive and 
Tuesta (2003, 2006), it is similar to that of Theonissen (2006), who also includes 
distributive trade costs in his model163. 
 
And finally, when the home economy faces a smaller implicit cost of bond holdings 
(the dotted line), NFA_P (i.e. when it is set at 0.001 as opposed to at 0.007 under the 
baseline calibration), the real exchange rate depreciates164. This is because the 
smaller cost of undertaking positions in the international financial market increases 
risk-sharing. So, even if in this case the accumulation of NFA is larger, which all 
things being equal should result in a larger RER appreciation, with the smaller cost 
of bond holdings, risk sharing is greater, as a result of which terms-of-trade 
depreciates more (i.e. more purchasing power needs to be transferred to foreigners), 
and outweighs the appreciation of the internal real exchange rate. This suggests that 
the presence of distribution costs is not essential for RER appreciation, although it 
does contribute to it. 
 
A positive nontradable productivity shock results in the expected depreciation of the 
RER (via both, the internal, LOOP and terms-of-trade channels), which is larger in 
the model without distribution services (see Figure 3.3). This is because, when 
                                                
 
163
 All these papers look at the two-country symmetric case with distribution services, but only in the 
Corsetti et al. (2008) and Selaive and Tuesta’s (2006) papers do terms-of-trade improve together                              
with RER appreciation in response to a positive productivity shock. In contrast, but as in the model 
presented here, in Theonissen (2006), both the terms-of-trade and real exchange rate depreciate. 
164
 This happens irrespectively of whether LOOP holds or not in the model. 
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distribution services are present in the model, despite the smaller depreciation of the 
internal real exchange rate, the terms-of-trade deteriorate significantly more (and 
thus ‘Elasticity’ channel appreciates less). The latter happens because the positive 
productivity shock to the NT sector, which lowers the nontradable price also 
diminishes the associated increases in the price of a domestic tradable good. When 
the risk-sharing is greater (i.e., when NFA_P=0.001), the RER deterioration is 
marginally larger, as terms-of-trade deteriorate slightly more.  
 
Figure 3.3. Orthogonalized Positive Productivity Shock - Nontradable Sector 
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Note: Solid line: the share of distribution services is 0.6 and NFA_P=0.007. Dash-dotted line: the 
share of distribution services is zero and NFA_P=0.007. Dotted line: the share of distribution services 
is zero and NFA_P=0.001.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
And finally, a positive quality shock (see Figure 3.4), indeed brings about a terms-
of-trade improvement, but in contrast to the results of Chapter 2, the total impact of 
this shock on the change in the RER rate is positive (i.e., the RER depreciates). This 
is due to three factors: the depreciation via the ‘Elasticity’ channel, depreciation 
related to the break in the LOOP, and price decreases in the nontradable sector. 
Simulations performed for the model where ζ  is set to zero still lead to RER 
depreciation, although this depreciation is smaller. This is because even if the 
depreciation of the internal real exchange rate is larger for the model without 
distributive trade costs (i.e. negative wealth effects associated with a transfer 
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problem are observed), the terms-of-trade improvement is greater (as a drop in the 
nontradable price does not contribute to changes in the price of domestic tradables 
anymore), and there is no depreciating contribution from the ‘LOOP channel’. The 
appreciation of the RER associated with the positive quality shock is however 
possible when the model moves further away from financial autarky 
(i.e. NFA_P=0.001). This is because, in this case, the internal RER depreciates less 
and terms-of-trade strengthens more. This appreciation, unlike in the case of the 
positive productivity shock, is associated with the CA deterioration (i.e. the 
depletion of the NFA is observed) and thus negative wealth effects are observed.  
 
Figure 3.4. Orthogonalized Positive Quality Shock - Tradable Sector 
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Note: Solid line: the share of distribution services is 0.6 and NFA_P=0.007. Dash-dotted line: the 
share of distribution services is zero and NFA_P=0.007. Dotted line: the share of distribution services 
is zero and NFA_P=0.001.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Notice that the gap between terms-of-trade responses to tradable and nontradable 
productivity as well as quality shocks in the models with and without distribution 
services is largest in the case of a positive nontradable shock. This is because this 
shock triggers larger changes in the nontradable price, which is also a fraction of the 
price of tradable goods (see equation (3.54)).  
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Given that a positive productivity shock to the tradable sector results in an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (not a standard result in DSGE models), 
sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to the trade elasticity and correlation 
of sectoral shocks. The results show that the RER appreciation is fairly robust to 
changes in the value of φ 165. Only when home and foreign goods become closer 
complements (i.e., φ =1.6), does the real exchange rate depreciate. This compares 
to φ =1.9 when distribution services are excluded from the model.  When tradable 
and nontradable productivity innovations are assumed to be correlated, with 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.2, at the baseline value of φ =2 real exchange rate 
depreciation is observed. For the real exchange rate to appreciate, the elasticity of the 
substitution between home and foreign tradable goods φ  needs to be set at 3 or 
higher. However, RER volatility at φ =3 is still reasonably high and equals 3.86. 
 
Variance Decomposition 
 
This section establishes the contribution of each shock in the model to explaining the 
variation of the real exchange rate, the internal real exchange rate as well as terms-
of-trade. Additionally, the impact of each shock on the LOOP channel is examined. 
Table 3.2.6 presents the decomposition of the variance for these four international 
variables for three model scenarios: low and high share of distribution services as 
well as the scenario when 0ζ = . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
165
 For convenience, the related impulse responses are not shown. They are however available upon 
request. 
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Table 3.2.6 Variance decomposition 
εH εqH εNT ε*F ε
*
NT εϒϲ
εϒL
Q 0.3 0.06 55.07 1.93 26 3.75 12.89
  Qint 13.69 2.57 49.93 3.97 21.37 2.08 6.38
LOOP 1.77 0.33 55.22 2.43 25.49 3.38 11.37
TOT 55.66 10.45 10.42 1.34 6.78 2.94 12.42
Q 0.34 0.06 56.68 1.51 24.74 3.36 13.31
  Qint 11.21 2.11 52.49 3.28 21.43 2.06 7.41
LOOP 1.3 0.24 56.82 1.85 24.49 3.13 12.18
TOT 45.19 8.49 18.14 1.07 9.33 3.12 14.67
Q 0.05 0.01 48.44 4.42 31.7 3.44 11.94
  Qint 24.04 4.51 40.01 6.79 20.15 1.18 3.31
TOT 74.08 13.91 1.4 1.78 1.62 1.24 5.96
ζ=0.6
ζ=0.9
ζ=0
 
Note: The tradable and nontradable productivity, quality, consumption and labour preference shocks 
in the SOE are labelled: Hε , NTε , Hqε , and C Lε εϒ ϒ , respectively.
*
Fε ,
*
NTε , stand for tradable and 
nontradable productivity shocks occurring in the large economy. Real exchange rate, internal RER, 
the movements of the RER due to the break away from LOOP, and terms of trade are abbreviated as 
intQ, Q , LOOP, T , respectively. ζ  stands for values of distribution services in the price of tradable 
goods. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results obtained from this exercise indicate that under the low distributive trade 
scenario of 0.6ζ = , around 55% of the real exchange rate volatility is due to the 
positive shock originating in the nontradable sector; 26% of the variance arises from 
the positive nontradable shock originating in the foreign country; and 13% comes 
from the labour preference shock. Other shocks, including productivity and quality 
improvements in the tradable sector, are of little importance in explaining real 
exchange rate movements. The channel, which captures the deviations from the 
LOOP, is similarly impacted by these shocks. Likewise, the internal RER is also 
mainly driven by the nontraded productivity shock. Nonetheless, the contribution of 
the tradable shock to the internal real exchange rate’s movements is larger than to 
the movements of RER, and is around 14 percent. Terms-of-trade, are however 
dominated by productivity shocks in the tradable sector. Because terms-of-trade are 
dominated by productivity shocks in the tradable sector, these productivity shocks 
cannot be observed in the movement of the real exchange rate (more precisely, 
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because terms-of-trade deteriorate in response to the tradable productivity shock, it 
absorbs productivity differentials in the tradable sector). This result is similar to that 
of Altissimo et al. (2005), who looks at sources of inflation differential in the 
eurozone countries. 
 
An increase in the share of distributive trade hardly alters the way particular shocks 
affect the RER. As for the other two elements, the internal RER and TOT, the 
importance of the productivity shock decreases with the higher share of distributive 
trade. Surprisingly, excluding distribution services from the model does not alter the 
result that a nontradable productivity shock dominates the movements of the RER 
(the shock is still responsible for 48% of the RER variance). This suggests that 
adding distributive trade costs to the model does not change the conclusion that the 
real exchange rate is driven by shocks which originate in the nontraded sector.  
 
The fact that the model suggests that tradable productivity improvements are only 
important in explaining movements in terms-of-trade and do not contribute to 
movements of the real exchange rate is rather surprising, and runs counter to the 
commonly accepted view that improvements in tradable sector productivity lead to 
inflation differentials between New and Old Member States. One way of interpreting 
this result is that asymmetric shocks originating in the nontradable sector are more 
important than tradable shocks in explaining inflation differentials between Poland 
and the eurozone.   
 
Therefore, in the context of Polish euro adoption and taking into account the fact that 
nontradable sectors are typically sheltered from international competition, it is 
important to introduce measures which would increase competitiveness in these 
sectors – for example, via lower labour costs, higher factor mobility (labour and 
capital), creation of incentives for adoption of new technologies, deregulation of 
market for services, and release of capacity constraints in the labour market. The 
existence of flexible adjustment mechanisms should contribute to lower volatility of 
the real exchange rate, in turn creating less scope for independent monetary policy. 
Moreover, if price increases in the nontradable sector are caused by large capital 
inflows and are not combined with productivity increases in this sector, this will lead 
to higher inflation in Poland than in the eurozone. This outcome may not be 
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equilibrium phenomena, but rather a sign of overheating pressures – a scenario that 
seems to be playing out in Estonia, for example.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a more complex version of the basic SOE-DSGE model of real 
exchange rate determinants presented in Chapter 2 was put forward. Although, the 
model proposed here can still be classified as a canonical real business cycle model, 
it is augmented by additional channels of real exchange rate movements. In addition 
to the home bias channel and quality factors investigated in the basic model of 
Chapter 2, the model includes incomplete markets, a nontradable sector, and 
distributive trade costs. Next, the model is simulated with the shocks and parameters 
calibrated to the Polish economy.  
 
Unlike standard two-sector DSGE models (see for example Benigno and Theonissen 
(2003)), the model in this chapter generates RER appreciation in response to tradable 
productivity improvements (i.e. consistent with the HBS-like and wealth effects). 
This appreciation is possible despite the depreciation of the country’s terms-of-trade. 
Appreciation of the RER is also possible when the quality shock associated with the 
lower bond holding costs is included in the model. In this case, however, the 
country’s terms-of-trade improves. 
 
It should be noted that real RER appreciation in response to a positive productivity 
shock was previously shown in papers by Corsetti et al. (2008) and Selaive and 
Tuesta (2006), who utilize two-country two-sector symmetric DSGE models. There 
are no papers which show this in a SOE framework – the contribution of this 
chapter. Nontheless, unlike here, in both papers by  
Corsetti et al. (2008) and by Selaive and Tuesta (2006), RER appreciation is 
combined with terms-of-trade improvement. Nonetheless, Theonissen (2006), who 
works with a two-country two-sector symmetric DSGE model with distribution trade 
costs, argues that the appreciation attained by Corsetti et al. (2008) is only possible 
thanks to the utilization of an endogenous discount factor in the model (i.e. closing 
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the model with the cost of bond holdings rules out the possibility of the negative 
transmission mechanism according to Theonissen (2006))166.  
 
Also, unlike in Vilagi (2005), who argues that the HBS-like effect can only be 
achieved in NOEM models when pricing-to-market is incorporated into the model, 
in this chapter it is shown that although the presence of distribution costs (a form of 
pricing-to-market) does contribute to the RER appreciation, it is not essential for this 
appreciation to happen. What is crucial, however, is the existence of wealth effects 
arising in the incomplete market framework (notice that Vilagi’s model assumed 
complete markets) – i.e. for the model calibration, the required appreciation is only 
possible for higher values of bond holdings costs (i.e., when the model moves further 
away from the complete market set-up). When this cost was lowered to the values 
used by Benigno and Theonissen (2003), the real exchange rate did depreciate in 
response to a positive tradable productivity shock (similar to the complete market 
models of Vilagi (2005) and that proposed in Chapter 2).  
 
Another parameter on which the model RER appreciation depends on is the elasticity 
of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods. Although Vilagi (2005) 
concludes that no intermediate degree of international substitution exists that would 
ensure the appreciation of the RER, here, it is shown that such appreciation is not 
only possible, but is also possible for values which are in line with those typically 
used by the IRBC literature (i.e., for values which make goods closer substitutes). 
Indeed, the presence of distribution costs is important here. When distribution costs 
are excluded from the model, the lowest possible value of the elasticity of 
substitution for which the RER appreciates is 1.9. This compares with 1.6 in the 
model with trade costs.  
 
Another notable result obtained from the model simulations is RER volatility and 
persistence, which is shown to match the Polish data fairly well. This is encouraging 
as existing SOE-DSGE models used for policy purposes for the NMSs either do not 
report statistics for the RER, or fail to match its empirical variance (see, for example, 
                                                
 
166
 It should be noted however that Selaive and Tuesta (2006) do obtain a negative transmission 
despite closing the model with bond holding costs. 
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Ravenna and Natalucci (2007) or  Lipińska (2008, 2008a)). Given that the model put 
forward in this chapter was able to explain approximately 80 percent of the RER 
volatility in Poland, the importance of other real shocks could be investigated (for 
example, a fiscal policy shocks could be looked at). However, since in Chapter 1 it 
was shown that to some degree nominal shocks still move the Polish and Czech real 
exchange rates, the observed empirical RER volatility could perhaps be better 
matched by adding nominal rigidities and monetary policy to the model of RER 
determinants for these countries.   
 
In order to ascertain the real exchange rate determinants in Poland, variance 
decomposition analysis was performed. The results run counter to the commonly 
accepted view that improvements in the tradable sector lead to inflation differentials 
between New and Old Member States. The model suggests that tradable productivity 
(and to some degree quality) improvements are only important in explaining 
movements in terms-of-trade. Therefore, although the HBS-like effect is consistent 
with the model, its results do not support the view that asymmetric productivity 
shocks originating in the tradable sector are of relevance for explaining inflation 
differentials between Poland and the eurozone. Quality factor also do not seem to 
matter. Instead, model results point to asymmetries in the nontradable sector. This 
conclusion matches that offered by Altissimo et al. (2005), who find that relative 
variations in productivity in the nontradable sector are the primary cause of price and 
inflation dispersion between the eurozone average and its member countries. Also, 
Rabanal and Tuesta (2006), using Bayesian methods, find that tradable technology 
shocks (and monetary policy shocks) are of little importance in moving RERs.  
 
The importance of the nontradable productivity shock can be perhaps explained by 
the fact that the internal and external RER move in the same direction when the 
economy is hit by that shock. This is not the case when tradable productivity 
improvements occur. In fact, in the onset of the tradable productivity shock, internal 
and external real exchange rates move in the opposite direction diminishing overall 
RER volatility and significance of the tradable component in the RER movements. 
Nonetheless, even if it is true that the importance of the nontradable component 
could be overstated because of the model specifics, it is also true that for the 
reasonable parameter values, the model is able to explain around 70 percent of the 
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variance of the Polish real exchange rate when the economy is hit by supply side 
shocks only. Also, this result is not at odds with the findings of the empirical 
analysis conducted in Section 3.2.1, which found that nontradable component could 
contribute to as much as 60 percent of the RER movements in Poland (i.e. the result 
shown for Betts and Kehoe (2006) price indices).  
 
Of course, these results should be treated with caution as they are highly stylized and 
ignore the possibility of non-stationary shocks. However, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that such permanent productivity shocks are anticipated 
(there is perfect foresight) and as such do not add to the volatility of the investigated 
variables.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In recent years there has been tremendous growth in interest, and in the literature 
addressing the full accession of the NMS into the EMU – in particular to their 
participation in the third stage of monetary union, which is intended to complete the 
project of creating a single European market. This dissertation contributes to this 
literature by proposing a definition of real convergence, which is based on real 
exchange rate dynamics. Because fluctuations in real exchange rates represent 
deviations from the PPP, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on PPP 
theory. Finally, by proposing a SOE-DSGE IRBC model of real exchange rate 
determinants for the NMSs of the EU, it fills a gap that has hitherto existed in the 
literature.  
 
The analysis of real exchange rate dynamics was conducted on two levels: empirical 
and theoretical. On the empirical level, the scale of RER dynamics (with respect to 
the euro) in the NMSs of the EU was measured. Factors contributing to these 
dynamics were identified. On a theoretical level, and motivated by the empirical 
findings, variants of the SOE-DSGE-IRBC equilibrium model of RER determinants 
for a typical NMS of the EU were developed.  
 
The relevance of RER dynamics as an indicator of real convergence in the context of 
the euro adoption was broadly discussed in the Introduction to this thesis and in 
Chapter 1. Given that the RER can be seen as an indicator of underlying economic 
conditions between the particular NMS and the eurozone, it was proposed that - in 
the eurozone candidate countries - real convergence could be measured in terms of 
real exchange rate volatility. Or more precisely, it was argued that the scale of RER 
volatility (against the euro) could be a useful measure of the degree of real 
convergence understood as the degree of symmetry between a particular NMS and 
the eurozone. This is because the lower the degree of real exchange rate volatility, 
the greater the extent of adjustment mechanisms at work other than the nominal 
exchange rate, and/or the lower the exposure of the NMS to asymmetric shocks, 
and/or the greater is the degree of symmetric monetary policy responses between the 
respective NMSs and the eurozone in response to symmetric shocks. Consequently, 
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a less volatile real exchange rate indicates less scope for monetary and exchange 
rate independence. The advantage of using real exchange rate volatility as an 
indicator of real convergence is that it only relies on the assumption that national 
price stability is desirable, and that therefore the flexibility of the nominal exchange 
rate may be justified to avoid changes in the real exchange rate that entail inflation or 
deflation above or below the eurozone average.  
 
To quantify RER volatility in the New and Old Member States of the EU, as well as 
to assess whether the NMSs are converging over time in real terms, in Chapter 1, a 
two-step variance analysis was conducted. In step one, the univariate variance 
analysis of real exchange rates in countries of interest was performed. To measure 
the degree of the RER volatility, the AR(p)-GARCH(p,q) econometric methodology 
was implemented. In step two, a bivariate variance analysis was done, using a BQ-
SVAR methodology. It allowed for an accurate assessment of the degree of real 
convergence in countries of interests by separating and measuring the magnitude of 
real and nominal components in real exchange rate movements. Moreover, to the 
extent that giving up an independent monetary and exchange rate policy constitutes a 
cost of the euro adoption, the BQ-SVAR analysis also helped in evaluating the role 
of the nominal exchange rate in the NMSs in accommodating real asymmetric 
shocks.   
 
The findings of Chapter 1 show that the univariate variance analysis performed in 
the chapter provides an accurate measure of RER volatility in the selected NMSs and 
OMSs, and thus a measure of real convergence. This is because the bivariate 
variance analysis conducted in this chapter revealed that the impact of nominal 
shocks in real exchange rates’ movement at the 3-month forecast horizon in all the 
countries but Poland and the Czech Republic is minimal. Because, in Poland and the 
Czech Republic nominal disturbances are still somewhat significant, the true level of 
real convergence in these countries is in fact larger than suggested by the univariate 
variance analysis. Therefore, based on the developed definition of real convergence 
the following conclusions can be made. First and foremost, there are definite gains to 
the euro adoption by the NMSs of the EU. This is because, as the Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) variance decomposition showed, the nominal component of nominal 
exchange rate movements in counties in question (perhaps with the exception of 
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Slovakia, the  most recent eurozone member) are not insignificant. Nevertheless, 
these shocks, on average, do not move real exchange rates and therefore are not 
destabilizing. Second, the analysis conducted showed that in all countries considered 
except for Slovenia (already a eurozone member), the nominal exchange rate plays a 
shock-stabilising role. In summary, the estimates show that based on the proposed 
definition of real convergence, more effort is needed in reducing idiosyncratic real 
shocks (with the exception of Slovenia167 and Estonia) to lessen the costs of the 
eurozone membership. Immediate euro adoption is therefore perhaps not advisable. 
Instead more effort should be put into enhancing structural reforms.  
 
From the policy point of view, if progress is to be made towards greater real 
convergence in the euro area, it is necessary to understand what generates the 
inflation differentials among the EMU members. To this extent, and given the 
findings of Chapter 1 that that most of the movements in the real exchange rate in 
the NMSs of the EU are real in nature, Chapter 2 and 3 developed variants of SOE-
DSGE IRBC models of real exchange rate determinants for these countries168.  
 
There are two main challenges with building such models. The first challenge is 
related to the fact that international variables in the NMSs (such as terms-of-trade or 
real exchange rates) display a high degree of volatility relative to other 
macroeconomic aggregates. The second challenge is related to the fact that real 
exchange rates in the NMSs record persistent RER appreciation since the early 1990. 
Both of these features of the data for the NMSs are not easy to mirror in standard 
DSGE models. In fact, since volatile and persistent real exchange rates are also 
observed for developed countries, their dynamics are often referred to as ‘puzzles’ 
within the international economics literature. The reason why modelling RER 
appreciation is not easy relates to difficulties in capturing supply side factors 
responsible for RER appreciation in the NMSs – in particular quality and 
productivity changes. This is because, on one hand, the more traditional way of 
                                                
 
167
 As Slovenia is already in the eurozone, it can be said that – based on the proposed indicator – it 
was ready to give up its monetary and exchange rate policy and should benefit from euro adoption. 
On the other hand, Slovakia’s entry into the euro area may have been premature.  
168
 The reasons why the SOE-DSGE models developed in this work do not include nominal rigidities 
and monetary policy are elaborated in Section 2.2. 
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capturing quality changes in the DSGE framework is to include a R&D sector in 
model. As discussed, this approach is not appropriate for the NMSs where R&D 
expenditures are not significant and are mostly borne by multinational firms in their 
country of origin (see van de Klundert and Smulders (1999)). On the other hand, 
although, in the two-sector model, productivity improvements in the tradable sector 
should lead to currency appreciation as predicted by the HBS effect, in the standard 
DSGE models, a positive productivity shock causes a depreciation of external real 
exchange rates, which can more than offset an appreciation caused by the HBS effect 
(Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), Vilagi (2005)).  
 
In this dissertation, the issue of real exchange rate volatility and its persistence were 
addressed within the international real business cycle models. This is because, as 
other research has shown (e.g. Søndergaard (2004)), there is nothing to be gained in 
terms of volatility and persistence from adding nominal rigidities to the standard 
DSGE model. Nevertheless, the basic SOE-DSGE IRBC model put forward in 
Chapter 2, although delivering a fairly persistent real exchange rate, underpredicted 
RER volatility, unless very low vales of elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign traded goods were assumed. Therefore, in Chapter 3 new features were 
introduced. Nontradable goods, incomplete asset market structure and distribution 
trade costs were introduced to the expanded version of the SOE model. Introducing 
these new features did not change the model performance in terms of the RER 
persistence. However, its volatility increased significantly even for the more 
conventional levels of the trade elasticity (volatility essentially doubled even for the 
version of the model which excluded distribution services). Surprisingly, the 
expanded model did not perform so well in terms of matching the volatility of terms-
of-trade. In this respect, the basic model proved better able to explain the empirical 
observations.   
 
The SOE-DSGE IRBC models developed in Chapters 2 and 3 were also successful 
in generating the RER appreciation observed in the NMSs of the EU. It was shown 
that these models can be consistent with explanations of this appreciation both in 
terms of the quality factor (in the one and two-sector models) and the HBS effect (in 
the two-sector model). In particular, it was shown that, in the one-sector model with 
complete markets, quality changes lead to RER improvements. In the two-sector 
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model with incomplete markets these improvements depend, however, on the value 
of the bond holding costs, i.e., they are possible when the costs are lower. The HBS-
like effect in the two-sector SOE-DSGE IRBC model was shown to be possible 
provided higher bond holding costs and more conventional for the IRBC literature 
values for elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods are 
assumed. Although pricing-to-market (in the form of distributive trade costs) did 
contribute to the real exchange rate appreciation, it was not essential for it to happen 
(unlike in Vilagi (2005)). This result is important as, generally, two-sector DSGE 
models have trouble in preserving the HBS-like effect (Benigno and Theonissen 
(2003), Vilagi (2005)).   
 
Given that the basic SOE model put forward in Chapter 2, unlike its expanded 
version of Chapter 3, was only able to roughly match the moments of the Polish data 
for very low levels of elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable 
goods, its findings contribute more to providing further insights into the long-
standing theoretical ‘puzzle’ of RER volatility and its persistence, than to empirical 
policy work. Therefore, from the policy point of view, the conclusions based on the 
results obtained from simulations of the expanded model are of more relevance. The 
expanded model results show that relative variations in productivity in the nontraded 
sector are the main cause of price differentials between Poland and the euro area. 
This is in contrast to the two competing hypothesis that either productivity or quality 
improvements in the tradable sector are the main source of real exchange rate 
appreciation in these countries. Because of the specifics of the extended model of 
Chapter 3, it is possible that the significance of nontradable productivity shocks is 
overstated in the study (see conclusions to Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the findings 
match those of Altissimo et al. (2005) and Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) and support 
the empirical analysis conducted in Section 3.2.1, which showed that the nontradable 
component of RER movements could contribute to as much as 60% of the RER 
movements in Poland. Also, it was shown that for reasonable parameter values, the 
extended model is able to explain around 70 percent of the Polish real exchange rate 
variance when the economy is subjected to supply side shocks only.  
 
Although, both the HBS and qualify factor hypotheses of RER appreciation are 
possible within the framework of the extended model of Chapter 3, the variance 
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decomposition of Chapter 3 showed that neither of them appear to be the cause of 
RER appreciation in Poland. These hypotheses are also not supported by the findings 
of Chapter 1, where it was shown that in response to positive productivity shocks, 
real exchange rates depreciated in Poland and other NMSs. These findings lend 
support to another possible hypothesis which suggests that – consistent with 
Smaghi (2007) – RER appreciation observed the NMSs may be a result of 
overheating pressures. This may be a useful area of future research.  
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ANNEX C.1. REAL EXCHANGE RATE DECOMPOSITION 
 
The approach used to obtain the results shown in Figure 3.1 is described below. 
 
The data for all the calculations is sourced from Eurostat. To calculate price indices 
for the variance decomposition in Graph 1 and 2, monthly data spanning from 
1996M1 to 2007M2 is used. The data used in the decomposition presented in Graph 
3 is of quarterly frequency and spans from 1995Q1 to 2008Q2. All the price indices 
have base year 2000 = 100. They are not seasonally adjusted. 
 
First, the real exchange rate ( tRER ) is decomposed into the traded component TtRER  
(i.e. nominal exchange rate deflated by tradable prices in the eurozone (EURO) and 
Poland), and the relative price component RELtRER  (i.e. the relative price between the 
relative nontradable prices in eurozone and Poland):   
 
(C1) *ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) T RELt t t t tRER NER P P RER RER= + − = +  
 
(notice that the price index for Poland tP  and the eurozone EUROtP  is a geometric 
weighted average of traded, 
,T tP , and nontraded goods prices ,NT tP , respectively: 
, , , ,
ln( ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( ),  ln( ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( )EURO EURO EUROt T t NT t t T t NT tP P P P P Pα α β β= − + = − + ) 
 
Second, the appropriate price indices are identified:  
 
1. Engel’s (1999) indices (i.e. Graph 1 in the main text) 
 
Engel (1999) proposes the following definitions of TtRER and RELtRER : 
 
(C2) 
, ,
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )T EURO POLt t T t T tRER NER P P= + −  
 
where tNER  stands for the nominal exchange rate. 
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(C3) 
, , , ,
(ln( ) ln( )) (ln( ) ln( ))REL EURO EURO POL POLt NT t T t NT t T tRER P P P Pβ α= − − −  
where price indices 
,T tP  and ,NT tP  are calculated from different sub-categories of 
the overall HICP index (CP00).  
 
Services (SERV) and housing (Actual Rentals for Housing, CP041) are classified as 
nontradable and commodities as tradable (GOODS and IGOODS) 169.  
 
(C4) 1 2
,
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )T tP GOODS IGOODS IGOODS
φ φ
φ φ φ φ= − ++ +  
 
(C5) 3 1 2 3
,
1 2 1 2
1( 041) ( 041)
1 1NT t
P SERV CP CPφ φ φ φφ φ φ φ
− − −
= − +
− − − −
 
 
The weights for the particular sub-categories in the total price index are obtained by 
running a similar regression to that of Engel (1999, p.532): 
 
(C6) 
1 2
3 t
(CP00- CP041)= (GOODS- IGOODS- CP041)+ (IGOODS-CP041)+
                              + (SERV- CP041)+
φ φ
φ ε
∆ ∆ ∆
∆
 
 
The estimates from running the regression (C6) show that the weights for the 
particular sub-categories are 1φ =0.2871, 2φ =0.4252, 3φ =0.1968. 
 
2. HICP and PPI indices (i.e. Graph 2 in the main text) 
 
Here, the same decomposition as in Engel (1999) is utilized, but 
,T tP is represented 
by the PPI indices and 
,NT tP  by the HICP indices of currency zones in question, so 
that:  
 
                                                
 
169
 These categories slightly differ from those used by Engel (compare Engel (1999, p. 532)). 
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(C7) 
, ,
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )T EURO POLt t PPI t PPI tRER NER P P= + −  
 
and 
 
(C8) 
, , , ,
(ln( ) ln( )) (ln( ) ln( ))REL EURO EURO POL POLt HICP t PPI t HICP t PPI tRER P P P P= − − −  
 
Using the PPI index for tradable prices has two disadvantages: first, some producer 
goods are most likely to be nontraded; and second, PPI data comes from the different 
survey than HICP data, which means that there may be measurement differences in 
the price of the same good (see Engel (1999) for details).  
 
3. Betts and Khoe’s (2006) indices (i.e. Graph 3 in the main text) 
 
Betts and Kehoe (2006) use annual gross output data to construct internal relative 
prices NTtRER . In particular, they decompose gross output into primaries, 
manufactures, and services. They compute the traded fraction of the value of gross 
output in each of these three sectors (more then 10 percent of the gross output value 
has to be traded in order for the particular sector to be classified as traded, as in 
Gregorio et al. (1994)), and derive the nontraded NTtRER as a difference between 
tRER  (the aggregate price index for the country is equal to the nominal total gross 
output divided by real total gross output) and TtRER  (defined as in (C2)) so that: 
 
(C9) 
, ,
(ln( ) ln( )) (ln( ) ln( ))NT POL POL EURO EUROt T t t T t tRER P P P P= − − −  
 
The advantage of this decomposition – as compared to that above – is that there is no 
need to directly measure the relative price of nontraded goods to capture their impact 
on real exchange rate determination.  
 
Given data availability, in this chapter the data on quarterly Gross Value Added 
(GVA) is used instead of GDP. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Betts and Kehoe 
(2006), the GVA deflators are net of the value of intermediate goods and thus do not 
really measure production prices of sectoral outputs.  
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To obtain sectoral GVA (DEF) the economy is divided into two sectors: tradable and 
nontradable. The tradable sector comprises industry, less construction, agriculture, 
forestry and fishing – i.e. sections A, B, C, D and E of the NACE classification of 
economic activity. The nontadable sector consists of all other sectors (i.e., F-P).   
 
,T tP  is represented by the value added deflator for the tradable sector (DEF_T) of the 
economy. It is constructed by dividing the sectoral value added in current prices by 
the sectoral value added in constant prices. The sectoral weights (A, B, C, D, E) in 
the total value added are calculated using constant prices.  
 
Then, TtRER  and 
REL
tRER reads as: 
 
(C10) 
_ , _ ,
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )T EURO POLt t DEF T t DEF T tRER NER P P= + −  
 
(C11) 
, _ , , _ ,
(ln( ) ln( )) (ln( ) ln( ))REL POL POL EURO EUROt DEF t DEF T t DEF t DEF T tRER P P P P= − − −  
 
 
ANNEX C.2. PRICE INDEX AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
 
Households solve two allocation problems. They need to decide how to allocate 
consumption between tradable and nontradable goods as well as how to allocate 
tradable consumption between home and foreign goods.  
 
The CES price aggregator tP  (equation (3.7) in the main text) can be derived from 
the following household minimum expenditure problem: 
 
(C12) 
                             
, ,
1 1 1 1 1
                           min
s.t. ( ) (1 )
t tt
t T t NT t
C PC
C C C
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε εγ γ
− −
− 
= + − 
  
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(C13) 
, , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1
+ ( ) (1 )NT t NT t T t T t t t T t NT tP C P C C C CL
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε εγ γµ
− −
−
 
  
+ − + −  
    
=   
 
Note: Solving for the Lagrangian multiplier tµ  is equivalent to solving for the home 
goods price index tP  since tµ  is a proxy for the amount required to purchase one 
extra unit of consumption basket tC  (i.e.,  t tPµ = ). 
First order conditions are: 
(C14) ( ) ( ), ,
NT,t
1
-1
1-:  - 1-NT t t t NT t
L P C C
C
ε εγµ∂
∂
 
(C15) ( ), , ,
,
1 1
1-:  -T t t t T t
T t
L P C C
C
ε εγµ
−∂
∂
 
(C16) 
, ,
1 1 1 1 1
:  ( ) (1 )T t NT t t
t
L C C C
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε εγ γ
µ
− −
− ∂
+ − = ∂   
 
 
(C14), (C15), (C16) can be re-written as: 
 
(C14a) ( )( ), , 1-NT t NT t t tC P Cε εγ µ−=  
(C15a) ( )
, ,
-
 T t T t t tC P C
ε εγ µ=  
(C16a) 
, ,
1 1 1 1 1
 ( ) (1 ) 1T t NT t tC C C
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε εγ γ
− −
− 
+ − = = 
  
 
where (C14a) and (C15a) are final demand functions for nontradable and tradable 
consumption goods. 
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Now, substituting (C14a) and (C15a) into (C16a), it is possible to solve for tµ  and 
thus tP (which is the equation (3.7) in the main text). The CES price aggregator ,T tP  
(see equation (3.8) in the main text) can be derived analogically (see also  
Annex B.1). 
 
Individual Demand Functions  
 
Individual demand functions for the representative consumer s are obtained from the 
optimal allocation of expenditure across H, NT and F goods. 
(C17) 
, ,
,
0
1
, ,
0
1 1
min ( ) ( )     
1
. . ( )j
j
j j
j
n
j t j tj t
n
j t j t
C P j C j di
s t C C j dj
n
σ
σ
σ σ
σ
−
− 
  ≡    
 
∫
∫
                              ,j H NT=  
(C18) 
1
, , , , ,
0 0
1 1
1( ) ( )    + ( )j
j
j j
j
n n
j t j t j t j t j tL P j C j dj C C j dj
n
σ
σ
σ σ
σµ
−
−
 
     −      
   
∫ ∫=   
First order conditions are: 
(C19) ( )( ), , ,
,
1
:  C ( )( )
jj
j t j t t j
j t
L j C P j
C j n
σσµ −∂ =
∂
 
(C20) :
t
L
µ
∂
∂
1
, ,
0
1 1
1 ( )j
j
j j
j
n
j t j tC C j dj
n
σ
σ
σ σ
σ
−
− 
  =    
 
∫  
 
To solve for 
,j tµ it is enough to substitute (C20) into (C19): 
(C21) 
, , ,
0
1
111 ( )
n
j t j t j t
jjP j dj P
n
σσµ
−
−
=
  
=   
  
∫  
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So that the individual demand for the unique good 
,
( )j tC j  can be written as: 
(C22) ,
, ,
,
( )1( )
j
j t
j t j t
j t
P j
C j C
n P
σ−
 
=   
 
 
Individual demand for the unique good 
,
( )F tC f  can be obtained in the similar 
manner, i.e. by solving the following household’s minimum expenditure problem: 
(C23) 
1
,
1
1
, ,
11
min ( ) ( )     
1
. . ( )
1
F
F
FF
F
F FF t
n
F t F t
n
C P f C f df
s t C C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
σ
−
− 
  ≡   
− 
 
∫
∫
 
(C24) 
1
1 1
, , ,
11
1( ) ( )    + ( )
1
F
F
FF
F
F F F t F t F t
n n
L P f C f df C C f df
n
σ
σ
σσ
σµ
−
−
 
    
−   
−  
   
∫ ∫=   
So that: 
(C25) ,
, ,
,
( )1( )
1
F t
F t F t
F t
P f
C f C
n P
σ−
 
=   
−  
 
 
To obtain equation (3.18) from the main text, it is enough to substitute (C14a) into 
(C22). To obtain equations (3.19) and (3.20) of the main text it is however necessary 
to derive demand functions for home and foreign tradable goods from the following 
minimization problem: 
 
(C26) 
, ,                              
,
, , ,
1 11 1 1
                       min
. . ( ) (1 )
T t T tT t
T t H t F t
C P C
s t C C C
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φλ λ
− −
− 
=  + − 
  
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, , , , , , , ,
1 11 1 1
+ ( ) (1 )H t H t F t F t T t T t H t F tL P C P C C C C
φ
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φµ λ λ
− −
−
 
  
+ −  + −  
   
 
=   
They are respectively: 
(C27) ,
, ,
,
 
H t
H t T t
T t
P
C C
P
φ
λ
−
 
=   
 
 
(C28) ( ) ,
, ,
,
 1- F tF t T t
T t
P
C C
P
φ
λ
−
 
=   
 
 
 
Substitution of (C15a) into (C27) and (C28) yields: 
(C29) , ,
,
,
 
H t T t
H t t
T t t
P P
C C
P P
φ ε
λγ
−
−
   
=     
  
 
(C30) , ,
,
,
 (1- ) F t T tF t t
T t t
P P
C C
P P
φ ε
λ γ
−
−
   
=     
  
 
 
Finally, substituting (C29) and (C30) into (C22) and (C25), respectively, brings 
equations (3.19) and (3.20) . 
 
ANNEX C.3. FOREIGN COUNTRY TRADABLE OUTPUT 
 
The production function for the tradable output *
,
( )F tY f  for a large economy takes a 
CES form, as is the case of the SOE. However, given that SOE does not affect the 
large country, foreign output comprises of the domestic value added *
,F tVA and 
intermediate domestic input *tD .  
(C31) 
1 11 1 1
* *
,
* *
, ,
(1 )( )
F
F F F
F F F F
F F t F tF t F tY f Y VA D
µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ µυ υ
− −
− 
+ − 
  
= =                         
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Domestic value added for the large economy evolves in accordance with the 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function of primary factors, capital *
,F tK  and 
labour *
,F tN : 
 
(C32) 1* * * *
, , , 1 ,( ) ( )F FF t F t F t F tVA A K Nα α−−=                   
 
From the cost minimisation similar to that described by the equation (3.43) for the 
SOE, the following ratio is obtained: 
 
(C33) 
* * * *
, , 1 , ,
1
F t F t F t F t
F F
R K W N
α α
−
=
−
 
 
as well as a functional form determining demand for the domestic intermediate  
good *tD :  
(C34) 
* *
, ,
* * *
, ,
1
1 *
,(1 ) ( ) FFD t F t FP P
F t F t t
F tY fP MC
P P D
µµυ
 
 = −
 
 
 
where *
,D tP  is the foreign currency price of the domestic intermediate good and 
*
,F tMC is the marginal cost of production in the foreign tradable sector. 
 
Foreign demand for the intermediate imported good is not modelled explicitly. It is 
assumed that the following ad hoc equation determines the demand for this good 
(i.e., it resembles the SOE demand equation for imported intermediate good): 
 
(C35) 
* *
, ,
* * *
, ,
1
1 *
,(1 ) ( ) FFM t F t FP P
F t F t t
F tY fP MC
P P M
µµυ
 
 = −
 
 
 
 
where *
,M tP  is the foreign currency price of the imported intermediate good, and 
*
tM represents the quantity. Fυ and Fµ are assumed to be the same as for the 
domestic economy. 
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*
,M tP  is at the world price level and also represents the purchase price of foreign 
intermediate goods paid by domestic importers. It is given exogenously. Thus, in the 
symmetric equilibrium, *t tM M= . 
 
 
ANNEX C.4. DEMAND ELASTICITY AND DISTRIBUTION COSTS 
 
Equation (3.21) from the main text can be re-written as:   
(C36) 
1 1
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
1 ( )
1
P
F t F t NT t H t H t
P
H t H t NT t F t F t
P P P C C
G t
P P P C C
φ φζ λ ω
ζ λ ω
     +
−
= = = =          + −     
 
 
Now log-linearizing the equality G(t), i.e., ( ), , , , ,, , ( , )P PH t F t NT t H t F tG P P P f C C=  leads to 
 
(C37)  
 ( )  ( )  ( ), 0 , 0 , 0 0, , , , , ,
, 0 , 0
P
P P P PF t F t NT t t
F t H t F t H t H t F t
H t H t
P P P GP P P P C C
P P
ζ
φ
= = = =
= =
−
− = − ≅ −  
 
Since in the steady-state 
 
, 0 , 0 , 0 t=0 and thus G 1H t F t T tP P P= = == = =  
 
The above comes down to 
 
(C38)  ( ) ( )  ( )  ( ), 0 , , , , , ,
, 0
11 1
P P P PNT t D
F t H t F t H t H t F t
H t
P
P P P P C C
P
ζ µ φ
=
=
 
− − = − − ≅ −  
 
 
 
and  
 
(C39)  ( ) ( )  ( ), , , ,11P PF t H t H t F tDP P C Cφ µ− ≅ −−  as in Corsetti et al. (2008) 
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where ( )1 Dφ µΩ = −  is the price elasticity of imports (or elasticity of substitution 
between H and F tradable goods adjusted for the presence of distribution costs). 
 
Recall that terms-of-trade and the producer level equals the price ratio of the 
imported and domestic tradable good at the wholesale level, ,
,
P
F tP
t P
H t
P
T
P
= , which in a 
log linear form is 
 
(C40)   , ,P P Pt F t H tT P P= −  
 
So that  
 
(C41)  ( )  ( ), ,11Pt H t F tDT C Cφ µ≅ −−  
 
Therefore, as discussed in Corsetti et al. (2008), increasing distribution margins Dµ  
lowers the implied price elasticity of elasticity of substitution between H and F 
tradable goods Ω . Moreover, for the terms-of-trade to appreciate, either a positive 
productivity shock has to induce an increase in consumption of foreign goods (i.e. 
via wealth effect) which is larger than the increase in consumption of home tradable 
goods, or distribution margins would have to be larger than 100. 
 
ANNEX C.5. OPTIMAL PRICING PROBLEM FOR THE DOMESTIC TRADABLE FIRM 
 
The tradable goods’ producers’ profit maximization problem (3.49) can be re-written 
as: 
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(C42) 
, , ,
,
,
, , ,
* ,
, ,
,
* * *
*, , , , ,
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H t
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 
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 
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H
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H t
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P
Y
P
σ
ζ
−
+
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
           
 
 
(C43) 
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+
1
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d
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 
=  
 
 
which can be re-witten as: 
(C44) 
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σ
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,
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P
 
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 
 
 
,,
and simplified to (i.e.,   and  cancels out):H tdH tY P  
(C45) 
( ), , ,
,
,
( ) 1
: (1 )( ) (1 ) ( )( )
             0
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H t P
H H H H t NT t
H t t t
H t
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P h P P
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τ σ τ ζ
σ
∂
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Now, re-arranging the above, it can be shown that 
,
( )PH tP h  (in real terms) is a 
function of   
,
 H tMC  and ,NT tP : 
 
(C46) , , ,( ) 1 1
11 1
P
H t H t NT tH
t H H H t
P h MC P
P P P
ζσ
σ τ σ
= +
− − −
 
 
 
(C47) 
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=  
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which can be simplified to: 
 
(C48) ,* * *
, ,
*
,
: (1 )( 1) ( ) (1 )
( )
H t
t H H H t H t t H NT t
tH t
MCQ P i P Q P
PP i
τ σ σ τ ζ∂ − − + = − − −
∂
 
and re-arragned to:
 
 
(C49) 
* *
, , ,
* *
( ) 1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
H t H t NT tH
t H H t t H t
P i MC P
P Q P P
ζσ
σ τ σ
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Recall that 
 
,
1
11
NT
NT t NTNT t
NT t
t NT NT t
P MC
mk mc
P P
σ
σ τ
= =
− −
 
 
where 1
11
NT
NT
NT NT
mk σ
σ τ
=
− −
 
 
so finally: 
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(C50) 
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and 
 
(C51) 
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σ ζ τ
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−
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= +  
− − − 
 
 
 
ANNEX C.6. REAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOG-LINEARIZATION 
 
Log-linearization is obtained in a standard way, by using a first order Taylor 
approximation around the steady state, i.e. it can be shown that the log-linear form 
of: 
 
 ( ) , )(t t tg Z X Yf=   
 where tX , tY  and tZ  are strictly positive variables 
 
is: 
[ ]' 1 2( ) (0) ( (0),  (0)) (0)   ( (0),  (0)) (0) t t tg Z Z z f X Y X x f X Y Y y  = +   
 
where (0)X , (0)Y , (0)Z are time 0 (steady-state) values 
 
In order to log-linearize the real exchange rate equation without distribution services:  
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the following steps are taken: 
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Partial derivatives with respect to foreign variables: 
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Partial derivatives with respect to  home variables: 
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1
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T T T T
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P P P P
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−
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 ∂ ∂
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Notice: 
LHS  = 
* * * *
, , , ,* * * *
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
( , ) ( , )
, , , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , )(
H t F t NT t T t
H t F t NT t T t H t F t NT t T t
H t F t NT t T t
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RHS = *, )( t tP Pg  
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=
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
 
 
* 1 * *
1
* *
0
(1 ) (1 )
: F
F F Ft
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P P XY XY P
φλ λ− −
=
−∂ ∂ −
= =
∂ ∂
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*
* 1
1 * * *
* * * *
0
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NT
T F
NT NT T F Tt
PBB A
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ε
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−
−
=
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= =
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−∂ ∂  
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∂ ∂
 
 
1 *
1
2 2
0
1
: H F
H H Ft
X ABP Pf X AB
P P Y X XY P
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=
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− = − = − ∂ ∂  
 
 
1 *
1
2 2
0
(1 ) (1 )
: F F
F F Ft
X ABP Pf X AB
P P YX YX P
φλ λ− −
=
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−
=
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1
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ε
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−
=
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Now, log-linearization of the RHS is: 
 
* * * * * *
, , , , , ,* * *
, ,0 0 0
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, 00
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




=
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 
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To log-linearize the LHS of the equation, since it contains only multiplicative terms, 
one can use a faster procedure:  
* * * * *
* *
*
/ (0) / (0)log log( ) log( (0)) (log( ) log( (0))
/ (0) / (0)
t t t
t t
t t t
t t
P P P P PLHS P P P P
P P P P P
LHS p p
 
= = = = − − − 
 
= −
 
Since LHS=RHS, we have 
 
  ( )  ( )    * ** * *, , , , , ,(1 )( ) ( 1)( )t t F t H t NT t T t NT t T tp p p p p p p pλ λ γ γ− = − − + − − + − −  
 
Or with the symmetric home bias in both countries, i.e., * (1 )λ λ= − , and further 
assuming *γ γ= : 
 
(C52)   ( )  ( ) ( )
 ( )
 ( )
, ,*
, , * *
, ,
2 1 1
T t NT t
t t F t H t
T t NT t
p p
p p p p
p p
λ γ
 
− +
 
− = − − + −  
− − 
 
 
 
Note that within this (well known) decomposition, deviations from PPP can occur 
because of the home bias channel, because H and F goods are at least imperfect 
substitutes, or because of the differences in the relative price of tradables to 
nontradables between the countries  ( )  * *  T NT T NTp p p p  − ≠ −      . Moreover, unless 
different elasticities of demand for the same good across countries are allowed for, 
the LOOP holds in the model without distribution services. 
 
ANNEX C.7. STEADY-STATE CHARACTERIZATION 
 
The non-stochastic steady-state is defined with a zero inflation rate. The small open 
economy is presented as a limiting case of a two-country symmetric model, i.e. it is 
assumed that n=0 and home bias (1 )λ ω= − . Unless indicated otherwise, for steady-
state values subscript t is dropped. The steady-state is solved analytically.  
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In the steady-state, all shocks are constant and normalized to one:  
1 1
1NT H NT TA A
ϕ ϕχ χ
− −
= = = =  
 
Gross steady-state domestic real interest rate is: 
 
(1 ) 1/r β+ =
 
 
Sectoral rental rates for capital are: 
 
1 (1 )jKr rδ δβ= − − = +
 
 
Capital accumulation evaluated at the steady-state yields the investment to capital 
ratio in both sectors equal to its rate o depreciation: 
 
j
j
I
K
δ=
 
 
Steady-state labor supply L  is fixed to be 0.3 (a standard value in the literature), 
sectoral labor supplies between the small open economy and a large country 
equalize:  
*
*
NT NT
H F
N N
N N
=
=
 
  
Given that all shocks are constant in the steady-state, factor prices and shares of 
capital equalize in the H and NT sectors. Hence it must be true that: 
 
NT T MMC MC P= =  
It is also true that: 
 
(1 )H H
H H
M Y
VA Y
υ
υ
= −
=
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Sectoral markups in the steady-state equalize and are equal to: 
 
( 1)
( 1)(1 )
NT
NT
NT NT
mk σ
σ τ
 −
=  
− − 
 
 
*( 1)
* 1( 1)(1 )
NTH
H
H H H
mk
mk ζσ
σ τ σ
   −
= +  
− −   
 
 
Then, it can be shown that: 
 
*
*
*
/T T NT H
NT NT
P P
R R mk mk
P P
ζ= = = = +  
 
and that: 
 
*
*
*
1F H
H F
P PT T
P P
= = = =  
 
Now, using the definitions of price indices we can define the following price ratios: 
 
( )( ) 11 1( (1 ) 1H
T
P
T
P
φ φλ λ − −= + − =   
1
1 1( (1 ) 1F
T
P
T
P
φ φλ λ− − = + − = 
 
 
( )( ) 11 1( (1 )H F TP P P RP P P ε εγ γ − −= = = + −      ( )
1
1 1( (1 )NTP R
P
ε εγ γ− −= + −  
 
For the large country, these price ratios are defined analogously. 
 
The share of NT output relative to the H can be calculated using the demand 
functions and market clearing conditions: 
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( )*
(1 )
(1 )
NT T
N
H T
P P
P PY
Y P
P
ε ε
ε
γ ζγ
ω γ ωγ
− −
−
    
 − +       
=
  
 − +     
  
 
Having established this relationship, it is easy to calculate the relative size of sectors. 
 
 
ANNEX C.8. ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FACED BY EACH PRODUCER IN THE 
TRADABLE SECTOR 
 
To ensure that the markups in the steady state equalize, the elasticity of demand 
faced by each producer in the tradable sector Hσ  is set as follows. 
 
Recall that in the steady-state sectoral markups are equal to: 
 
1
11
NT
NT
NT NT
mk σ
σ τ
=
− −
 
 
(1 )1 1
11
H H
H NT
H H H
mk mkσ ζ τ
σ τ σ
 
−
= + 
− −  
 
 
Now, since they are required to equalize (i.e., NT Hmk mk= ), the following problem 
needs to be solved for Hσ : 
 
(1 )1 1 1 1
11 11 11 11
NT NTH H H
NT NT H H H H H NT NT
σ σσ σ ζ τ
σ τ σ τ σ τ σ σ τ
−
= +
− − − − − − − −
 
 
Given that sectoral tax rates are the same, the above can be simplified to: 
 
1
1 1 1 1
NT NTH
NT H H NT
σ σσ ζ
σ σ σ σ
= +
− − − −
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Which can be re-arranged to show that: 
 
( )1H NTσ σ ζ= +  
 
 
ANNEX C.9. CALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES   
 
Table C.1 Baseline Parameter Values 
Description Symbol Value 
Intertemporal discount factor β 0.99 
Coefficient of risk aversion ρ 5 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply η 0.3 
Elasticity of substitution between T and NT goods ε 0.44 
Elasticity of substitution between H and F goods ϕ 2 
Share of  T goods in the consumption and investment γ 0.4 
Price elasticity of demand in the H sector σH 9.6 
Price elasticity of demand in the NT sector σNT 6 
Distribution margins µD
 
37.5% 
Distribution parameter ζ 0.6 
Steady-state revenue tax (in H and NT sectors) τ 0.1 
Mark-up µ 1.33 
Home bias λ 0.7 
Degree of openness ω 0.3 
Capital shares in the H and NT sectors α 0.4 
Steady-state capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 
Adjustment cost in changing capital stock ν 3 
Impact of quality changes on marginal cost of the firm ι 0.1 
Cost of undertaking positions in the international asset NFA_P 0.007 
 
           Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
